P5+1 Heartache Over Iran

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07/06/2012

P5+1 Heartache Over Iran

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Details emerge on Iran’s priorities in nuclear talks

Iran says it is willing to lower uranium enrichment levels to end sanctions. But it also set out red lines in PowerPoint presentation at recent Moscow talks.

By Scott Peterson, Staff writer / July 6, 2012

An oil tanker loads gas in Assaluyeh seaport at the Persian Gulf, 870 miles south of Tehran in this May 27, 2006 file photo. Iran will see its July oil exports more than halved from regular levels seen last year because tough new Western sanctions are stifling flows and costing Tehran more than $3 billion in lost revenue per month.

Morteza Nikoubazl/Reuters/File

Istanbul, Turkey

Details are emerging about the content of Iran‘s nuclear talks with world powers, days after a 15-hour marathon meeting of technical experts in Istanbul, which show the two sides poles apart but engaged on substantive issues.

Ending 20-percent enrichment

The second point discussed in Istanbul was the P5+1 demand that Iran close down its enrichment facility at Fordow, which is deeply buried underground, difficult to attack, and home to Iran’s 20 percent enrichment.

“My first impression is that there is room to be optimistic, as long as both sides need to calm the situation, because it is getting out of control,” says an Iranian official familiar with the talks, who asked not to be further identified.

At the negotiating table, Iran “clearly for the first time” offered to exchange 20-percent enrichment for lifting of sanctions, says the Iranian official. That indirectly echoes Iran’s PowerPoint proposal, which states that Iran “will cooperate with the 5+1 to provide enriched [20 percent] fuel,” and expects the P5+1 will in return “terminate the sanctions and will remove Iran’s nuclear file from the [UN Security Council] agenda.”

“We said the issue of 20-percent could be a matter of discussion, when the [final] result was known, if they said what they are going to give us in return – a full lifting of sanctions,” says the Iranian official. “We said all of them, though it could be done part by part.”

On the other side, the P5+1 say they need to see Iran take confidence-building measures first, before real bargaining can begin.

“So far, we have not seen a willingness by the Iranians to do anything else than talk, write letters, and gesture,” says a Western diplomat close to the talks. “There is a real sense among the P5+1 that we’re going to have to see some action … from the Iranians.”

“It’s not that we are inflexible, but there is a sense that before we get into the flexibility, they have to do more than just talk,” says the Western diplomat.

Economic pain

The sanctions have damaged Iran’s economy and have tightened in recent days, with a European Union oil embargo and more US measures coming into effect. Sanctions relief is not among incentives of the P5+1 package, and many of the escalating American measures imposed by Congress require more than Iranian movement on its nuclear case in order to be lifted.

On the last page of the Iranian response document is a cryptic line in quotations marks, apparently referring to the P5+1 package, which reads with ellipses: “The United States is prepared to … adjust its sanctions policy….”

Of the four main objectives listed at the top of Iran’s PowerPoint proposal, the first is to “normalize Iran’s nuclear file” at the UN and with its nuclear watchdog agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “by termination of the UNSC, unilateral, and multilateral sanctions against Iran.”

“We said we need a quick response…. We warned them that tomorrow it may not be the case that 20 percent [enrichment] is still the issue,” says the Iranian official, noting some calls in Tehran to raise the level of enrichment – an unlikely and provocative step.

“We said closing Fordow is completely out of the question, and provided the explanation that it is not a military base and is under safeguard by the IAEA,” he says. “So there is no need to close it, it is not a matter of concern.”

That point is made in Iran’s official presentations. Stating that there is “no limitation” to IAEA access at Fordow, the documents add that “sustained threats” against Iran’s nuclear program and the assassination of a number of its scientists make protection of sensitive facilities “necessary.”

Threats

“Facing constant threats, we need a backup facility to safeguard our enrichment activities,” Iran’s document states. Iran further suggested that it has plans for “at least four other research reactors,” and therefore needed a steady supply of 20 percent enriched uranium to make fuel for them.

Iran further stated that there was no reason to ship its current stockpile out of the country, because it was already under IAEA “supervision” and “seal” inside Iran – and would be so anywhere else.

Underpinning the Iranian position, according to the PowerPoint presentation and document – a third, shorter PowerPoint about the legal implications of the fatwa by Iran’s top religious authority rejecting nuclear weapons has not yet been made public – is that both sides move forward “step by step” in a reciprocal, simultaneous and balanced way.

The documents also say Iran is committed to both rights and obligations under the NPT, which include removing doubt about longstanding accusations of past weapons-related work, and accepting more intrusive inspections. While dismissing those charges as “baseless accusations and ambiguities,” the PowerPoint says Iran will “transparently cooperate” with the IAEA to clear up “possible military dimensions.”

Under the title: “A framework for comprehensive and targeted dialogue for long term cooperation among 7 countries,” Iran calls for top negotiators – Saeed Jalili for Iran and EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton for the P5+1 – to meet every three months.

Barely mentioned is that the P5+1 also requires Iran to suspend all enrichment – including the bulk of its work, at 3.5 percent purity for nuclear fuel – in keeping with UN Security Council and IAEA resolutions. Iran has always rejected such a move.

Critical for “guaranteeing the success” of the talks, reads one Iranian PowerPoint slide, is that both sides “clearly set the ultimate outcome of the talks” up front – meaning, in Iran’s view, that the P5+1 agree to lift all sanctions by the end of the process, and “normalize” Iran’s nuclear efforts.

But many of Iran’s official positions are unacceptable to the P5+1, just as many P5+1 proposals are unacceptable to Iran. Any common ground will be chewed over at the next meeting, between deputies of the top negotiators, on a date not yet specified.

“We’ve come up with a pretty good package with which, if they take it at face value, we could be trundling down a productive path for both of us,” says the Western diplomat. “The most important carrot is a process toward rehabilitation, respect, and acknowledgment, of which the immediate steps are meant to get down the track to that wider, comprehensive arrangement.”

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History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue

Press Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Nonproliferation Analyst, (202) 463-8270 x102

Updated: April 2012

Diplomatic initiatives to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue have produced several proposals for a negotiated settlement or to build confidence between Iran and the international community. Thus far, none of those proposals have gained acceptance from all of the involved parties and efforts to address Iran’s nuclear program continue. As Iran progresses down a path towards a nuclear-weapons capability, the difficulties in finding a compromise that would protect against a nuclear-armed Iran while being acceptable to the leadership in Tehran have grown.

Tehran devised a number of these proposals between 2003 and 2005, some of which included provisions to initially limit operations at its key nuclear facilities and implement transparency measures for its nuclear activities. Iran’s IAEA envoy Ali Asghar Soltanieh said during a September 2011 Arms Control Today interview however, that those proposals are “obsolete.” Since that time, proposals offered by Iran have generally not addressed concerns that it is seeking a nuclear-weapons capability.

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the EU3) also offered Iran several proposals to resolve the nuclear issue during negotiations with Iran in 2004 and 2005. China, Russia, and the United States joined the three European countries in 2006 as part of a format known as the “P5+1”—in reference to the permanent five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany—offering similar comprehensive proposals to Iran. The P5+1 have described their negotiations with Tehran regarding these proposals as one track of a “dual track strategy” to address Iran’s nuclear program. The second track consists of Security Council resolutions which impose sanctions on Iran and demand that it suspend all uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, as well as construction of a heavy water reactor.¹ The West fears that Iran might enrich uranium to high levels necessary for use in nuclear weapons, or reprocess spent nuclear fuel to acquire plutonium for weapons.

Recent initiatives have focused more on short-term confidence-building measures rather than a negotiated agreement resolving the nuclear issue, with the goal of bridging the trust deficit between the two sides before entering more difficult and long-term negotiations.

Spring 2003 Proposal

According to Tim Guldimann, former Swiss ambassador to Tehran, Iran issued a proposal to the United States in May 2003 calling for negotiations on a variety of contentious issues between the two countries. The document listed a number of agenda items that the two countries would negotiate and proposed the creation of three parallel working groups to carry out negotiations on disarmament, regional security, and economic cooperation. Key among the agenda items were:

Relief of all U.S. sanctions on Iran
Cooperation to stabilize Iraq
Full transparency over Iran’s nuclear program, including the Additional Protocol
Cooperation against terrorist organizations, particularly the Mujahedin-e Khalq and al-Qaeda
Iran’s acceptance of the Arab League’s 2002 “land for peace” declaration on Israel/Palestine
Iran’s full access to peaceful nuclear technology, as well as chemical and bio-technology

The Bush administration dismissed the proposal in favor of placing additional pressure on Iran.

EU3-Iran Proposals

Several months later, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom agreed to discuss with Iran a range of nuclear, security, and economic issues as long as Tehran suspended work on its uranium enrichment program and cooperated fully with an investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, that agreement unraveled the following year when Tehran continued work on uranium conversion, the precursor to enrichment. Iran then agreed with the EU3 in November 2004 to implement a more stringent suspension. Negotiations between the two sides began shortly afterward.

Iran presented four proposals during the course of these negotiations. In addition to Iran’s nuclear program, the proposals covered subjects such as Tehran’s support for terrorist organizations, regional security issues, and economic cooperation.

The Iranian proposals were as follows:

January 17, 2005 This Iranian proposal to the EU3/Iran Political and Security Working Group outlined commitments on both sides in general terms, including:

An Iranian commitment not to pursue weapons of mass destruction
A rejection of any attacks, threats of attack, or sabotage of Iran’s nuclear facilities
Cooperation on combating terrorism, including intensifying the exchange of information and the denial of safe havens
Regional security cooperation, including on Iraq and Afghanistan
Cooperation on strategic trade controls and the EU removal of restrictions on transfers of conventional arms and dual use goods to Iran

March 23, 2005

The Iranian proposal to the EU3/Iran steering committee in March provided greater detail into the “objective guarantees” Iran was willing to discuss regarding its nuclear program, including:

Iran’s adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol and continuous on-site inspections at key facilities
Limiting the expansion of Iran’s enrichment program and a policy declaration of no reprocessing
Immediately converting all enriched uranium to fuel rods
An EU declaration recognizing Iran as a major source of energy for Europe
Iran’s guaranteed access to advanced nuclear technology along with contracts for the construction of nuclear plants in Iran by the EU
Normalizing Iran’s status under G8 export controls

April 29, 2005

In April Iran’s proposal repeated some of the items in the March proposal, but focused more on short-term confidence-building measures than long term resolutions. Its key terms included:

Iran’s adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol
A policy declaration of no reprocessing by Iran
Continued enrichment suspension for six months
Establishment of joint task forces on counter-terrorism and export control
An EU declaration recognizing Iran as a major source of energy for Europe

July18, 2005

Iranian Message from Hassan Rowhani, then-Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In his statement Rohani proposes:

An agreement on initial limitations on uranium enrichment at Natanz
Negotiations for the full-scale operation of Natanz
Arrangements to import material for uranium conversion and the export of UF6
Negotiation of an “optimized” IAEA monitoring mechanism for Natanz

In August 2005 the three European countries presented their own comprehensive proposal for a long-term agreement, outlining the following:

Arrangements for the assured supply of low enriched uranium for any light water reactors constructed in Iran
Establishing a buffer store of nuclear fuel located in a third country
A commitment by Iran not to pursue fuel cycle technologies, reviewable after 10 years
A legally binding commitment by Iran not to withdraw from the NPT and Iran’s adoption of the Additional Protocol
Arrangements for Iran to return spent nuclear fuel to supplier countries
EU recognition of Iran as a long-term source of fossil fuel energy
EU-Iran cooperation in a variety of political-security areas, including Iraq and Afghanistan, terrorism, and drug trafficking

Iran rejected that proposal days later, claiming that it did not recognize Iran’s right to enrichment. Tehran proceeded with uranium conversion, breaking the suspension agreement with the EU3 and ending negotiations.

In order to support Iran’s talks with the EU, Russia proposed to Iran in October 2005 that Tehran share ownership of a uranium-enrichment plant located in Russia. Following months of discussions on that proposal, Iran ultimately rejected it in March 2006.

P5+1 Proposals

China, Russia, and the United States joined the three EU3 countries in June 2006 to offer another proposal for comprehensive negotiations with Iran. The proposal mirrored some of the previous offers for negotiations and included the following key points:

Iran’s suspension of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities
The establishment of a mechanism to review this moratorium
Iran’s resumption of the Additional Protocol
The provision of state-of-the-art light water reactors to Iran through joint projects, along with nuclear fuel guarantees and a 5-year buffer stock of fuel
Suspension of the discussion of Iran’s nuclear program in the UN Security Council
Cooperation on civil aviation, telecommunications, high-technology, and agriculture, and other areas, between the United States, EU, and Iran

Tehran responded to this proposal in August 2006. It rejected the terms of the proposal due to its requirement that Iran suspend its enrichment-related activities, but noted that the proposal contained “useful foundations and capacities for comprehensive and long-term cooperation between the two sides.” It did not, however, identify what those useful foundations were.

In March 2008, the P5+1 agreed to “repackage” the June 2006 proposal in order to specify some of the benefits that they would offer Iran as part of a long-term agreement on its nuclear program and to better demonstrate the nature of those benefits to the Iranian public. This agreement to revise the 2006 proposal coincided with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1803, the third UN sanctions resolution on Iran.

Before that package was formally submitted to Iran, however, Tehran issued its own proposal to the six-country group. While the Iranian proposal also called for comprehensive negotiations leading to cooperation on nuclear energy, and political and economic concerns, it offered very few details regarding the steps Iran would take to resolve concerns related to its nuclear program. Some of its key provisions were:

“Establishing enrichment and nuclear fuel production consortiums in different parts of the world-including Iran”
Improved IAEA supervision “in different states”
Cooperation on nuclear safety and physical protection
Cooperation on export controls
Cooperation on regional security and global economic issues

The P5+1 group presented their revised package during a June 2008 meeting in Tehran which included participants from five of the six countries, excluding the United States. During the meeting, the six-countries relayed an understanding that preliminary talks could begin under a six-week “freeze-for-freeze” period in which Iran would halt the expansion of its enrichment program while the six countries would agree not to pursue additional sanctions against Tehran. The proposal also entailed:

The 2006 package remains on the table
Consideration of nuclear energy R&D and treatment of Iran’s nuclear program as any other NPT non-nuclear-weapons state once confidence is restored
Technological and financial assistance for Iran’s nuclear energy program
Reaffirmation of the UN Charter obligation to refrain from the use and threat of use of force in a manner inconsistent with the Charter
Cooperation on Afghanistan, including drug-trafficking, refugee return, reconstruction, and border controls
Steps towards normalizing economic and trade relations, including support for WTO membership for Iran
Further details on the prospect for cooperation on agriculture, the environment and infrastructure, civil aviation, and social development and humanitarian issues

Representatives of the six-country group, including the United States for the first time, followed up the June meeting with a meeting in July 2008 in Geneva. At the meeting, Iran issued a non-paper proposing a process for negotiations, highlighting that such discussions would be “based on the commonalities of the two packages” issued by Iran and the P5+1 group in May and June. Both the P5+1 and Iranian proposals called for political, economic, and security cooperation but the Iranian proposal did not address steps that Tehran would take in regard to its nuclear program. The Geneva discussions were inconclusive.

Following the election of U.S. President Barack Obama, who sought to abandon the previous U.S. policy requiring Iran to fulfill UN Security Council demands to suspend nuclear fuel cycle activities prior to negotiations, the P5+1 sought to renew their negotiations with Iran. They issued a statement in April 2009 in which the other five countries welcomed “the new direction of U.S. policy towards Iran,” formally inviting Iran to talks once again.

Iran did not respond to that invitation until that September, when Tehran issued a revised proposal. Although that proposal repeated several of the provisions of the one Iran issued in 2008, it did not include a section on the nuclear issue. Instead, the proposal covered the following:

Cooperation to address terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, and piracy
UN and Security Council reform
The codification of rights for the use of space
Promoting a “rule-based” and “equitable” IAEA oversight function
Promoting NPT universality and WMD nonproliferation

Tehran Research Reactor “Fuel Swap” Proposal

In June 2009, Iran informed the IAEA that it was seeking assistance to refuel its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), a U.S.-supplied 5 megawatt research reactor that produces medical isotopes. Following Iran’s entreaty, the United States proposed that, in return for a supply of 120 kilograms of fuel for the TRR, Iran ship out an equivalent amount of uranium enriched to 4%, totaling about 1,200 kilograms. The 1,200 kilograms accounted for roughly 80% of Iran’s LEU stockpile at that time, a percentage that diminished as Iran continued to produce LEU. At an initial meeting between the United States, France, Russia, Iran, and the IAEA October 1, 2009, Iranian officials agreed “in principle” to the exchange.

Iran exports 1,200 kilograms of LEU in a single batch before the end of the 2009
Russia further enriches Iran’s LEU to about 20%, a process producing about 120 kilograms of 20%-enriched uranium for the TRR fuel rods
France manufactures the TRR fuel rods for delivery about one year after the conclusion of the agreement, prior to the depletion of the current TRR fuel supply
The United States works with the IAEA to improve safety and control implementation at the TRR

Following reservations expressed by Iran about the terms of the deal, the P5+1 indicated their readiness to take some steps to facilitate the arrangement:

A political statement of support by the six countries to guarantee that the TRR fuel would be delivered to Iran
Financing for the movement of LEU and fuel
An option for the IAEA to hold Iran’s LEU in escrow in a third country until the TRR fuel is delivered

In the months following the initial agreement of the TRR proposal Oct.1, Iran delayed giving the IAEA and the P5+1 a definitive response to the proposal, with many prominent Iranian politicians voicing their opposition to the arrangement, motivated at least in part by their opposition to President Ahmadinejad. Iranian officials publicly suggested alterations to the fuel swap proposal, including: staggering the export of Iran’s LEU over the course of a year or transporting 400 kilograms of LEU to Iran’s Kish Island to exchange for TRR fuel. These proposals, however, undermined or eliminated the confidence-building nature of the export of the bulk of Iran’s LEU. Tehran began to increase the enrichment level of some of its LEU to 20% in February 2010, ostensibly for TRR fuel.

Brazil, Turkey, Iran Tehran Declaration

Brazil and Turkey carried out a diplomatic initiative in the Spring of 2010 to broker the TRR fuel swap with Iran. In an April 20 letter to the leaders of the two countries, President Obama said Iran’s agreement to export 1,200 kilograms of LEU “would build confidence and reduce regional tensions by substantially reducing Iran’s LEU stockpile.” The initiative resulted in the May 17 Tehran Declaration agreed between Presidents Lula da Silva, Erdogan, and Ahmadinejad.

The three countries “recall the right of all State Parties, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy (as well as nuclear fuel cycle including enrichment activities)”
Iran transfers 1,200 kilograms of LEU to be held in escrow in Turkey within one month
Pending their approval of the Tehran Declaration, the IAEA, France, Russia, and the United States (the Vienna Group) would agree to provide 120 kilograms of 20%-enriched uranium fuel to Iran within one year
If the terms were not filled by the Vienna Group, Turkey would transfer the LEU back to Iran (which maintains legal possession of the material)

France, Russia, and the United States rejected the Tehran Declaration on a number of grounds identified in a June 9 letter to IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano. The key critique was that the declaration did not address Iran’s production of 20%-enriched uranium and Iran’s accumulation of a larger amount of LEU.

Russian Step-by-Step Proposal

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov first publicly proposed a “road map” to implement the P5+1’s proposed incentives package July 12 during a speech in Washington. The proposal itself has not been made public, but its key elements have been described by former Iranian deputy nuclear negotiator Hossein Mousavian.

Step 1

Iran limits enrichment to Natanz, does not install any additional centrifuges, and halts the production of advanced centrifuges.
The P5+1 suspends some UN sanctions, including financial sanctions and ship inspections.

Step 2

Iran agrees to provide early design information to the IAEA under Code 3.1, caps its enrichment level at 5%, and allows greater IAEA monitoring over its centrifuges.
The P5+1 suspends most UN sanctions and gradually lifts unilateral sanctions.

Step 3

Iran implements the IAEA Additional Protocol.
The P5+1 suspends all UN sanctions in a phased manner.

Step 4

Iran suspends all enrichment-related activities for 3 months.
The P5+1 lifts all sanctions and begins to implement the group’s proposed incentives.

Other P5+1 members have not voiced public opposition to the Russian proposal, but some do not appear to support it in its current form. U.S. officials have said that Washington is studying the proposal, and have held meetings with Moscow regarding the plan. Similarly, Iran publicly welcomed the proposal but has been non-committal regarding its terms, claiming it would take several months to study.

1. To date, the UN Security Council has adopted six resolutions in response to Iran’s nuclear program. The council first demanded that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities with the adoption of resolution 1696 in July 2006. The following three resolutions, 1737 adopted in December 2006, 1747 adopted in March 2007, and 1803 adopted in March 2008, imposed incremental sanctions on Iranian persons and entities believed to have been involved in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. Resolution, 1835, adopted in September 2008, reiterated the demands made in resolution 1696 without imposing additional sanctions. The UN Security Council significantly expanded sanctions in June 2010 with the adoption of Resolution 1929.

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Thursday, January 26, 2012

Will Israel Sabotage US-Iran Diplomacy?

By Robert Dreyfuss
On January 17, 2012 – 10:01am ET
Courtesy Of “The Nation”

The war of words between the United States and Iran is escalating, with much of it, as always, for domestic consumption—President Barack Obama against his hawkish Republican rivals, and various Iranians in competition within Iran’s fractured politics. Still, the bluster and toughened sanctions are worrisome. There’s little to no chance, practically zero, that the United States will attack Iran in 2012. But what’s worrisome is that Iran, feeling backed into a corner and under assault—the United States is threatening its lifeline by moving to cut off its oil exports and sanction its Central Bank’s transaction with financial institutions worldwide, while yet another of its nuclear scientists was assassinated this month—might lash out militarily or via terrorism of its own. Or Israel might decide to take matters into its own hands. In either case, it’s likely to lead to a full-fledged US-Iran war.

Strangely enough, it’s all happening just as it appears that talks between Iran and the P5+1 world powers might be restarting and it appears that a delegation from the International Atomic Energy Agency will visit Iran later this month.

Like the Bush administration before it, the Obama administration is more than well aware of Israel’s ability to bomb some of Iran’s nuclear research sites. (Bush administration officials repeatedly warned Israel not to do so, and Obama’s team has done the same since 2009.) According to the January 14 Wall Street Journal,

U.S. defense leaders are increasingly concerned that Israel is preparing to take military action against Iran, over U.S. objections, and have stepped up contingency planning to safeguard U.S. facilities in the region in case of a conflict. President Barack Obama, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and other top officials have delivered a string of private messages to Israeli leaders warning about the dire consequences of a strike.

The Journal article notes that in response to US pleadings, the Israelis have been “noncommittal.”

Outrageous as it might be that Israel, a supposed ally, would refuse to cooperate openly with the United States on a matter of such grave importance, it also appears that Israel is openly seeking to sabotage the possibility of US-Iran negotiations. The latest assassination of an Iranian scientist in north Tehran, via a bomb attached to his automobile by a motorcycle-riding terrorist, came one day after the arrival of a top State Department official, Bill Burns, in Turkey, part of an attempt by the Obama administration to restart the long-stalled negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 world powers. The timing of that act, which provoked great anger in Iran, was probably calculated to inflame opinion so that diplomacy, once again, fails.

The United States did deny responsibility for the assassination outright, but it failed to condemn it in strong terms. If that’s because the United States is trying to handle its seemingly uncontrollable ally with kid gloves, that’s an enormous mistake. Terrorism is terrorism, and killing Iranian scientists, inserting computer worms in its control systems, and the explosion that killed one of its leading rocket experts in 2011 are clearly acts of war. If Obama thinks that he can tolerate such behavior by Israel, or worse, abet it, and then talk Israel out of bombing Iran, then he’s wrong.

As Laura Rozen reported for Yahoo, a large-scale set of military maneuvers between the United States and Israel, set for later this year, has been postponed or canceled. Though both sides downplay the cancellation, hopefully it’s intended as a message to the Israelis that they need to behave themselves.

Posted by CavalierZee at 9:00 PM

Labels: Allegiance To Israel, Dragged To War For Israel’s Sake, False Ally, Iran, Israel Before America, Israel Lobby (AIPAC), Israeli Nukes, The Enemy Within, Treachery Of Israel Firster’s

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“Terrorist” Just a Word… ‘Terrorist’ is just a word, one I wish I’d never heard… When it’s used to vilify, without the need to question why… Only fools would swift condemn, that which has not befallen them… Until you know what lies behind, the actions of a tortured mind… Thank your God for sparing you, the suffering others have lived through… Where are the cries of just demand, for Arabs driven from their land?… Blame the victim, turn the cheek, praise the bully, kick the weak!… Mock the man who truth does speak… Tinker, tailor, soldier, spy, greed, corruption, torture, lies!… Blair invasion, sly persuasion, annihilation, massacred nation… Keep on running, karma’s coming!… Money talks, truth walks, oil spills, greed kills… Tide is turning, London’s burning!… Bombs will fall and blood will flow, as sure as my own name I know… Until corrupt dictators go, brutal, rotten, to the core… Their day has come, they rule no more… Show me the man who will not fight, to save his child, his home, his right!… You can call him what you like, you’re not in his sorry plight… Cowards stay and Martyrs go, I know not where, but this I know… Speak your truth and stand your ground, fight your corner… When all around, point the finger, purse the lips, pin the label, ‘Terrorist’!… Just a word, but one that sticks, even when the cap don’t fit… But for the grace of God go I, remember that, before you cry… False accusation, names of shame, at those who may not be to blame,… Their crime, refused to play the game, of meek acceptance, dumbing down,… Your life, your choice; Warrior / Clown…

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Wednesday, January 18, 2012

How Obama Should Talk To Iran

By Trita Parsi,
Published: January 13
Courtesy Of “The Washington Post”

Just 13 minutes into his presidency, Barack Obama indirectly reached out to Iran in his inaugural address, offering America’s hand of friendship if Tehran would unclench its fist. After eight years of the George W. Bush administration’s ideological contempt for diplomacy with America’s foes, it was a bold move born out of necessity, not desire.

But Obama’s diplomacy has fallen short. After two rounds of talks in October 2009, in which Tehran refused to accept a U.S. confidence-building measure to exchange its low-enriched uranium in return for fuel for a medical research reactor, the sanctions track was activated. Ever since, Iran and the United States have been on a confrontational path. Washington has imposed unprecedented economic sanctions and isolated Iran politically. In turn, the Iranians have threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, amassed more low-enriched uranium and begun enrichment at a facility deep underground.

Rather than resolving the nuclear issue, Iran and the United States are inching closer to a military confrontation. But war is not inevitable. Diplomacy, which the Obama administration prematurely abandoned, can still succeed.

“Our Iran diplomacy was a gamble on a single roll of the dice,” a senior State Department official told me in 2010. In short, it either had to work right away or not at all. In fact, six months after the U.S. talks collapsed, Turkey and Brazil secured a version of the fuel swap that Obama had sought.

Fearing that the failure of the U.S. talks would eventually lead to war, Turkey and Brazil stepped in to persuade Iran to accept the American benchmarks for the fuel swap. To the surprise of many in the White House, Turkey and Brazil succeeded.

But by then, it was too late. The Obama administration was already on the path to sanctions. Brazil and Turkey felt snubbed, temporarily chilling their relations with Washington. (Brazil has since turned its focus to other issues, but Turkey is still involved as an occasional mediator with Iran.)

Instead of continuing toward a war the U.S. military doesn’t want, we should double down on diplomacy, in part by emulating Turkey and Brazil’s efforts. In light of news reports this past week that Iran would be open to talks later this month with the P5+1 negotiating group — China, France, Germany, Russia, Britain and the United States — here are five ways we can learn from Turkey and Brazil’s interactions with Iran.

Talk To Everyone — and Talk A Lot

A paralyzing question often asked in Washington is: Who do we talk to in Iran? The futile search for a sole authoritative Iranian partner often causes diplomacy to be rejected before it even begins. Turkey and Brazil did not fall into this trap. Instead, they recognized that there are many power centers in Iran — including the supreme leader’s office, the parliament, the president’s circle of advisers, the National Security Council and influential clergymen — all of which need to be included in the process.

Just as no country expects to sign a significant deal with the United States without addressing the concerns of the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon and Congress, no major decision is likely to be made in Iran unless a range of decision-makers is brought into the discussion. Brazil and Turkey built confidence with the relevant Iranian players and won their support for mediation.

“There is one country that resembles the Iranian power structure,” a prominent journalist close to Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu told me. “It’s the United States of America. [To get a deal], talking to the president is not enough. You have to talk to everyone.”

Brazil and Turkey did not put time constraints or other limits on their diplomacy, as the United States did by adopting an unrealistic deadline for talks to produce results and by making the fuel swap a condition for expanding diplomacy into other areas.

Between the collapse of the U.S. talks in October 2009 and Brazil and Turkey’s successful mediation in May 2010, Brazil and Turkey spent more time talking to the Iranians than did the entire P5+1 negotiating group. Brazil’s and Turkey’s foreign ministers shuttled in and out of Iran for months before the formal negotiations, building trust and political space for their mediation.

Respect and Tone Matter

After three decades of mutual demonization, the United States and Iran have been trying to coerce one another into submission rather than negotiating toward compromise. When addressing each other, Washington and Tehran tend to use the vocabulary of conflict and war. The Bush administration’s inclusion of Iran in an “axis of evil”effectively terminated a very useful collaboration between the United States and Iran against the Taliban in 2002. Respect for the other side is rarely expressed, out of fear that it would be interpreted as weakness — especially in an election year.

Turkey and Brazil adopted a different approach. “Iran listens because we respect them,” a senior Turkish diplomat involved in the 2010 talks told me. “When you put intimidation and coercion ahead of respect, it falls apart.”

Don’t Limit The Agenda

Reducing 30 years of wide-ranging U.S.-Iran tensions to negotiations focused on one variable — the development of nuclear weapons — is not a formula for success. A larger agenda that includes other issues, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, regional security, and human rights, would provide greater maneuverability. We could overcome a stalemate in one track through headway in another.

For example, Brazil raised the issue of human rights, a sensitive topic for Tehran. Defense Minister Celso Amorim, who was Brazil’s foreign minister during the negotiations, told me how, behind the scenes, he used his many trips to Iran to secure the release of a French student accused of espionage. For future talks to be successful, the agenda should be expanded — and even sensitive issues such as human rights should be included. Not only would this help strengthen relations with the Iranian people, it would also enable the United States to address the plight of Americans imprisoned in Iran.

Put Nuclear Inspections and Verification At The Center

Negotiating whether Iran can enrich uranium has been a losing proposition from the outset. There is a greater chance for success if the focus is shifted toward how enrichment can be inspected, verified, limited and controlled. This would require a clear acceptance of enrichment in Iran — a step the West has refused. In Amorim’s assessment, his success in getting Iran to agree to the fuel swap was largely because the deal tacitly accepted enrichment on Iranian soil.

“Iran would never agree to anything, any kind of arrangement that would in theory or in practice deprive them of the right to enrich uranium,” Amorim told me in 2010.

Get By With A Little Help From Your Friends

Iran’s relationships with every one of the P5+1 countries range from bad to worse. Not a single member of that negotiating group trusts Iran — and vice versa. Resolving the nuclear dispute through a mechanism nearly devoid of trust is a formidable task. Although the Security Council negotiation track cannot be sidestepped, it can be complemented by relying on states that — because of their cordial relations with both the permanent members and Iran — can bring trust to the diplomacy. Beyond Turkey and Brazil, nations such as Norway, Sweden, South Africa, Oman and Qatar can help overcome the current impasse, primarily by bridging the trust gap between Iran and the P5+1. Enlisting their assistance is particularly critical in the next 15 months because there’s a heightened risk that tensions could escalate during the U.S. and Iranian election seasons.

Moreover, trust is an outcome, not a precondition. Rather than putting their trust in Iran, Brazil and Turkey put their trust in the enforcement mechanisms of the fuel-swap agreement, realizing that the talks leading to a deal would help build a strong rapport.

“It’s not about trusting anyone,” an adviser to then-Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva told me in 2010. “It’s about generating the mechanics under which people can prove that they deserve that trust.”

Sustained, persistent diplomacy remains untested between the United States and Iran. It is superior to war and sanctions for the simple fact that, if successful, it not only could prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, but the reduced tensions would lessen Iran’s demand for nuclear deterrence. War and sanctions may limit Iran’s nuclear capabilities, but at the expense of increasing Iran’s desire to have those capabilities. At some point, the desire will overcome these obstacles.

One simply cannot threaten or sanction a country into a sense of security.

tparsi@niacouncil.org

Trita Parsi, head of the National Iranian American Council, is the author of the book “A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama’s Diplomacy With Iran.”

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As sanctions tighten, Iran gets squeezed

Iran is increasingly stockpiling its oil production as purchases decline because of sanctions.

May 23rd, 2012

02:00 AM ET

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As sanctions tighten, Iran gets squeezed

By Jamie Crawford

Despite recent assurances by senior officials in Iran that the country will weather sanctions targeting the country’s petroleum and financial sectors, the international effort is having a noticeable impact on the Iranian economy. And the situation may well figure into talks scheduled for Wednesday in Baghdad over the Islamic Republic’s disputed nuclear program, U.S. officials say.

Iranian exports of crude oil fell sharply in April, and could be down by as much as 1 million barrels a day, as many countries seek to reduce their imports of Iranian oil ahead of sanctions set to come into full effect later this summer, the International Energy Agency (IEA) said in a report released earlier this month.

President Barack Obama has until June 28 to decide whether countries that purchase Iranian oil have significantly reduced their purchases, or face a cutoff in access to the U.S. financial system under legislation signed in December.

Separately, the European Union is set to enter into a complete embargo of Iranian oil on July 1. As countries diversify their purchases ahead of both sets of sanctions, U.S. officials say Iran’s declining customer base for oil, as well as prohibitions on Iran’s central bank, are having a broad impact on the overall Iranian economy.

“The value of their currency has dropped like a rock and that has a significant impact on Iran’s ability to pay for the material it needs for its nuclear program,” David Cohen, Treasury under-secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, told an audience in Washington earlier this month.

“They are increasingly isolated – diplomatically, financially and economically,” he said. “I don’t think there is any question that the impact of this pressure played a role in Iran’s decision to come to the table,” for talks with the United States and its allies about the nuclear program.

As the sanctions deadlines draw nearer, Iran is losing oil revenue because of both declining sales volume, and declining prices as countries that still purchase the crude see it as a distressed asset, and seek to negotiate steep price discounts on every barrel purchased.

To be sure, Iran is still producing a great deal of oil. In its report, the IEA said Iran was pumping about 3.3 million barrels day. But as most of Iran’s customers reduce their purchases, the agency said much of Iran’s excess production is being diverted to storage both onshore, and aboard floating tankers at sea. Estimates of Iranian oil added to floating storage since March range from 450,000 to 800,000 barrels a day, while an additional 20 million to 25 million barrels have been added to onshore facilities, the IEA said.

Once on floating storage, Iranian tankers have been turning off ship transponders so their movements are more difficult to track. Analysts who follow the Iranian program say the elusive tactic serves two purposes: It allows Iran to ply the seas and engage in covert sales of the crude, often at greatly discounted prices. Also, Iran is loathe to signal to the world a high volume of floating storage, as that would be an acknowledgment that the sanctions are having an impact.

The tracking systems are required by international law on seagoing tankers as a means to protect against accidents and spills.

Even more financially detrimental to Iranian oil exports is the prospect of shutting down any of the country’s oil fields should onshore domestic storage build up as more buyers go elsewhere to avoid being targeted by sanctions.

“It’s not just at your tap, or at the faucet where you just turn it off and turn it on,” Jamie Webster, a Middle East oil analyst at PFC Energy, said. “When you turn it back on, 10 to 40% of that oil will not be there again, and you’re going to have to essentially build new pipes, do some more drilling.”

Japan and 10 countries from the European Union have already secured waivers from U.S. sanctions as they have significantly reduced their purchase of Iranian oil.

Supporters of the U.S. legislation on Capitol Hill are pointing to Japan as a prime example of how far they are looking for countries to go in their reductions of Iranian oil.

Already in a precarious position with its energy security following last years earthquake and tsunami that also triggered a nuclear crisis, Japan’s early commitment to reduce it’s purchases of Iranian crude by 15% to 20% should serve as an example to other countries, congressional aides say.

Sens. Robert Menendez, D-New Jersey; and Mark Kirk, R-Illinois, who both authored the legislation targeting oil purchases through Iran’s central bank, jointly endorsed a proposal recommending an approximately 18% reduction of Iranian oil purchases by all countries across the board in a letter to Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner earlier this year.

“Congress is not going to be very happy about it,” if other large importers of Iranian oil don’t reduce to near the levels of Japan, a congressional aide told CNN while declining to be identified due to the sensitivity of the situation. The administration has “done a really good job of implementing the sanctions, better than any Republican I think expected, but if they don’t fully implement, they are going to take a lot of heat up here,” the aide said.

India, one of the biggest importers of Iranian crude, said last week that it would cut imports by 11% in the coming year as it has faced enormous pressure from Washington to reduce its purchases. While the announcement was welcomed by the administration, it was not clear whether an even greater reduction would be necessary to get a waiver.

“As (Secretary of State Hillary Clinton) said when she (was in India recently), we are making progress,” State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland told reporters after India’s announcement. “There’s more progress to be made.”

The administration is also looking to South Korea and China to make significant reductions in their purchases of Iranian oil. Earlier this year, China reduced its purchases by as much as 50%, but that decision was driven mostly by a pricing dispute over existing contracts China had with Iran.

And as the deadline on sanctions enforcement nears, analysts who follow the situation say China is taking advantage of the situation by buying Iranian oil covertly, but gaining significant discounts – as much as $20 a barrel – as a condition to keep purchasing.

Diplomacy and international relations are likely to play a role in the administration’s determinations with China especially so long as there is some form of reductions to go along with the significant price squeezing by the Chinese.

“I think the administration is really trying to thread this needle delicately,” said Mark Dubowitz, executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, who has followed the sanctions program closely. “Between on one hand really forcing Iranian oil off the market and forcing significant discounts on the oil that’s being sold, but on the other hand not doing it too aggressively, because in doing so, it would face the possibility of returning to high oil prices we saw a month or two ago.”

Both China and India have said they do not support either the EU or U.S. sanctions, and have not asked for a waiver.

For its part, Turkey, which along with South Africa, had recently ramped up its imports of Iranian oil in advance of the looming sanctions, is aware of the coming deadline.

TUPRAS, a private enterprise and Turkey’s sole importer of Iranian crude, recently announced it would cut Iranian imports by 20% from the previous year’s quantities. Presently, the crude imports from Iran account for 30% of Turkey’s total imports, or just over 200,000 barrels a day, a Turkish official told CNN.

The company intends to replace that lost volume with Iran with additional purchases from Libya, the official said.

And because U.S. sanctions target any transactions of Iranian oil processed through Iran’s central bank, Iran is facing a hard currency squeeze as more international banks refuse to repatriate any profits of oil sales back to Iran in their national currency, the rial. Iran is essentially being forced to barter and take profits in the form of the currency of the country purchasing the oil.

“Iran can’t do anything with (Indian) rupees or (Chinese) yuan except buy Chinese and Indian goods and services that it really doesn’t need,” Dubowitz said. Without the ability to convert their sales into Iranian currency, and repatriate their profits, “all the oil they sell is going to be useless to them,” he said.

Complicating matters even greater for those countries that are permitted to continue their purchases of Iranian oil at reduced rates is the increased difficulty in acquiring maritime insurance because of the sanctions.

With nearly 95% of all maritime insurance being underwritten in Europe, many of those insurers are denying coverage for anything that involves Iranian transactions.

In the absence of insurance, governments themselves would have to step in and guarantee liability on the event of a spill or some other catastrophe. Many Iran watchers expect the insurance sanctions to become particularly troublesome to Iran.

Whether the increasing pressure on Iran has brought about a willingness on its part to consider significant concessions on its nuclear program remains to be seen.

The so-called P5+1 group of the United States, Russia, China, France, Great Britain and Germany will discuss the issue with Iran in the Iraqi capital Wednesday. Most who follow the situation closely are skeptical about any significant announcements by Iran about its nuclear program in the near-term.

But regardless of whatever progress is made, some analysts say the United States should not be hasty in its response.

“I think the temptation which needs to be resisted is not to offer too much sanctions relief too fast,” Dubowitz said. “Because this whole system which is being held together by the fear of U.S. penalties is going to quickly unravel, and I think the administration will lose all of the leverage that it so diligently assemble over the past few years.”

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CNN’s Security Clearance examines national and global security, terrorism and intelligence, as well as the economic, military, political and diplomatic effects of it around the globe, with contributions from CNN’s national security team in Washington and CNN journalists around the world.

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