Egypt crisis: Morsi’s concession fails to quell anger – Sunday 9 November 2012

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• Sunday, 09 December 2012
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  Brotherhood calls on opposition to end protests, accept referendum

  Muslim Brotherhood praises President Morsi’s new decree, calls on opposition to end demonstrations and ‘accept democracy’

  Ahram Online, Sunday 9 Dec 2012

  

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  • Egyptian reactions vary to President Morsi’s new constitutional decree

  

  • Translation of President Morsi’s latest constitutional decree

  

  • Morsi’s decree cancelled, constitution referendum to take place on time

  

  Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood on Sunday declared its full support President Mohamed Morsi’s new constitutional decree.The decree, which came after a national dialogue meeting on Saturday, abrogated the controversial 22 November Constitutional Declaration – maintaining any decisions resulting from the decree which included the installation of a new prosecutor-general – and said the constitutional referendum would go ahead as planned on 15 December.

  Brotherhood spokesperson Mahmoud Ghozlan said dialogue was the only “civilised” way to solve the country’s problems and work towards its interests.

  The ballot box should have the final say in any disagreement, he said. Egyptians should therefore vote in the 15 December referendum.

  Parliamentary elections would follow the referendum and help bring stability to the country, he added.

  “The constitutional decree of November 2012, which caused recent conflicts, has been cancelled by the new decree issued on 8 December. There is now no excuse for mass mobilisation,” the statement read, referring to opposition calls for further protests against both the decree and the draft constitution.

  “We reject all forms of violence and thuggery that have led to the torching and damaging of [Muslim Brotherhood] offices, the killing of young people and thousands of injuries,” the statement added.

  The Brotherhood stressed it would accept the results of the referendum and asked the opposition to do the same.

  “This is the basis of democracy; so will [the opposition] accept it? Or will they continue mobilising, demonstrating, threatening and damaging [the country]?”

  “This will reveal who cares about the country’s interest and who serves particular agendas and personal interests,” the statement concluded.

  Hundreds of thousands of protesters have taken to the streets over the past week calling for President Morsi to withdraw his 22 November Constitutional Declaration, which gave him sweeping powers, and to condemn the draft constitution.

  Supporters of President Morsi have taken to the streets to show support for the decree and the draft constitution. Violence between the two opposing factions has resulted in at least six deaths and hundreds of injuries.

  There have been a number of attacks across the country on local headquarters of the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party.

  The dialogue meeting on Saturday was boycotted by most opposition figures. Most of the attendees were close to the Brotherhood.

  Opposition forces are planning demonstrations on Sunday to object to the results of the dialogue, which they say are not satisfactory because the consequences of the earlier decree remain in place and the constitutional referendum will be held on 15 December despite opposition objections to the draft constitution and the assembly that drafted it.

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• Egyptian Press and the Transition to Democracy: A Study of the Conditions and Challenges Facing National Print Media Post the January 25th 2011 Revolution
  By: Hala El Zahed
  Abstract
  National press in Egypt has long been restricted and manipulated by the regime. For more than three decades it was the regime’s mouthpiece. Paradoxically, the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011; which was supposed to bring freedom to all institutions, mired the Egyptian press resulting in its regression rather than progression. The press had begun facing a series of political and financial problems even before the January 25th 2011 Revolution due to declining leadership and advertising revenue. After February 11, 2011, with protestors jamming Tahrir Square, the induced democracy soon got stalled. Notably, all internal pressures for change were stifled. Political and legal challenges remained to be imposed on media professionals. Journalists systematically faced legal and financial pressures and other forms of intimidation hindering them from fulfilling their role in the democratization process. Indeed, a democratic state can’t be built without a vibrant and independent media. (1) Surmountable causes can be linked to why the process of democratization in Egypt has been slow and retrograde, nevertheless. The question is: How can we possibly turn the Egyptian press into an independent institution whose main concern is to serve the people through providing information with accuracy and transparency? And whether there is a specific model that we can emulate to develop the Egyptian national press.
  Introduction
  National press in Egypt had long been undergoing a state of transition. It is called ‘transitional’ because the system is debatable and seems to be unsettled. In fact, it contains elements that favor government control besides elements that prefer freedom of expression. There are some newspapers that are owned by the government and are; thus, called ‘national newspapers’ like Al-Ahram, most prestigious and oldest newspaper catering the elite segment, which tends to influence public debate. Other newspapers are either owned by independent private sectors or by political parties.
  Paradoxically, we call the Egyptian system “transitional” but it is not clear which way it is going or that it is in transition to a different type of system that will stabilize and stay for years to come.
  Despite claims after the January 25th 2011 Revolution that Egypt is in transition to democracy, the fact remains that there are still obstacles that impede the process starting with the drafting of
  a new constitution that defines and protects the right to freedom of expression and freedom of information as well as the exact role of the press.
  Traditionally, the Egyptian Government had not hesitated to use its economic power over the print media. Eventually, such system had brought journalists to court, sent them to jail and fined them. Hence, the government got accustomed to exercising its influence through various ways starting from press ownership, censorship, litigation, economic pressure to selecting editors-in-chief of the national press.
  Stemming from the fact that the press constitutes the fourth branch of government and the pertinent role it plays and ought to, especially post the January 25th 2011 Revolution, this paper tries to tackle how freedom is constituted in Egypt, the conditions and challenges facing national print media and what might be done to safeguard its freedom. Researcher aims to specifically examine few press models that Egypt may embrace in order to hasten its transition to democracy.
  1. Ownership
  Ever since President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1953 – 1970) nationalized the press in 1960, major Egyptian newspapers fell under total government control; hence, turning journalists into civil servants. Then the following presidents followed suit. It was late President Anwar El Sadat (1970 – 1981) who allowed the establishment of three opposition parties having their own newspapers and accordingly expressing their views. “Wanting to conceal the fact that the state directly owned the newspapers – fearing for his image in front of his new American friends – Sadat created a second House of Parliament, or the Shura Council, and it was tasked with ownership and administration of the affairs of the ‘national press’.” (2) Accordingly, the national press is owned by the Supreme Press Council (SPC) and the Shura (Consultative) Council. Notably, SPC has the right to issue licenses for all press including independent papers. (3) And since both councils are controlled by the regime’s political party, the president has the ability to appoint newspapers’ editors-in-chief.
  The Egyptian Constitution allows newspaper ownership by public or private political parties or corporate legal entities. Article 22, Law on Press Authority, posits that “national press establishments shall be considered the property of the state and the Shura Council shall exercise ownership rights over national press establishments.” (4) In other words, this Article gives the right to the Shura Council to establish more press establishments. (Thus national newspapers are not truly ‘national’ as the Law does not grant them full independence of the executive authority and all political parties. Likewise, editors become dependent.) Article 23, Law on Press Authority, stipulates “the relationship between national press establishments and all their employees, including journalists, administrative staff, and laborers shall be governed by individual employment contracts. Employees of national press establishments may, where in the interest of work, be transferred from one establishment to another by decree of the SPC.” (5)
  2. Censorship
  The first law defining the functions of the Censorship Bureau was issued in 1975. Accordingly, the Egyptian Government can affect the content of the print media indirectly, or by persuasion. Moreover, journalists themselves do practice self-censorship, mindful of their paymasters, knowing that repercussions for what they publish may cost them a dear price. This goes for national and independent press alike.
  There are provisions in the laws that can restrict these publications on grounds that they are disrupting social peace. There are ‘taboo’ areas or ‘red lines’ where newspapers cannot, under any circumstances, venture. Evidently, newspapers are not allowed to criticize, to attack, or to insult the country’s president or the armed forces or security-related information. Otherwise, such criticism invites the government’s strong reaction resulting in trying journalists and their newspapers as well. According to Egypt’s penal code, journalists can be fined, jailed if they cross the ‘red lines’. A famous case of state bullying freedom of expression is the independent Al-Dostour Editor Ibrahim Eissa’s who was sentenced to jail, subject to appeal, as he dared to touch a taboo when he wrote about the ailing health of Mubarak back in 2007. (6) Presently, the same newspaper’s editor-in-chief Islam Afifi is being imprisoned, subject to appeal on September 16, despite President Mohamed Morsi’s declaration on August 21, 2012 to penalize journalists instead of the jailing sentence.
  3. Litigation
  Notably, the Egyptian Government exercises influence over all print media through several means. It can license newspapers or shut them down for what they print. It can impose fines on newspapers and journalists alike. It can arrest journalists and/or ban them from travelling abroad. And to further control and restrict the formation of new political parties or any dissenting press, the Egyptian Government had used various laws such as the Emergency Law (1967) – until recently – and Antiterrorism Law (1992).
  Between 1996 and 1999, the public prosecutor referred 175 journalism cases to court. “The law gives the public prosecutor power to ban publication of news related to a case involving national security.” (7) The Egyptian Penal Code still contains a chapter with thirty-nine articles on “Crimes of the Press.” And to add insult to injury, a 2006 Law was passed creating the offense of insulting a foreign head of state. Eventually relations between the press and the state deteriorated and reached their lowest levels in 2007 under the same old rhetoric: “Egypt must be united. The national interest is supreme. Excesses of free speech endanger national stability.” (8)
  4. Economic Pressure
  National media is owned by the government; unlike independent or private media which depends financially on advertising and subscription. The government also has the power to exercise economic pressure on newspapers and journalists. Its subsidies are granted; thus, forcing opposition newspapers with limited financial means to certainly be dependent. The government also controls publishing houses including those of the opposition; hence, restricting freedom of expression. Noteworthy, the government also exercises import restrictions of print media published outside Egypt on grounds of protecting public order. Article 24, Law on Press Authority, posits that “the SPC shall issue resolutions and guidelines regulating the administration, development of annual budget, and profit distribution method of the press establishments.” (9)
  5. Selection of Editors-in-Chief
  Selection of editors-in-chief falls under the jurisdiction of the Shura Council by an official decree since 1970. Government officials from time to time instruct and guide journalists to portray certain issues in the media the way they would like major issues to be promoted. On occasion there are strong ties between the government and editors. The most famous example would be that staunch relationship between Egyptian President Nasser and Al-Ahram Editor-in-chief Mohamed Hassanein Heikal who was Nasser’s confidante and the most influential journalist during the ‘50s and ‘60s.
  According to Article 32, Law on Press Authority, in each national newspaper, “an editorial board shall be constituted of 5 members at least under the chair of the editor-in-chief selected by the Shura Council (…) The editorial board membership term shall be three renewable years.” (10)
  Significantly, this researcher attempts to delve into the impact of this coercive and manipulative system on the content of the press post the January 25th 2011 Revolution by examining the conditions and challenges facing national print media, what might be done to safeguard its freedom and most importantly, what model should Egypt adopt to hasten its transition to democracy?
  Toppling the Regime
  When people took to the streets heading to Tahrir Square demanding to topple the regime, the state-run media was unable to grasp the magnitude of the event, it only cowered beneath the regime that bred it and; hence, covered the events in a biased and distorted manner that was expected of it. But then it went into a panic when Mubarak was forced to step down. It did not know how to react momentarily. Accordingly, the national press resorted to its traditional role of denial of any disturbances and played on the notion of threat of chaos if such acts continued. It even pointed to foreign elements and doubted a conspiracy theory in the making. As the regime
  further crumbled, the national press dashed in several directions immediately, pointing fingers at protesters one day and signaling some distance with the failing regime the next.
  The ousting of Mubarak placed the national press in a difficult position; nevertheless, forcing it to explain what had happened and why the change of disposition. Meanwhile, the stunning growth of social media or online journalism and blogs (introduced in the early 1990s in Egypt); known as “Citizen Journalism”, seemed to call attention to its massive power by tackling issues that were considered taboo. They seemed to be the agenda setters by choosing intricate issues that needed to be addressed like torture and human rights abuses that were pervasive in Egypt. Eventually, the internet contributed to raising people’s political awareness and formed a wake-up call to a wide spectrum of readership: the Egyptian youth constituting 60% of the population.
  Temporarily, the national press chose to ignore the call for demonstrations that was organized by Facebook groups whose numbers ranged to thousands opposing police brutality. Instead, national press only reported news about protests carried out by workers demanding better working conditions and salaries. Ironically, on January 26th, 2011, Al Ahram tackled protests in Lebanon in its headline banner main position and placed protests in Egypt in a side location. It focused; however, on the killing of a security officer without revealing the reason behind his death which was due to being pushed and stepped on by his colleagues during the demonstrations. Additionally, all three main national newspapers, Al-Ahram, Al-Akhbar and Al-Gomhouria rather insinuated at various instances that the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was behind those protests.
  As events escalated on January 28th, 2011, all such national press reported that counter demonstrations amounting to millions marched in support of President Mubarak despite the fact that their number didn’t exceed thousands of workers in petroleum companies owned by businessmen who financed them to buy their allegiance to the ousted regime. Moreover, on February 2nd and 3rd these papers totally neglected how the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) co-opted thugs to disseminate demonstrators by any means; an infamous act that came to be known as the “Camel Battle”.
  After Mubarak’s ouster on February 11, these newspapers started to disclose government corruption and that of the president and his family. Eventually, editors-in-chief switched their stance and played a different tune in an attempt to contain the protests by declaring that the youths’ demonstrators have economic and social demands that need to be realized. Such demonstrators’ power could not have been ignored any further by the national press that began to lose their readership in terms of credibility and circulation. Finally, with Mubarak’s stepping down, national press realized that they were standing alone against the society; hence, Al-Ahram; per se, switched gears and repositioned its loyalty in favor of protestors in a banner headline that likely made more Egyptians laugh than cry: “The People Brought down the Regime!” The press suddenly got disoriented without a president to flatter, before swinging eagerly behind the
  Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), Egypt’s interim ruling military, in a desperate attempt to find a new patron to rescue it from financial and political chaos.
  Ironically, in the next few days after Mubarak’s ouster, headlines in red banners in Al-Ahram appeared as follows:
  On February 12: Downfall of Mubarak Regime: Congratulations Egyptian People
  On February 13: Cleansing Egypt
  On February 14: Stalling the Constitution: Dissolving the Parliament & the Shura Council
  On February 15: Fall of Corruptors
  On February 16: No Return to Conditions before January 25th
  On February 18: Millions Demonstrate Today to Emphasize the Revolution’s Demands “[S]ince February and the fall of the regime that it served (and that shielded it), the national press has entered an era of profound crisis. No longer able to ignore its problems, various papers and publishing houses have faced internal revolts and demands for reform.” (11) Most importantly, it had learned that losing its credibility and transparency would mean losing its readership that would easily turn to other media in search for the truth. This print media then realized that what’s at stake is its share of advertisement and once large circulation. Implications of January 25th Revolution on the Press Significantly, January 25th Revolution’s goals didn’t represent one specific party as it aimed to establish a modern civil state under the slogan; Freedom, Social Justice & Human Dignity, meaning no Authoritarian, no Military and no Religious rule shall obstruct it from realizing its goals. (12) Notwithstanding the dire need for drafting a new constitution identifying the relationship between the ruler and the citizens and reflecting various political and ideological tendencies, matters went into the opposite direction. In the wake of the January 25th Revolution; however, it was the independent press (besides social media) that projected a dissenting voice tackling corruption cases, demanding civil rights for citizens and opposing ‘hereditary rule’ in addition to reporting on conflicts taking place inside Syndicates and civil society. Noteworthy, the impact of civil society on the press is tremendous as it represents people’s voice against any attempts to limit political rights of citizens. As such, an active and vibrant civil society can prevent government’s involvement in the media. Civil society and public access to information can facilitate people’s right to free expression and media freedom. (13)
  “The emergence of independent newspapers like the daily Al-Masry Al-Youm in 2004, along with online journalism, has laid the foundation for pluralism.” (14) The fact that the independent press displayed credibility as opposed to national press during the Revolution reflects how the former have gained more privilege over the latter whose credibility has been worn out during the past years under editors-in-chief who were deeply involved with the NDP and the hereditary scenario. Imperatively, “the independent press represented the voice that awakened a new kind of awareness; an awareness that broke the fear barrier confronting government’s power, displaying an example of freedom of opinion devoid of any interest.” (15) On the other hand, the national press; notwithstanding, had suffered tremendous loss due to the following: 1. Lack of Vision regarding its functions and administrative procedures. 2. Being manipulated by the regime and especially the then ruling NDP to serve, realize and promote its goals including ruling by ‘hereditary rule’. 3. Loss of people’s credibility, accountability and confidence in national press due to its swinging to extremes between being loyal to the regime and then expressing its extreme animosity to the regime. 4. Corruption that exceeded all limits within the functioning of these media. (16)
  Non-traditional Media & its Effect on National Press
  Social media played a key role in mobilizing people. Indeed, the emergence of political blogging in Egypt is linked to The Egyptian Movement for Change; known as Kefaya (Enough), as early as 2004 when this movement called for an end to Mubarak’s rule, government corruption and Egypt’s state of Emergency Law. Notably, Egyptian bloggers put tremendous pressure on the political system by tackling sensitive issues like government corruption, sexual harassment, torture and pervasive human rights abuse. Unfortunately, Egyptians seemed to have been accustomed to insults and torture from the police in their daily lives. After reporting on such incidents by bloggers, people have realized that this kind of police brutality and abuse is a violation of their rights and; thus, they can sue the police for criminal behavior for the first time. In fact, this kind of reporting contributed to raising people’s political awareness. It has also helped in creating social awareness of feminist rights by opening up job opportunities for women in the media, per se. (17) The internet has made the practice of censorship by the government very difficult. As a result, bloggers succeeded to get these thorny issues heard by an international audience. (18) Imperatively, April 6 Youth Movement presents an interesting example of an organized group of youth who desired to reform Egypt. As early as 2007, they called for a general strike on April 6 to protest against the massive price rises, stability of salaries and deteriorating living conditions. Evidently, the exact turning point took place on April 6, 2008 using Facebook to extend
  solidarity with 27,000 protesting workers of Al-Mahalla al-Kubra who were demanding better salaries. “The strike was not an end in itself, but the means to promote a culture of peaceful protest and to encourage people to claim for their legitimate rights.” (19)
  Another important movement was the National Association for Change (NAC) which was initiated by former head of the International Atomic Energy Mohamed El Baradei. By 2009, access to internet had increased tremendously. The independent newspapers covered NAC in order to compete with “citizen journalism” which was already providing their readers with the information they yearned to know.
  Eventually, the Internet “opened up new global communication conduits, providing Egyptians with greater access to information while making government efforts to restrict information more difficult.” (20)
  Conditions & Challenges Facing National Press
  Since the 1950s, the government had owned nineteen media institutions. In 1980, the Egyptian government assigned the Shura Council to run matters concerning national press.
  It is necessary to comprehend the conditions or challenges under which print media in Egypt functions in general in order to devise methods of reform. They are as follows:
  1. Limited Independence;
  2. Government Domination;
  3. Private but partisan;
  4. Censorship (government & self-censorship);
  5. Influence of security agencies;
  6. Granting licensing to media institutions is restrictive;
  7. Growing religious & financial power of the ruling elites;
  8. Spread of journalists who breach the Code of Honor;
  9. Lack of transparency on reporting on government practices especially by national press. Indeed, the “closed nature of Mubarak’s political system and his government’s near monopoly over important information sources made information gathering especially difficult in Egypt. Acquiring information was even more challenging for journalists at independent and opposition newspapers because government sources were often suspicious of their reporting intents and sometimes refused to speak to them.” (21)
  10. Defamation laws protect those public officials who are shielded from criticism like the President (and his family), the military, security agencies, religious authorities, ministries, parliamentarians, legal and judicial authorities, leaders of foreign countries, and the flag.
  11. Arbitrary justice applied on journalists who cross the line by appearing before civil and military courts. Various laws are used to justify such acts like the Emergency Law, theory
  of exceptional circumstances, external breaches and government solemnity and confidentiality of information. All such free expression restrictions are applied.
  12. Few professional standards (poor hiring standards) as journalists are often hired and promoted based on nepotism or favoritism rather than competence and professionalism. The Shura Council is still responsible for selecting editors-in-chief of all national newspapers.
  13. On a positive note, public access to information via social media has led to more pluralistic voices resulting in a press that has become more critical of government’s practices. Nevertheless, slow attempts at progress toward reform and a move toward democracy remains to be seen. (22)
  Notably, the national press had also suffered from other troubles. First, they were quickly losing credibility. Most Egyptian readers skipped the news and op-eds of the state-owned dailies and went straight to obituaries in Al-Ahram or sports of Al-Gomhouria. In the last two decades and with the age of satellite, people could easily turn to other sources of information. “There were suddenly places where politics could be discussed intelligently (or at least in an interesting manner) and the official monopoly of information was broken.” (23)
  Second, new competitors emerged as early as the ‘80s and ‘90s like pan-Arab newspapers which entered the Egyptian market in addition to few opposition publications. Moreover, the independent Al-Masry Al-Youm, boldly entered the Egyptian scene in 2004 catering to elite readers and posing a challenge to Al-Ahram’s prominent position. Al-Shorouq is yet another independent newspaper that introduced a high level of professionalism, long absent from national press, and cleverly maintained a calm oppositional tendency. Al-Youm El-Sabei has gained a wide popularity especially among the Egyptian youth with a tremendously growing circulation.
  Third, the national press was on the brink of bankruptcy since the publishing houses hired too many workers with little training and very low salaries. With a decline in advertising and circulation, the state borrowed heavily that it could not repay without some kind of restructuring.
  Fourth, those who headed the industry were reputed to pay themselves astronomical salaries as they treated the institution as their own private property. Moreover, allegations of financial corruption were spread in all enterprises (Al-Ahram, Al-Akhbar, Al-Gomhouria and Dar al-Ma`arif, publisher of October, and others) claiming that they were sold at below market rates to friends of top officials.
  Fifth, the fact that editors-in-chief are assigned by the government reflects their vehement support to the regime. Unfortunately, top officials of national newspapers used to squander millions of pounds from their institutions on gifts presented to the regime gangsters hoping to guarantee their satisfaction. (24) (Though some employees sought to bring corruption allegations to the public prosecutors’ attention, their voices went in vain.)
  Sixth, inability to access information makes it very difficult for national print media to report transparent and authentic information. The government remains to be the source of information. As such, the right to access information is subject to government control. This is done through the Press Bureau which is under the control of the Ministry of Information; again subject to government control!
  Seventh, the standard of professionalism and ethical considerations is not of high quality as it ought to be.
  Eighth, the lack of training to support print and electronic journalism has contributed to the ailment of the organization and its loss of vision as to where it needs to go. Indeed, there is a technology gap between those who have access to the latest forms of science and technology and those who do not. (This gap certainly needs to be bridged.)
  Finally, a blurred mission has hindered the national press from supporting democracy and human rights in Egypt.
   A State of Limbo
  The publishing houses are still immensely plagued by the same problems from before the Revolution. These problems have been further aggravated by the current political and economic decisions. However, if the national press was to gain control of any assets previously embezzled by the ousted bosses, it would still be in a very difficult economic situation. Many of the top leaders and officials of these newspapers have repulsive political or ethical reputations—or both. Although many such senior officials associated with the old regime have been removed, their replacements have not been any different. For instance, a group of reporters gathered in Tahrir Square demanding the “cleansing” of the press with posters displaying photographs of their bosses. Echoes could be heard of similar descriptions of the current situation as a state of limbo between a discredited old regime and the now Morsi’s MB regime that may not hold that much promise.
  Investigations of corruption charges against former as well as current officials of the national press “continue to proceed slowly if at all, fostering simmering resentments and potentially depriving the institutions of funds they desperately need to recover.” (25) The only newspaper that may survive the difficulty seems to be Al-Ahram due to its circulation and advertising besides earning revenues from its printing press (which most of the independent newspapers are forced to use due to licensing restrictions on other press.)
  Nevertheless, Egypt’s national press cannot operate as it has in the past; it has lost its economic and political base. A serious restructuring is indeed imperative as most national press is burdened with tremendous debts, overstaffing, dropping circulation, and politically exposed (making a bailout difficult). One chief journalist at Dar al-Hilal once explained, both an
  economic and a political restructuring is necessary. “The former is needed to reconstruct institutions that stop bleeding funds; the latter is needed to shore up professionalism and grant the national press the autonomy and credibility it has lacked for generations.” (26)
  But the path forward is extremely hazy at present. Seemingly, both tasks are intimidating. Economic restructuring is difficult as Egyptian media outlets pursue limited advertising revenue, shrinking readership and loss of credibility. Whereas independent newspapers are able to rely on freelancers, smaller staffs, and wealthy backers, the national press has to strive to find a way not only to earn revenue and cut costs but also to dig out of its huge debt. It is necessary; however, to enhance readers’ participation and access to information to guarantee individual’s liberty and the effective functioning of the democratic process.
  Political restructuring is also problematic. Ironically, it is unclear what role (if any) the national press should have if some mechanisms of the authoritarian regime are completely dismantled and with Morsi’s regime, skepticism lurks.
  Nevertheless, economic and political restructuring might pull in conflicting directions. The former requires addressing the problem of an overstaffed, underpaid, and underperforming labor force. The latter requires answering demands of the employees by mobilizing them and inspiring real reform.
  Moreover, national press may not witness any freedom “unless we take a close look at its ownership or by segregating between its ownership and administration. As for responsibility, there seems to be a grave difference between those papers that attend to scoops rather than paying attention to objectivity and credibility.” (27)
  Practically speaking, the structures that the national press report to—the Ministry of Information, the Shura Council and the parliament (currently dissolved) —are themselves in a state of political limbo. In the absence of a clear process for political reconstruction, Egypt’s national press may, indeed, lack the ability to restructure itself. As such, the following objectives are suggested for media reform:
  1. To evaluate the media performance during the last 5 years since 2005 elections until January 25th Revolution.
  2. To propose alternatives for media reform based on international experience that may be related to the Egyptian context.
  3. To enhance the capacity of media cadres by providing regular training sessions and supporting print and electronic journalism.
  According to Brian Steffens and Ed Lambeth, what separates journalism from other information media is its key role in the conduct of public affairs. Successful politics mean successful government, press and people who are partners in the democratic process. (28) Furthermore, “the mission isn’t yet accomplished. Indeed, toppling the regime’s head doesn’t necessarily mean the end of the old regime since its tools and system still exists. Perhaps, it’s trying to bring it back to life.” (29)
   The New Constitution & The Press
  Constitutions and international treaties may guarantee freedom of expression but the reality on the ground may somehow be different. Millions of people around the world live in countries where the flow of information is tightly controlled, censored and freedom of expression discouraged or restricted. Defamation laws preventing criticism are all too common and prevalent around the world. Egypt is no exception. This is true in the Middle East and North Africa. Despite the fact that on paper, the Egyptian Constitution guarantees the right to free expression, in reality government practices, laws and regulations obstruct that right.
  If constitutions are insecure, governments will repress freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. Imperatively, Egypt’s new constitution must be founded on two basic rules: separation of powers and a strong respect for fundamental freedoms. The West chose freedom because they decided that “freedom of speech was not only no threat to, but a condition of, a durable democracy.” (30)
  Freedom of the press is crucial to any democratic regime. This freedom equates responsibility – a general norm in all laws. All dictatorial regimes had always been hostile to freedom of the press despite disclosing otherwise. Notably, the Egyptian press had enjoyed press freedom after 1919 Revolution; during which time liberalism spread. With Nasser’s 1952 Revolution freedom of the press got to be restricted and during Sadat’s era, the press witnessed a limited freedom that was severely curtailed following 1977 riots. During Mabarak’s regime, all institutions declined tremendously and the media could not escape such decay.
  Consequently, people were divided into those who envisioned a dire need for a new constitution that represents a roadmap for the ensuing period. However, others favored holding parliamentary elections before drafting the new constitution. The latter won, unfortunately. A turbulent period followed creating a legislative vacuum after which a limited majority in favor of political Islam took over the political scene representative of the Freedom and Justice Party (MB) at which time, SCAF’s Major General Tantawi hurriedly called for the establishment of a constituent assembly to produce a Supplementary Constitutional Declaration (SCD) aiming at limiting the power of the president while still holding onto its old entrenched power. (31)
  In drafting the derailed new constitution, Articles regarding the press and media do not differ much from those set in 1971 Constitution. Article 2 advocates the right to stall and cancel
  newspapers through judicial procedures; despite the toppled regime which had concurred in 2006 under journalists’ pressure by cancelling the halting punishment in Articles 199 and 200 of the Law. Regarding the cancellation of newspapers; whether through administrative or judicial procedures, Egyptian Laws appeared to be devoid of it since the drafting of 1923 Constitution.
  The Press Syndicate has posited that no censorship, confiscation, suspension, or cancellation shall be imposed on the press or on any other media. Nevertheless, Article 3 limits the right of ownership and publishing of newspapers to public and political party figures – a statement that was added to 1971 Constitution in amendments introduced in 1980; thus, confiscating the right of private individual ownership; a right that Egypt had until 1980. Moreover, Article 5 returned jail sentence in slander and libel crimes. Notwithstanding, the old regime had agreed in 2006 to replace such offense with a fine for offenses ranging from slander, libel to insulting a foreign country representative. (32)
  The need for an interim set of rules that could fill the current constitutional vacuum in Egypt was and is still pressing. Without one, people have no idea what powers Egypt’s elected President Morsi possesses; especially with the bold measures he recently embarked upon when he announced on August 13, 2012 the annulment of the Supplementary Constitutional Declaration after declaring the retirement of Major General Hussein Tantawi, chief of SCAF since 1993. Nor do people know what his relationship would be with respect to other organs of the state like the judiciary and media, per se. However, the idea of putting such an important document together in haste without really reflecting all society’s cross-section and without consultation is still deeply worrying.
  Some journalists have acknowledged that under the current circumstances, old habit of self-censorship has not disappeared completely. Undoubtedly, censorship and control of information serves the interest of but a privileged few; the rule of law is negatively affected, human rights ignored and corruption unchecked. Albeit, the new regime would still exercise its hegemony over the media bringing it back to square one!
  Moreover, the same old system is still in effect and no journalist is immune to Crimes of the Press Law and the list of offenses is awaiting journalists from national and independent press alike. In fact, on August 8, 2012, the Interior Ministry’s raided Dar Al-Tahrir Printing House at sunrise to confiscate independent Al-Dostour newspaper which opposes the MB on pretext that it contains material that touched President Morsi’s own figure and humiliated his character; thus, constituting a crime, “as if we’ve returned to ‘sunrise visitors’, no law, no principles, nothing.” (33) Here, a question looms: who is behind such attack? The MB. Yes, indeed, Egyptian Freedom is in jeopardy!
   The Shura Debate
  Before the January 25th Revolution, editors-in-chief were appointed by the president under an institutional arrangement devised in 1970. They were eager to become personally close to the ruler and display their loyalty by writing what’s in his favor and in return they were granted a free hand over their domains. “Heading one of these institutions could bring tremendous job security, considerable autonomy, and high pay. Turnover was not unknown, but it was rare. In 2005, some figures with more than two decades of service were forced to retire in a string of changes marketed as reform, but amounting to a substitution of new sycophants for old ones.” (34)
  In his column entitled “½ Word,” published on July 21, 2012 in Akhbar El-Youm, journalist Ahmed Ragab commented that some presidents used to tell editors-in-chief (whom they have chosen) that they write their names in pencil and as such can be erased easily. (35)
  Ironically, the MB holds the majority of seats in Parliament and in the Shura Council. Whereas, the Shura Council is still responsible for selecting editors-in-chief of all national newspapers which constitute eight institutions producing 55 publications; a real battle reminiscing from the ailing regime continues. One assumes a hideous desire by the Shura Council to tailor editors-in-chief who can carry out certain tasks at this time (36) resulting in a crippled media still controlled by the government. Many people wonder why the Shura Council still continues to exist. “Once more, we witness press nationalization.” (37) If both the Shura Council and the Parliament constitute legislation, it will be impossible for such legislative body to own the national press. “Nowhere on earth have we heard of a legislative authority owning the press unless our situation is askew.” (38)
  It was agreed; nevertheless, to keep the Shura Council until discussions were held regarding the drafting of Egypt’s future constitution. The fact that Egyptians hardly exceeded 10% in the Shura Council elections reflects how people did not believe it was needed to begin with.
  Paradoxically, the MB “suddenly remembered that the Shura Council enjoys powers that they need to put into action. Feeling bitter towards editors-in-chief of ‘national’ newspapers whom they accuse of failing to back President Mohamed Morsi in his election campaign, the [MB] deputies announced that they will appoint new editors to all state-controlled newspapers.” (39) And so they did!
  Nobody can disagree on the press’s need and the media in general for reform and change. “However, one doesn’t presume that such reform can be achieved through the Shura’s selection of new editors-in-chief due to the fact that the Shura Council itself represents a parable created by former dictatorial regimes to control the media and play with people’s minds.” (40)
  And now with Egypt witnessing a new era after January 25th Revolution, it is irrational to continue this obsolete system which reflects a continuation of corruption and making the media a mouthpiece of the regime that carries out a dictated agenda instead of implementing its role as a tool for spreading information, enlightenment and reflecting societal needs. Without a free press, the Revolution will not be able to achieve any of its goals and Egypt will not proceed in the right direction.
  In her article titled, “No to Editors-in-Chief Selected by the Shura Council,” published in Al-Ahram on July 30th, 2012, Asmaa Al-Hussainy suggests that the press people should refuse new selections of editors-in-chief and hegemony by unspecialized people over the media. Furthermore, she calls for a national media conference where media people and specialists participate to examine an adequate drafting of ownership and administration of national media institutions and its relationship with the state and not the government. She concludes her argument by extending a warm welcome to public opinion, to dialogue and participation rather than what the Shura Council posits now; which reflects a certain party’s disposition. However, she proceeds; the media should represent the society and state that are more than just parties. In the end, if this situation continues, she warns, people should expect more intervention from the government.
  If “we want a civic, democratic, modern and contemporary Egypt (that is also based on Islamic principles)” the Shura Council should neither own it nor should a governing body like the SPC still exist. (41)
   Media Development & the Democratic Transition
  Crucially, the Egyptian society needs a media that expresses the goals of the Revolution in which 1500 people sacrificed their lives and some 9000 who got either severely wounded or maimed. Yet, “the ways in which the media is currently studied are themselves in need of reform.” (42)
  There is a dire need for a media that do not cater to special agendas or aims at profitability. “To realize these needs we must restructure the media establishment, strengthen its professional standards, enhance its administrative and financial efficiency, and turn it to the service and aims of society as a whole.” (43)
  In 2008, the focus was on building capabilities of Egyptian journalists in preparation for a media in transition. Scholar Naila Hamdy focused on the need for professional training and the need for a national policy of media development by the government. According to Botros Botros-Ghali, former Secretary-General of the United Nations, media figures must be fluent in other languages besides English [and French] like Russian, Chinese and Japanese.
  A new code of ethics should be instilled to implement the following recommendations:
  1. Creating a legal environment that protects the rights of members of the press. This requires new laws to reform the existing ones.
  2. Focusing on journalists’ skills & financial stability.
  3. Institution building by utilizing information technology, developing new financial relationships with national & international press partners.
  4. Building journalists’ professional ethics & ensuring that they can continue improving their skills.
  5. Empowering experts to measure the press’s independence, integrity & competence.
  This final point entails three important components that are noteworthy:
   Independence = Enacting freedom of expression, press ability to access information, absence of censorship & journalist’s professional independence.
   Integrity = Setting up clear standards & ethics for professional journalists including
  a. Searching for the truth
  b. Honesty
  c. Loyalty
  d. Accuracy
  e. Objectivity
  f. Respecting news sources
  g. Protecting Privacy
  h. Avoiding defamation
  i. Refusing bribes (money or junkets)
  j. Fighting against corruption
  k. Refusing to submit to others’ views through media diversity & equal access to content.
   Competence = Assuring professional qualifications & providing opportunities for periodic training
  Our press shall be independent. No authority shall interfere in selecting editors-in-chief or in newspapers’ political tendencies. If selecting editors-in-chief by the Shura Council used to be the norm, after the Revolution, it would be a shame to still keep these rules. A separation must be made between the ruling authority and newspapers’ editorial stance. In a democracy, though rulers may be changed, editorial policy may not. (44)
  The media should be more effective in supporting democracy and human rights in Egypt. As such, it would first have to build a secular middle class, reach a level of economic growth and foster a democratic culture. Furthermore, toward a secure exit from the crisis, Dr. Mohamed El Said Idris stresses the necessity of a social-political contract between the leader and his citizens
  that works as a compass which directs the government toward good governance based on complete justice and freedom.
  Repressive regimes everywhere are finding it much harder to control the flow of information. Whereas security forces have tried to close down the internet as in the case of Egypt during the January 25th Revolution, people are often quick to find ways to dispatch and receive information.
  Despite the challenges facing the emerging Egyptian democracy, there is an opportunity for national dialogue that can lead to a new constitution meeting the needs and aspirations of all members of the society. Few minimum requirements of democracy are freedom of expression, the right to vote, free and fair elections. Nevertheless, democracy is not just voting as it may produce populous despotism. (45) Therefore, “[t]he most important aspect of Egyptian democracy-building will not be the elections. It will be the writing of the constitution and making sure there are guarantees for women, for minorities, for free speech and for free assembly.” (46)
  Regrettably, democracy in Egypt represents some piecemeal reforms but has little to do with changing the existing power structure. While the press has opened up in a number of ways in the wake of the Revolution, reform of the media is still underway. Journalists still face government repression and state media still largely act as a government’s mouthpiece. For instance, during the interim period, the SCAF applied restrictions on any reports, topics, news, statements, complaints, advertisements, pictures pertaining to the armed forces. In March 2011, SCAF had summoned and interrogated several journalists in military courts. Red line used to be Mubarak then it was the Military Council and now doubts surrounds Morsi’s real intentions in this respect. Unfortunately, Al-Ahram new editor-in-chief cancelled a page tracing how Morsi was faring in fulfilling the promises of his first 100 days in office. No reason was given. Also, one critic was asked to tone down an article in which she criticized MB for trying to dominate the state and its apparatuses. Her article was pulled after she refused to change the phrase, “journalism has worn a veil.” (47)
  Political scientist Daniel Brumberg calls it an “endless transition” that would never reap results and would only enrage regime opponents. The US and EU concur that such change would be gradual. To them, economic reform had to precede political reform.
  Some Pointers for Consideration
  Although the way forward may seem vague, rigorous developments will likely force the issue.
  First, corruption cases of media officials will certainly expose the decay inside these institutions.
  Second, the frustrated employees who chose to be discreet could easily protest if disgraced editors are not replaced, wages are unpaid, prosecutions do not materialize, or reform gets delayed.
  Third, elections for the Press Syndicate should be free and transparent under the new regime that should not aim to co-opt its members so easily. This entails reviewing the structure and role of the Press Syndicate and transforming it into an independent institution that supervises national and independent press. This demand needs learning from other successful experience to emulate good practice. In sum, a democratic regime functions alongside a democratic media. (48)
  Fourth, the election of a new parliament representing all parties will create a new pressure point for those seeking reform to rush to this parliament demanding that their positions and salaries be safeguarded.
  Fifth, the Constitution should devise a new manner rather than the current arrangement of attaching the press to the Shura Council. (49)
  Finally, free access and flow of information should be guaranteed to all media who shall be credible and transparent in their reporting.
  In Search for a Model
  Two types of press institutions have been described; the market model and the public sphere model. Whereas the market model treats the press as any other business institution, run for profit with readers being merely customers. Public sphere model advocates that press should uphold the interests of the public who should be treated as citizens not customers. (50)
   Free Model – spreading information to the public free of charge (internet);
   Less-is-more Model – deciding to maximize profits – often at the expense of the quality of news coverage.
   Advertising Revenue Model – relying mainly on advertising as the newspaper’s primary source of revenue. Yet, advertising alone can’t support press organizations.
   Subscription Model – charging readers for online editions through a monthly subscription. Examples: Newsday and The Wall Street Journal.
   Micropayment Model – charging readers a small sum for each article they receive. Example: The Financial Times.
   Non-profit Model – aiming at merely promoting social welfare rather than making a profit.
   Niche Market Profit – targeting a small but affluent readership through directing messages at specialized interests, tastes and groups.
   Collaborative Model – pooling their resources through combining business operations (sharing articles & photos) of competing newspapers in a geographic area while maintaining separate – and competitive – enterprises.
   State-run Model – generating revenue through public taxes. The press is owned by the public but operated by the government. (Authoritarian countries find this model very handy to control the press). In Sweden, at least two newspapers must be published in every town; one is liberal and the other is conservative. If one is unprofitable, the town taxes and donations go to support the struggling paper.
   Investment Capital Model – assuming that the press is a sound investment; accordingly, it aims at attracting investors.
   Employee-owned Model – forming a union that purchases the newspaper; hence, making the employees co-owners. The rationale behind that is that employees are familiar with the operation more than others. (51)
   The Guardian Model – Being run by Guardian Newspaper Limited (GNL) and guided by the values of Scott Trust – founded in 1936 – to uphold and protect the newspaper’s independence. The Guardian conducts social audits in order to evaluate the impact of its overall activities ranging from news coverage, environmental effect and response of the newspaper’s stakeholders like readers, journalists and advertisers regarding the paper’s performance. (52) The Trust sees its main functions as being the following: a. To secure the Trust’s own continuity by renewing its membership and by dealing with threats to its existence; b. To monitor the organization, financial management and overall strategy of the Group, holding the board accountable for its performance; c. To appoint and ‘in extreme circumstances’ to dismiss the editors of The Guardian. d. To act as a ‘court of appeal’ in the event of any dispute between the editorial & managerial sides of the operations. (53)
  Revamping the Same Old Road
  In her article, “Reclaiming the State Media,” published by Al-Ahram Weekly, journalist Awatef Abdel-Rahman posits the following recommendations:
  First, abolishing articles contained in The Press Regulation Law of 1996 restricting freedoms and clamping down on journalists.
  Second, guaranteeing professional and administrative autonomy of national press under the ownership of the state but within the supervision of the Press Syndicate who’s responsible for ensuring complete application of the journalist’s Charter of Honor.
  Third, the Press Syndicate should be the main body to select editors-in-chief based on a criterion of professional and ethical standards drafted by the Press Syndicate. Candidates must present proposals envisioning the development of state journalistic establishments. Selected editors-in-chief must be accountable to the Press Syndicate.
  Fourth, each newspaper should hold elections for their board of directors who shall be accountable to the Parliament.
  Fifth, Newspapers’ Board of Directors together with the Press Syndicate shall be accountable for advertisement content.
  Sixth, a new budgetary and accounting system should be applied by the Press Syndicate to all newspapers.
  Seventh, periodic professional training and awareness-raising sessions for all levels of journalists must be conducted on a regular basis after which journalists who pass certain courses obtain certificates that guarantee their promotion.
  Eighth, freeing and purging national newspapers from business interests.
  Mixed-Revenue Model
  In a report composed by Ben Compaine of The Huffington Post entitled “Newspapers shouldn’t be seeking – and don’t need – government help,” he suggests three proposals: One advocating that newspapers should concert to non-profit status. Hence, their operating revenues would be tax-exempt.
  Second proposal claims to find ways of making money from putting the newspaper’s work online.
  Third proposal asserts a foundation-supported model whose mission is to support the press. “The journalism business will be stronger and more credible if it avoids the government’s embrace.” (54) Indeed, The Huffington Post (Huff Po) and The Atlantic Philanthropies announced in 2009 of a new Huff Fund to support investigative journalism with US$1.75 million to preserve investigative journalism and its pertinent role in democracy.
  Nevertheless, whether this final proposal safeguards a newspaper’s complete independence remains controversial!
  Going Private – BBC Experience
  Some people claim that the solution to the debacle of national press in Egypt is in journalism privatization to reconstruct the media. As such, many journalists prefer the ‘public service’ model in which the press is financed by people’s taxes like that of the BBC.
  Others assume that press privatization isn’t the real solution and is difficult to achieve. To reform the structure of the press, they propose abolishing the Ministry of Information and replacing it with a Supreme Council of the Media, which would be responsible for planning and coordinating between media channels within a framework of a national strategy composed of representatives of experienced journalists, scholars and a group of political, legal, cultural and social of various dispositions. Also, this council would be responsible for electing media leadership on the basis of professional competence, ethical practices and moral integrity.
  But beyond vague suggestions of a BBC model for the Egyptian media, few proposals for political restructuring have been advanced. Nevertheless, advocators of this model emphasize learning from and emulating BBC’s successful experience where media is a public service financed by people to cater public interest.
  Conclusion & Recommendations
  The coverage of the January 25th 2011 Revolution by national print media proved to be a fiasco; a disaster by all means that turned Egyptian people away in search for credible and transparent news from independent press, social media and foreign media. Such coverage instilled distrust in people’s minds; hence, proving that there is an internal decay that needs to be addressed and remedied at once.
  The national press ought to be published for readers under a regime that does not co-opt the media, a regime that facilitates free access and flow of information. Its mission should be promoting and supporting democracy and human rights. The press must be independent in terms of finance and administration. Initially, a new constitution should be drafted defining the role of the press and media in general and guaranteeing freedom of expression and opinion. This constitution should also define the exact role of the president of the country, obligations,
  responsibilities and his power limitation. Once a constitution is organized, all government branches will be organized. Notably, if Egypt aspires to establish a democratic regime, there must be a democratic media to begin with.
  Nonetheless, national press should neither be owned by the government nor be fully privatized in order to continue its watchdogging role, expressing all segments of the society and not leaning toward one particular sector or expressing the opinion of its owner.
  The jurisdiction of the SPC should be revised to clearly indicate whether it is an administrator on behalf of the owner of national newspapers or as a council with moral powers, representing public opinion and safeguarding professional ethics.
  Regarding the selection of editors-in-chief, I would recommend changing the structure of the national press, to safeguard its independence, by having its own internal independent system in selecting its editor-in-chief and staff on grounds of efficiency, ethical practices and moral integrity rather than being selected by the Shura Council. This will guarantee that the press’s employees will not be indebted to any external institution for their posts or promotions.
  Egyptian press has its distinctive character; however, that requires a culturally sensitive approach that could borrow from various models. (55) Regarding its functioning, it may also be advisable to combine models – BBC Model & Collaborative Model – especially under the present political turmoil; while Egypt is staggering to put its house in order. While the first model represents a public service financed by the people, the second model can revive struggling newspapers by combining business operations through sharing articles and photos leading to a win/win situation. a public service financed by people to cater public interest.
  Moreover, national press can benefit from others’ good practice like that of The Guardian, one of the most respected newspapers which has taken leaps toward conducting social audits to evaluate the impact of its overall activities ranging from news coverage, environmental effect and response of the newspaper’s stakeholders like readers, journalists and advertisers regarding the paper’s performance. Likewise, training to support print and electronic journalism should be carried out.
  Toward that end, it is imperative to revive the structure and role of the Press Syndicate and to transform it into an independent institution that supervises national and independent press alike. Regarding the retirement age, some journalists expressed their desire to extend it for national press establishment employees, beyond sixty years, year by year as long as he/she is able to do so, provided journalists can retire with pension at 60.
  The fact that Egyptians discovered a power they did not know they had reflects how it turned out that they did not have to wait for democracy. To them, real change doesn’t happen through
  violence and doesn’t necessarily come through NGOs. Change starts with a vision and when people desire it.
  Finally, progress happens when a country draws a specific and clear strategy for itself and when it knows exactly what it wants. If Egypt is proud of its past; it is likely to take good care of its present and invest in its future.
  References:
  (1) Custer, Jon. Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE Development BLOG),
  www.cipe.org/blog. 3 May 2012.
  (2) Editorial. “Reforming the National media,” Al-Ahram Weekly. Issue 1105.
  Weekly.ahram.org.eg. 5-11 July 2012.
  (3) Black, Jeffrey. “Egypt’s Press: More Free, Still Fettered.” Arab Media & Society.
  (Formerly TBS Journal) Issue 4. www.arabmediasociety.com. Winter 2008.
  (4) The Press in Egyptian Legislation. Part III: National Newspapers. Chapter 1. Freedom of
  Expression Project. www.library.cornell.edu Pp.1-8.
  (5) Ibid.
  (6) Black. 2008.
  (7) Rugh, Willaim A. (2004) Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio & Television in Arab
  Politics. Praeger: Westport, Connecticut, London. P.126.
  (8) Black. 2008.
  (9) Freedom of Expression Project. pp.1-8.
  (10) Freedom of Expression Project. pp.1-8. (11) Brown, Nathan. “Can the Colossus Be Salvaged? Egypt’s State-Owned Press in a Post- Revolutionary Environment.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/
  (12) Mostafa, Hala. “The Egyptian Revolution … The Return of Spirit & Awareness.” Al-Ahram
  Democracy Review. 2nd Ed. Issue 42. April 2011. Pp. 6-14.
  (13) Biswas, M. “Media Freedom, Governance and Civil Society” Paper presented at The Annual
  Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Hotel Intercontinental, New
  Orleans from http://www.allacademic.com 01-07-2009.
  (14) Abdalla, Nagwa. “The Role of the Media in the Democratic Transition in Egypt.”
  Al-Ahram Democracy Review. 2nd Ed. Issue 42. April 2011. Pp. 6-14.
  (15) “Reforming the National media,” Al-Ahram Weekly. 5-11 July 2012.
  (16) El Sergany, Khaled. Performance of Mass Media: January 25th Revolution (Initial Readings
  and Futuristic Vision). Al-Ahram. April 2011. Pp.121-131.
  (17) Barakat, Dr. Walid F., El Guindy, Prof. Dr. Ibtessam A., Fahmy, Dr. Amany E. and Salah El
  Din, Dr. Khaled. “Rebuilding the Broadcasting System in Egypt after the January 25th
  Revolution” Presented under the auspices of Dr. Emad El Din Abou Ghazi,
  Minister of Culture at Opera House. March 30 – 31, 2011.
  (18) Mohamed, Ali Sayed. “On the Road to Democracy.” Journal of Arab and Muslim Media
  Research. Assuit University. July 1, 2011.
  (19) April 6 Youth Movement. “Demand Your right in any Form you like.”
  Shabab6april.mov@gmail.com
  (20) Elmasry, Mohamad Hamad. “Producing News in Mubarak’s Egypt: an analysis of Egyptian
  Newspaper production during the late Hosni Mubarak era.” Journal of Arab & Muslim
  Media Research. Vol. 4 No. 2 & 3.The American University in Cairo. July 1, 2011.
  (21) Ibid.
  (22) Barakat, et al., 2011 (23) Brown, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
  (24) Samy, Mostafa. Political Affairs: “Shura Council & Selecting Editors-in-Chief.” Al-Ahram.
  24 July 2012. P.11.
  (25) Ahtisaari, Martti. “Soldiers, politicians and constitutions: Why it matters to all Egyptians to
  get the relationship right.” Elders Blog. 14 June 2012.
  www.theelders.org
  (26) Ibid.
  (27) El Gamal, Dr. Yehia. “The Credibility of Mass Media.” Al-Masry Al-Youm. August 6,
  2012. P.13.
  (28) Steffens, Brian L. & Lambeth, Ed. Quill. 00336475, Vol. 81, Issue 7. Sept. 93.
  (29) Compaine, Ben. “Newspapers shouldn’t be seeking – and don’t need – government help.”
  The Huffington Post (Huff Po) May 16, 2009.
  (30) From a Seminar sponsored by Adam Smith Institute 1985 – David Graham, Director of
  Diverse Production www.adamsmith.org.
  (31) El Gamal. Al-Masry Al-Youm. P.13.
  (32) Eissa, Salah. “Press Freedom in the new Constitution Discussions” Al-Ahram. July 24,
  2012. P.10.
  (33) Omar, Nabil. “Freedom in Jeopardy!” Special Papers. Al-Ahram. August 14, 2012. P.4. (34) Brown, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
  (35) Ragab, Ahmed. “½ a Word.” Akhbar El Youm. July 21, 2012. www.akhbarelyom.org.eg.
  (36) Basil, Abdel Azim. “Wanted: An editor-in-Chief.” Al-Ahram. 7 July 2012.
  (37) El Kafas, Nasr. “Accept Our Condolences.” Al-Ahram. 7 July 2012.
  (38) Saeed, Dr. Abdel Moneim. “Shura Council and the National Press.” Al-Ahram. 7 July 2012.
  (39) Zayed, Dr. Ahmed. “Archeology of the January Revolution and the Revival of the Middle
  Class.” Al-Ahram Democracy Review. 2nd Edition. Issue 42. April 2011. P.30.
  (40) Al-Hussainy, Asmaa. “No to Editors-in-chief selected by the Shura Council” Al-Ahram.
  July 30, 2012. P.11.
  (41) Said, Abdel Moneim. “Reforming the National Press. The Media in Egypt needs to be
  overhauled, but not merely to guarantee freedoms of expression and speech.” April 1,
  2012. Ahram Online. http://english.ahram.org.eg.
  (42) Habib, Nader. “The Mirror of Society?” Al-Ahram Weekly. Issue 957. 23-29 July 2009.
  (43) Abdel-Rahman, Awatef. “Reclaiming the State Media.” Al-Ahram Weekly. Issue. 1082.
  26 Jan. – 1 Feb. 2012.
  (44) Idris, Dr. Mohamed El Said. “Toward a Secure Exit from the Crisis” Al-Ahram. 1 February
  2011. P.10.
  (45) Ramadan, Abdel Moneim. “Our Incomplete Democracy.” Al-Ahram. 3 July 2012.
  (46) Zakaria, Fareed. “The Real Obstacle to Democracy in Egypt”
  http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com May 22, 2012.
  (47) McGrath, Cam. “Veil Falls Over Egyptian Media” Inter Press Service News Agency.
  August 25, 2012.
  www.ipsnews.net/2012/08/veil-falls-over-egyptian-media/
  (48) Abdel Aziz, Yasser. “The Future of National Print Media” January 25th Revolution: Initial
  Reading and Futuristic Vision. Edited by Dr. Amr Hashem Rabie. Third Edition.
  Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies. April 2011. Pp.403-416.
  (49) Ahtisaari, 2012.
  (50) Silverblatt, Art. “Business Models for a Battered Journalism Industry.” St. Louis Journalism
  Review. Vol. 39. Issue 316, Nov/Dec 2009. pp.26-28.
  (51) Ibid.
  (52) Hossain, Mohammad Delwar. Jaehnig, Walter B. “Social Responsibility of the Press in
  Developing and Western Countries.” A Comparative Case Study of the Prothom Alo,
  Bangladesh.
  (53) The Guardian www.en.wikipedia.org
  (54) Mostafa. Al-Ahram Democracy Review.
  (55) Rozumilowicz & Stefaan G. Verhulst. (2002). “Media Reform: Democratizing the Media,
  Democratizing the State.” (Ed.) Monroe E. rice, Beata. London: Routledge
• Theology and Democratization: The Role of Religious Forces in the Aftermath of the Egyptian Revolution
  Nesreen K. El Molla
  ABSTRACT
  Liberal Democratic Theory has often advocated for the strict separation between the state and religion; confining the later to the private sphere. Over the past year, Islamist movements have increasingly managed to translate their popular standing into sweeping election successes especially in the Arab Spring region. This has raised the inevitable concern of whether political Islam can be compatible with democratic transformation or not.
  Due to this fact, the paper aims at examining the role such religious forces can play in the democratization process in Egypt and whether the political opening and attainment of power can affect their ideological and political stances or not.
  1. INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
  The role of religion in the public domain represents one of the main features of the post revolutionary phase in Egypt. According to some analysts, this may disrupt the process of democratization of the country. On the theoretical level, the Liberal Democratic Theory has often advocated for the strict separation between the state and religion; confining the later to the private sphere. Over the past year, Islamist movements have increasingly managed to translate their popular standing into sweeping election successes especially in the Arab Spring region. This has raised the inevitable concern of whether political Islam can be compatible with democratic transformation or not.
  With the demise of the authoritarian regime in Egypt and the current transition towards a democratic system, Islamist forces specifically the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists have been allowed to widen their scope of operations and activities, and to institutionalize their efforts into political parties that have come at the forefront of the current political landscape of the country.
   A Ph.D. Candidate at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science (FEPS) – Cairo University
  2
  1.1 Main Problem Statement
  It is worth mentioning that the complex relationships between the role of religious forces – newly attaining power – and state are still under-theorized and under-researched in the existing social science literature, as these are primarily linked to the Arab Spring phenomenon.
  To this end, the main problem statement of the paper is examining the expected role that can be played by the religious forces in the democratization process in Egypt and whether the political opening and attainment of power can affect the ideological and political stances of these forces or not.
  Through a comparative approach between the Muslim Brotherhood represented by the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and the Salafists represented by the Nour Party, the novelty in this paper is manifested in that it aims at the following :
   Scrutinizing and examining the beliefs, ultimate goals, and platforms of both the Freedom and Justice party (FJP) of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Nour party of the Salafists.
   Assessing the impact of the inter-generational dimension within these forces – specifically within the Muslim Brotherhood – on their political stances and choices with regards to the democratization process in Egypt.
  1.2 Research Questions
  In addition to the main problem statement, the paper aims at examining a number of research questions that include but are not limited to the following:
   To what extent political Islam can be compatible with democracy?
   How pluralism and political opening are affecting the ideological stances of the two main religious forces in Egypt? To what extent these forces coincide or depart from each other on specific political issues; such as the nature of the state, civil and political rights, and foreign policy orientations?
   What implications the state-religion relations may have on the quality of democracy under-examined.
  3
  1.3 Methodology:
  In doing so, the paper will examine the formal rhetoric/ discourse of the different Islamist forces in Egypt against their on-ground actions. This will entail studying their official statements; examining their discourse as expressed in their newly developed political platforms in relation to their actions and practices on ground. It is worth noting that such research efforts might be confronted with two main methodological challenges. The first is the difficulty in differentiating between the religious forces on one side and their institutional political set up ; as parties from the other side. Accordingly, throughout the paper the terms Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) , for example, might be used interchangeably.
  The second challenge is the absence of the inter -generational conflict within the Salafists as a religious force, due its recent presence on the political landscape. Thus, in addressing the inter-generational conflict, the paper will be only confined to the Muslim Brotherhood in tackling this aspect.
  2. THE RISE OF POLITICAL ISLAM AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION IN EGYPT: WILL THEY MATCH?
  The Arab Spring at first had nothing about it that was specifically “Arab” or “Muslim.” The demonstrators were calling for dignity, elections, democracy, good governance, and human rights. The main focus was thus individual citizenship and not some holistic entity such as “the people,” the “Muslim Community Umma”, or the “Arab Nation”1. Despite this fact, religion was not entirely absent from these revolutions. The demonstrators did not take power — indeed, they did not even try. Instead, they merely wanted to establish a new political scene. Predictably, the Egyptian and Tunisian elections brought ballot-box triumphs for Islamist parties2.
  In the Egyptian revolution, the rise of political Islam was a predictable phenomenon. Religion as a factor was not a main driver for the revolution, however it was present in many forms; some of which were tactical, while others were symbolic.
  The tactical presence was evident during the revolution; this was clearly manifested with the role of mosques in organizing and mobilizing citizens.
  1 Olivier Roy, ” The Transformation of the Arab World”, Journal of Democracy, Volume 23,July 2012
  2 Ibid
  4
  On the symbolic level, religion was present with the Islamists movements – and mainly the Muslim Brotherhood – taking part at the revolution; though in a non institutional and fragmented way 3. The Salafists, as well, had a role only at the last weeks of the revolution and beginning with the post revolutionary phase despite the fact that Salafists were against the revolution at the beginning due to religious and ideological obligations that forbid revolution on the ruler.
  In fact, one may say that since the collapse of the Mubarak regime, the Islamist forces particularly the Muslim Brotherhood were accused of hijacking the revolution. This was understood in light of the pragmatic and self centered approach that was adopted by the Brotherhood since the last days of the revolution. The Brotherhood engaged in negotiations with different players during the last few days of the revolution to test waters. In early February 2011, Omar Suleiman, then Vice President, brought together several political groups and organizations, including members of the Brotherhood, to negotiate a deal in an effort to thwart the revolution4. Despite the failure of these talks, the Brotherhood continued their willingness to negotiate in their relationship with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) until tensions aroused between both parties and the Brotherhood held a strong grip on the politics of the game then became at the forefront of the political scene.
  In the Egyptian case , the expansion of the role of religion in the post revolutionary phase is natural and expected. Two reasons can explain the smooth rise of the Islamist forces during and after the revolution. The first is that religion had a positive presence that was consistent with the mood of consensus that prevailed during the revolution. The second is the spontaneous harmony that occurred amongst the different political forces during the revolution; the single goal was overthrowing a long standing autocratic regime regardless of the political or ideological
  3 Khalil Al Anani, ” The role of religion in the public domain in Egypt after the January 25 revolution”, Research Papers, Arab center for Research and Policy Studies, April 2012 ( Available at: http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/d0b4cc5e-93d7-44ef-aacb-c0177157c490)
  4 Dan Murphy, “Will Egypt’s government now strike a deal with the Muslim Brotherhood?,” Copt Science Monitor, February 6, 2011 ( Available at: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0206/Will-Egypts-government-now-strike-a-deal-with-the-Muslim-Brotherhood)
  5
  differences that attributed those who revolted5. By achieving the common shared goal, the religious and Islamist forces became more vocal and visible than before.
  On the possible compatibility or clash between political Islam and democratic transformation in general, it has been mistakenly believed by a considerable number of Western scholars that Islam and democracy share different philosophical and historical assumptions and are thus incompatible. Moreover, a number of Western scholars have tried to present Islam as anti-democratic and inherently authoritarian6. Many voices has even warned that the Arab Spring might end up as an “Islamist Winter”, and that the Islamists, though claiming to support democracy, will soon turn against it. By misrepresenting Islam in this way, Islam was perceived as incorporating a set of values inferior to Western liberalism and thus constituting a barrier in the way of progress of civilizations. The Turkish and Malaysian models have set a positive example for the co-existence of democracy with religion. Moreover, with the wake of the Arab Spring, the relationship between political Islam and democracy became one of the controversial topics to the extent that one might talk about a fourth wave of democratization.
  In the Egyptian case, the assumption that political Islam is contradictory to democratic transformation can be perceived as a kind of fallacy. One may say that whatever new state emerges in Egypt, almost certainly, won’t be democratic in the liberal and European tradition7. Thus we might find ourselves before a new modality for democratization; in the Islamist outlook. With both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists coming at the forefront of the political landscape, many analysts argued that both are not known for their attachment to democracy. Even if they have given up talk of the “Islamist Revolution,” they still put religion at the heart of their agenda8.
  This paper argues that Islamist parties may have more power and freedom to maneuver from the famous Western model of democracy, but they too will find themselves being pushed to adjust to
  5 Khalil Al Anani, Ibid.
  6 Rahil Yasin, “Are Islam And Democracy Compatible?”, Countercurrents, 21 March, 2009 (Available at: http://www.countercurrents.org/yasin210309.htm)
  7 Timothy Stanley, An Islamist state in Egypt can still mean democracy”, CNN Website, 27 June, 2012 (Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2012/06/27/opinion/stanley-morsi-islam/index.html)
  8 Olivier Roy, Ibid.
  6
  the democratization process (even in their own format) due to the constraints and characteristic of the social, religious, political, and geostrategic fields in which these parties must operate.
  In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the Egyptian revolution specifically, the religious forces might find themselves sidelined9 . Not only that, but an open and participatory modality of governance will be the only chance for Islamist forces to survive and build their legitimate presence. The Islamists must also listen to their voters, who will not follow them blindly. Furthermore, the presumption that Egypt’s political Islam is the vanguard of theocratic dictatorship ignores historical and contemporary evidence which proves that Islam is simply too complex to be stereotyped as the faith of tyrants10. It would thus seem as a matter of stereotyping by assuming that a democrat should always be a liberal by definition. It would be even a mistake for scholars and the international community to use the election results to assume either that the future of Egypt is assured, or that the country is destined for Islamist leadership.
  An insight into Western history would also emphasize this argument. Religious tolerance in the west was not necessarily the fruit of liberalism and enlightenment. Rather, it was the byproduct of the savage wars of religion which resulted at a later stage in the Treaty of Westphalia in 164811. The paper argues that politics has always played a bigger role than philosophy or theology. Fathers of the United States were not secularists; for them, the separation of church and state was a way of protecting religion from government, not the reverse12.
  To this end, the paper argues that that the revolution has begun to break such stereotypes, revealing a more moderate Muslim Brotherhood than many expected. So far, observing the discourse of the presidency and the government of the Muslim Brotherhood, it is becoming clear that radical Islam will not be utilized by the Brotherhood and its supporters, yet there is an explicit emphasis and inclination by officials towards embracing democratic, national and civilian traits in their discourse .
  9 Ibid.
  10 Timothy Stanley, Ibid
  11 Olivier Roy, Ibid
  12 Ibid.
  7
  3. THE BROTHERHOOD AND THE SALAFISTS IN THEORY AND ACTION: A DIFFERNCE IN TACTICS RATHER THAN GOALS OR PRINCIPLES
  In the immediate aftermath of the Egyptian revolution, both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists institutionalized their efforts into political parties. Having the largest number of votes in the first parliamentary elections in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) along with the Salafist al-Nour Party represented what was termed as the newly arising political Islam. Despite the centrality of religion to both parties, yet, there are indeed important differences between both trends but these are really issues of timing and tactics rather than of goals or principles13.
  As a general remark, many analysts agree that the Muslim Brotherhood is a “moderate Islamist” group while the Salafists are explicitly radical. The Brotherhood – according to this viewpoint – seeks to transform Egypt into a state governed by the “Islamic Sharia”. It is, however, more cautious and smarter into the transformation process in comparison to the Salafists who are new comers to the political scene. Due to the lack of political experience on the Salafists’ side, their image was perceived as more of a fundamentalist, puritanical stream of Islamism14.
  In order to highlight how pluralism and political opening are affecting the ideological stances of the two religious forces and the extent to which these forces coincide, when and how they depart from each other, the paper will investigate into the stances of both parties concerning specific policy issues using their platforms and official discourse as the main guidance of analysis. These include the following:
   The stance towards the Islamic Sharia ( Islamist Rule) and the civil state;
   The perception of the role of women;
   The perception of the Egyptian Copts;
   The foreign policy orientations.
  13 Barry Rubin, “Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists: Same Goals; Different Strategies”, The Global research in International Affairs (Gloria) Center, December, 2011 (Available at: http://www.gloria-center.org/2011/12/muslim-brotherhood-and-salafists-same-goals-different-strategies-2/)
  14 Ibid.
  8
  3.1 The Stance Towards Islamic Sharia ( Islamist rule) and the Civil State
  In its political discourse, the (FJP) advocates for a political system that fully conforms with the Islamist norms and principles. This entails that the Islamist political values should be incorporated in legislation as well as in the life pattern of each individual. The (FJP) also aim at Islamizing the society through gradual work rather than sudden legislative change15.
  The main elements of the proposed state as elaborated by the Brotherhood is clearly manifested in the (FJP) platform under the section ” State Characteristics”. The proposed state according to the party’s platform is based on the principle of citizenship . It is attributed by being a constitutional, civil, democratic state (based on consultation)16 and governed by the rule of law17.
  The party has thus emphasized through its platform and through the official statements of its representatives its aim to establish a” civil state with an Islamist reference”18 . Moreover, the party elaborates in its platform what a civil state may entail. It emphasizes that the aspired state is neither a military state run by the military nor a theocracy run by the clergy19.
  To this end, the Islamic Sharia as understood by the (FJP) is aimed at regulating the day to day aspects of the political system and the lives of people but through generic and comprehensive guidelines and principles, leaving the specific details to the legislation and the proper interpretation of specialized scientists. Any interpretation of the Islamic Sharia should, thus, be based on the context and the changing needs of each era as advocated by members of the (FJP).
  As for the Salafists represented by the Nour party, one can say that the core issue tackled within the party’s platform was the issue of ” identity” especially with regards to its perception to the nature of the state.
  15 Nathan J. Brown, ” Egypt and Islamist Sharia: A Guide for the Perplexed”, Q&A, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May , 2012 (Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/05/15/egypt-and-islamic-sharia-guide-for-perplexed/argb)
  16 It is worth noting that platform equates between the connotation of the word democratic and the consultation process ( Shurra).
  17 The Freedom and Justice Party platform 2011, (available at http://www.hurryh.com/Party_Program.aspx)
  18 Khaled Hefni, ” Adopting a Civil State with an Islamist Reference” , El Masry El Youm Newspaper, December 3rd, 2011
  19 The Freedom and Justice Party platform 2011, Ibid
  9
  Although the party emphasizes in its platform that the state should not be a theocracy, yet, it also refused a non-religious state. The party aspires for a democratic state within the context of the Islamist Sharia (rule). 20It explicitly emphasized that it is against a civil state since it is equated to a secular state that maintains strict separation between religion and politics according to its perception. In this regards, the party advocates for “a state with Islamist reference in principles, objectives and guidelines21 . ” Going beyond that, the party also emphasized the necessity that the president of Egypt should be a “Muslim – Male” as stated by the spokesman of the party; Mohamed Nour , since it is religiously unacceptable that a woman leads from their perception22.
  3.2 The Perception of the Role of Women
  The (FJP) adopted in its platform a stance that is pro-women empowerment along with an attempt to investigate into the main reasons that were behind her marginalization during the past decades.
  Practically speaking, The (FJP) took concrete actions to prove its stance. It nominated 76 women on its electoral lists during the first parliamentary elections in the aftermath of the revolution. Moreover, the party managed to achieve the highest percentage of women success within the elected parliament in comparison to other parties and political forces.
  Despite this fact, some contradiction in discourse may appear with regards to the perception to the role of women. A significant example was clear when the (FJP) members criticized the committee on the “Elimination of Discrimination Against Women” because of the claim that the committee’s provisions violate Sharia- based rule about guardianship in the case of divorce23. As for the Nour party, it emphasized in its platform the respect to the role of women. Moreover, the platform emphasized that that the work of women is not a shame or a fault if the main principles and ethics of the Islamist Sharia (rule) were taken into account by women workers.
  20 Osama Saleh, ” The Cautious Approach: Will the Rising Islamist Movements Restructure the Arab State”, Al Syassa Al Dawlia: Strategic Transformation Papers, issue no. 188, April 2012, P. 19
  21 Ibid.
  22 Al Mashhad Journal, 17/1/2012
  23 Nathan J. Brown, Ibid.
  10
  The party also referred to statistics highlighting that 30% of the Egyptian families are being taken care of by women. More importantly, the party referred to the role of women during the era of prophet Mohamed where women used to go out during wars and conflicts to cure war injuries24.
  3.3 The Perception of the Egyptian Copts
  The (FJP) adopted a relatively open stance towards the Egyptian Copts. The party emphasizes the notion of citizenship and the equality of all Egyptians in rights and obligations before the law despite their religious or sexual affiliations. Moreover, the statements adopted by the party members’ assure that Copts are not a minority but rather partners with their Muslim counterparts. It also emphasizes that the negative image concerning the Brotherhood stance from the Copts had been an attempt from the old regime to widen the religious gap among the Egyptian citizens, and to increase and deepen domination over the state, institutions and the citizens25.
  To prove its good intentions, the (FJP) appointed the Copt intellectual Rafik Habib as a deputy to the president of the party. The party also emphasized in its platform the right of non Muslims to resort to their religious and personal status laws concerning their own affairs 26.
  As for the Salafists, the Nour party emphasized the full rights of the Egyptian Copts as partners, however they additionally expressed on numerous occasions that they were against the appointment of a non Muslim for the position of the president especially that the constitution stipulates explicitly that the religion of the nation is the Islam. On the other hand, the party has opened its membership to Muslims and non- Muslims alike.
  3.4 The Foreign Policy Orientations:
  The foreign policy orientations of the (FJP) and eventually the Brotherhood is clearly manifested in the party’s platform and is based on three main principles; the first is regaining Egypt’s position regionally and internationally, the second is maintaining a balanced and open relationship with all
  24 The official website of the Nour party; (available at: http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_headers)
  25 Alyoum 7 Newspaper, March 2, 2011 ( Available at: http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=361708&SecID=97&IssueID=106)
  26 The Freedom and Justice Party platform 2011, Ibid.
  11
  regional and international powers, and the third is preserving the dignity of Egyptians living abroad27.
  The First Principle; Regaining Egypt’s Position Regionally and Internationally: The (FJP) platform stipulates that Egypt has suffered during the past decade from a deterioration in its position and role whether at the regional or international levels. This has been a result of the practices of the old regime as clearly expressed in the platform. The (FJP) proposed a number of measures that should be adopted to regain Egypt’s role and position. These included emphasizing the importance of the Arab, African and Islamist foreign policy circles alike. A special emphasizes was made to the River Nile file. The platform stressed on the necessity of initiating joint developmental projects in Africa to fortify relations with African neighbors and to ensure the sustainability of the Nile water to Egypt. Emphasis was also granted to the relations with the Arab countries highlighting that the Egyptian national security is directly linked and affected by its relations with the Arab world. A just and fair settlement to the Palestinian case was also emphasized within the platform ensuring the Palestinian people’s rights of having their own state with Jerusalem as its capital.
  On the Islamist circle; the platform emphasized the necessity of opening channels and venues for cooperation with the Islamist countries and powers alike. The platform also gave a special status to the role of Al – Azhar in disseminating moderate Islam and in acting as a lead institution within the Islamist world.
  On the international circle: the platform assured a number of principles that should be adopted, these included the following:
   Establishing a network of relations with worldwide countries on the basis of mutual respect, independence of decisions and mutual interests.
   Adhering to international conventions and agreements that Egypt had been part to, while ensuring that these conventions and agreements are popularly accepted. The platform emphasized that this principle necessitates that conventions and agreements should be based on equal attainment of the interests of all parties alike and noting that such agreements could be revisited or revised whenever needed.
  27 Ibid
  12
   Refusing the dominance of any super power – particularly the United States of America (USA) – on the international community or any possible intervention in the internal affairs of any country. The platform also called for revisiting the role of the United Nations (UN) to act as a more efficient and effective organ in the international system.
  The Second Principle; Maintaining a Balanced and Open Relationship with all Regional and International Powers: This entails allowing for a margin of maneuvering in international politics. The platform stressed that relations should be based on mutual interests and mutual respect.
  The Third Principle; Preserving the Dignity of the Egyptians Living Abroad: This entails adopting principles that ensure the preservation of the dignity of Egyptians abroad.
  As for the Nour party, despite the fact that it shares the main principles adopted by the (FJP), yet it hadn’t identified detailed mechanisms for putting its principles into action. The main principles of the Nour party on foreign policy include the following:
   The establishment of relations with countries worldwide based on mutual interests, mutual respect and peaceful co-existence within a dialogue among civilizations rather than a clash of civilizations.
   The necessity of consolidating the diplomatic presence on both the regional and international levels. Special emphasis was dedicated to the African circle; especially the Nile River as well as the Islamist and Arab circles.
   Adhering to international conventions and agreements that Egypt had been part to and avoiding any irrational decisions which may drag the country into unpredictable conflicts worldwide.
   Emphasizing the independence of the decisions of the Egyptian policy makers based on the national interest.
   Emphasizing the necessity of relying on popular diplomacy along with formal and official diplomacy .
   The necessity of preserving the dignity of the Egyptians living abroad.
  13
  After highlighting the foreign policy orientations of both parties as reflected in their platforms and discourse, it is important to assess whether there had been an impact for the religious factor on the foreign policy orientations and preliminary actions of both parties or not. To this end a number of observations can be highlighted as follows:
   There is an evident similarity between the orientations of both parties with regards to the main aspects of foreign policy in the aftermath of the Egyptian revolution. Despite this fact, it was noted the (FJP) was more operational in reflecting its foreign policy orientations into a number of on-ground activities through the active role of its external relations unit in the party as well as the role of its main political figures in the realm of international relations. On the contrary to that, the Nour party didn’t reflect its foreign policy orientations into real on-ground activities in the foreign policy domain.
   The expected change within the Egyptian political system in the aftermath of the revolution may not necessarily lead to a complete discard of the old foreign policy orientations.
   To date, the role of the religious factor is not that evident with regards to the perceptions and the political discourse of both the (FJP) and the Nour parties. Pragmatism and strategic interests is the main driver of both activities and decisions with regards to foreign policy.
   Both parties emphasized their willingness to adhere to the international obligations that Egypt is part to. Despite this fact, leaders on both sides frequently stress that any party has the right to revisit the peace accords with Israel assuring that no unilateral decisions will be taken but, rather, decisions should be derived from the will of the will of the Egyptian people.
   The political platform of the Nour party was too short and not detailed in comparison with that of the (FJP). A number of reason are proposed to explain this fact. One of which could be the weak and immature experience of the Salafists in comparison to the Brotherhood who have been working in the political domain since decades . Another interpretation could be that the Salafists are willing to test waters before getting into any political commitments immediately in the aftermath of the revolution.
   Both parties gave special emphasis in their platforms to the African, Arab and Islamist circles, despite this fact, the Nour party platform did not address in its platform the importance of relations with the strategic partners such as the United States . Furthermore, it did not address the future relations with the emerging powers such as China and Malaysia for instance.
  14
   Two important transformations were noticed with regards to the role of the religious factor within the discourse of the two parties with regards to foreign policy. The first was that both parties are to a certain extent in agreement on the necessity of enhancing relations with the Islamist powers in the region namely Turkey and Iran. There has been even concrete steps towards resuming talks with Iran after decades. This was manifested by President’s Morsi’s visit to Iran on the meeting for the non alliance movement in August 2012.
  The second transformation is a tendency towards re-establishing the regional balance of power in the aftermath of the Egyptian revolution. In this regards, one might note that in the near future we might be before two regional settings; either an interest-based alliance comprising Egypt, Turkey and Iran or a traditional alliance comprising Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It is not quite clear yet which of the two alliances is most likely to take place. Again it is pragmatism and strategic interests that will determine the future orientation for the two parties.
  4. THE INTER-GENERATIONAL CONLICT WITHIN (THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
  Since the beginning of the Egyptian Revolution on January 25th , the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has tried to project an image of unity in its forces, actions and demands. In spite of this facade, the internal, operational and theoretical crises began to invade this show of unity28. Investigating into the internal structure of the Brotherhood, one can say that there are three main trends or groups within the Brotherhood as follows29:
  The conservative trend: is the group fully manipulating the guidance office ( Ershad) and the local offices of the Brotherhood. Their power is mainly derived from their dominance over the administrative and bureaucratic operations. Members of this group emphasize the adherence to the hierarchical structure and the rules and principles of the Brotherhood .
  28 Hany Nasira, The Internal Crisis of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the James Town foundation, Volume 9, Issue 16 , April 22, 2011, PP 5-6
  29 Mohamed Bassiuni Abd El Halim, ” The Generational Gap: The Aspects of the Internal Crises between the Muslim Brotherhood and their Leaders after the Revolution” Al Syassa Al Dawlia, Issue no. 188, April 2012
  15
  The pragmatic conservative trend: a group of members that abide by the rules and regulations of the Brotherhood but at the same time advocates for more participation by the other members. This group is more open to change but still is not that revolutionary.
  The reformist trend: a group of members that call for a renaissance and a renewal of thinking based on participation, openness and avoiding extremism. This trend is mostly comprised of youth who have their own revolutionary vision and aspirations. Members of this group have called for serious reforms of the movement’s political perspective and organization30. They are much more at ease with modernity and pluralistic politics than their elders, who have resisted internal attempts to democratize the decision-making process and open up to the outside. Members of this group have also demanded new ideologies that will lead the movement to more open perspectives, they also called for the dissolution of the organizational structure of the current Brotherhood and the formation of a transitional administrative council until new and free elections can be held31.
  Younger members of the group have used new media such as blogs , Facebook and Twitter to criticise their elders and to call for the democratising of the movement as a prerequisite to building a pluralistic civil state in Egypt. Their world-view is closer to that of their liberal and nationalist counterparts than to their conservative elders32. Frustrated by the closed leadership, younger members of the Brotherhood established four political parties of their own and were promptly expelled from the organisation for disobedience33.
  Against this background, the main elements of the inter- generational conflict within the Brotherhood was not absent from the revolutionary context in Egypt. The primary features of this conflict appeared on the decision of participation at the 25th of January revolution34. Despite the preliminary official stance of the Brotherhood of not participating in the revolution, this position
  30 Hany Nasira, Ibid.
  31 Ibid.
  32 Fawaz Gerges, ” The Irresistible Rise of the Muslim Brothers”, Comment and Opinion, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) Website, (available at : http://www2.lse.ac.uk/newsandmedia/commentandopinion/2011/12/brotherhood.aspx)
  33 Ibid.
  34 Mohamed Bassiuni Abd El Halim, Ibid.
  16
  was explicitly encountered by a more revolutionary stance from the young brothers who were pro participating in the revolution from the beginning. However, at a later stage, the rest of the Brotherhood came on board and joined the reformist group.
  Further losses and intergenerational conflict within the Brotherhood occurred with the decision to establish the (FJP) without any consultative process with the youth. Moreover, the president, the deputy and the secretary general of the newly established party were appointed by the Brotherhood Guidance Office (Ershad) with a lack of an open or transparent process.
  Generally speaking, the Brotherhood leadership forbade its members from joining any other party rather than its own. Those who joined other parties, or started their own, were expelled from the Brotherhood.
  On April 2, 2011, the escalation of the conflict was apparent when Dr. Abdul Moneim Abu al-Foutoh, one of the most prominent reformists within the Brotherhood declared his willingness to run for presidential elections; a decision that was against the Brotherhood’s position of not nominating any candidate to run for the elections.
  As a result of this position from Dr. Abo El Foutoh and the decision to dismiss him from the Brotherhood, a number of the reformist trend ( youth ) chose to support and back him and accordingly a severe polarization appeared among the main trends and generations within the Brotherhood.
  At a later stage, the Brotherhood decided to nominate Khairat El Shater to run for presidential elections, the mistrust among the generations was more evident than before especially that the conservative trend lost its credibility after having declared that the only purpose for the Brotherhood after the revolution is participation and not domination of politics.
  In an attempt to analyze the inter-generational conflict , the paper argues that the dynamics of managing such conflict within the Brotherhood usually take the form of a zero-sum game; when one trend achieves something, the other trend will eventually achieve nothing35. Evidence had shown that the conservative trend had been often inflexible and intolerant with regards to ideas proposed by the reformist trend. Harsh penalties that include dismissal from the Brotherhood was adopted towards reformists that were not aligned with the consensus of the group on discussed
  35 Khalil Al Anani, Ibid.
  17
  matters. The justification for such harsh penalties was usually: to preserve coherence within the Brotherhood and to avoid the contagion and the spillover effect of ideas that didn’t bring together members of the Brotherhood into consensus.
  There is a strong belief within the conservative group of the Brotherhood that individuals within the Brotherhood derive their influence not primarily from their own political talents but from the fact they are part of the group, one that is presumably greater than the sum of its parts.
  In a famous statement to the (FJP) deputy leader Essam El-Erian he emphasized that “All decisions are taken as an organization, with shura (consultation), with democracy… Youth are appreciated but they are appreciated in the context of the organization and not outside of it. Dissent was permitted before a final decision was made, but not after”36.
  For these reasons, the old guard within the Brotherhood had often constituted a firewall in front any attempt by the new reformist generation to hold any executive or influential positions37. The power politics between the different generations and trends within the Brotherhood will most likely be challenged in the upcoming years especially that the Brotherhood is now in power and thus conflict of interests and aspirations will probably alter the traditional balance of power within the group, and bring other players at the forefront. Without a clear enemy—the Mubarak regime—maintaining organizational cohesion will constitute a real challenge before the Brotherhood.
  There are other problems and challenges that stand in the way of the Muslim Brotherhood in the post-revolutionary Egypt. These challenges include the movement’s inability to renew its identity by keeping itself captive to the era of its founder, Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949). In addition, there has been a growing negative perception by some prominent Islamists and social leaders who believe that Egypt’s largest Islamist group; the brotherhood has deviated from the real teachings of Islam to concentrate its efforts on political pursuits38.
  36 Shadi Hamid, ” Brother President: The Islamist Agenda for Governing Egypt”, Cairo review of the Global affairs, June 2012
  37 Khalil Al Anani, Ibid.
  38 Hany Nasira, Ibid,
  18
  In light of these facts, one may highlight two main remarks that can be attributed to the intergenerational conflict within the Brotherhood as follows;
  First: The intergenerational conflict is mainly about the political aspects and not the preaching aspects of the Brotherhood 39. Despite the fact the (FJP) has aimed to act as the political arm of the Brotherhood; and where the latter should be confined to the religious preaching role , yet the intersection between the Brotherhood and the (FJP) led to further conflicts between generations on the political realm.
  Secondly: The conflict over the main principle of the Brotherhood which is the principle of “adherence and obedience”. The young generations within the Brotherhood are not accepting unconditional “adherence and obedience”. Instead , they are demanding new patterns of internal governance within the Brotherhood based on participation rather than obedience.
  The future and the dynamics of the inter-generational conflict in the Brotherhood is still unclear, one may say that there are two possible scenarios that can determine the future of relations between the different generations within the Brotherhood40:
  The first scenario; is about searching for a common ground between the generations of the Brotherhood. In this scenario there should be consensus on the main issues and topics while differences will be much focused on means of implementation and operation. While the second scenario; is about deepening the gap between the generations on the issues of differences between the different generations.
  Many analysts believe that the first scenario is more likely to happen, despite this fact, to avoid disintegration and fragmentation , the Brotherhood must compromise with their factions and wings. They must find a common ground to work on. This will require considerable political skill, which their current leader does not have. It also needs a vision of the future which the old guard does not have.
  39 Mohamed Bassiuni Abd El Halim, Ibid
  40 Ibid.
  19
  5. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE RISING ISLAMIST FORCES IN EGYPT
  For years, the west has feared the rise of political Islam in the Middle East region. Since the 11th of September 2001 attacks, fear of Islamism in general, not just of al-Qaeda, has taken hold of the western imagination and was further intensified. The parliamentary elections of Algeria in 1992 was a sort of a nightmare for western politicians .
  At the early days of the Egyptian revolution, the main players of the international community were counting on the long standing autocratic regimes existing in the region. With concrete successes achieved by those who revolted, the Western governments such as the USA and the EU member states called the existing regimes of the Arab region to take concrete and tangible steps towards achieving real reforms.
  The West was thus reluctant in supporting the Arab revolts at their first days and was even skeptical about the possibility that such revolts could lead to any tangible results.
  With authoritarian regimes in Tunisia then Egypt being demised, the West started to voice their support to the people of the Arab Spring countries and in some cases called for the immediate stepping down of autocratic rulers flagging the legitimate right for the people to choose their regimes.
  In the Egyptian case, and after decades of being outlawed and persecuted, religious activists and Islamists have emerged above ground as a pivotal forces and were openly mobilizing their old supporters as well as recruiting new members.
  The Egyptian revolution and the rise of political Islam has definitely affected the international community at large. To this end, the paper will examine the different positions and stances of the most prominent countries affected by such revolution.
  USA
  Western powers and specifically USA were extremely anxious about the rise of Islamist forces in Egypt specifically the Brotherhood. They view the group as a bitter foe and especially as a threat to Israel, which signed the Camp David peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, ending the state of war between the two neighbors41.
  41 Fawaz Gerges, Ibid.
  20
  Pro-western, autocratic Arab rulers, such as Mubarak, exploited this fear by portraying themselves as partners to the US in the fight against “extremists” and “fundamentalism”. “Either us or the extremists,” Middle Eastern dictators warned Western officials.
  “For years, dictators told their people they had to accept the autocrats they knew to avoid the extremists they feared” ; a statement that was emphasized by the US Secretary of State in response to the Arab Spring events42.
  Not only that, but Hillary Clinton even stressed that the Obama administration would work with the ascendant Islamist parties in Tunisia and Egypt if they played by the rules of the political game; a statement that marked a shift in the US foreign policy discourse.
  A pragmatic insight would reveal the fact that the US can also find common grounds with the rising Islamist powers. The US alliances with Sunni leaders are pivotal in front of Iran’s efforts to gain influence, and given its resources and international influence, the American government still has leverage that it is able to use in the region.
  EU
  The Arab Spring, has been a main visible failure of the EU projection – as well as other players – in the region, as it did not have any role in shaping or, at least, orienting what happened there though the Spring happened on its southern Mediterranean borders.
  The EU and its member states were also reluctant in supporting the Arab revolts in its early days due to the same reasons of the US. However, at a later stage, the EU expressed its endorsement to the Arab revolutions and expressed its willingness to support the Arab countries in their democratic transformation.
  Therefore, it was thus quite understandable why, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the EU has been very keen to set the deepening of the Arab reforms as a key objective of its development cooperation policy towards the region. The EU, then, swiftly proposed a series of European policy initiatives and a revisiting to its European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in May 2011 to offer support for Arab reforms and to embrace momentum into the old policy .
  42 Ibid.
  21
  Israel
  The Arab Spring and particularly the outbreak of the revolution in Egypt was a real surprise to Israel .The Israeli politicians continued their support to Mubarak’s rule until the last minute. For Israel, Mubarak was the country’s most important regional ally. There is no doubt that Israel as well as the whole international community did not anticipate the outbreak of revolts in the region and particularly in Egypt. There was a hope on the Israeli side that steps taken by Mubarak will eventually put an end to the disturbance. Despite this fact, and after Mubarak had been forced to step down, Israel was encountered by a state of uncertainty. Politicians even took a hostile explicit position towards the Egyptian revolution.”What happened in Iran could happen in Egypt”, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stressed expressing his fears that a radical Islamist regime like the one in Iran could also come to power in Egypt43.
  Generally speaking, there is a strong conviction amongst the politicians in Israel that although the protests in Egypt may not have been triggered by religious extremism yet they believe that in times of chaos and lack of state control the rise of religion in its extremist form can materialize. The fear can by also doubled by the possible cooperation between the Brotherhood in Egypt and its counterpart in Hamas putting additional pressure on the Israeli government and increasing the Israeli isolation within the region.
  Two factors will potentially characterize Israeli actions towards the Arab Spring; first; hostility towards Arab unity and secondly; hostility towards democracy in Arab countries44. Of course the main concern of Israel is the preservation of the peace accords signed with Egypt. Any possible alteration in this arrangement will result in further isolation of Israel in a changing Middle East. Despite the fact, that the Islamist forces in Egypt ; both (FJP) and Nour party emphasized their respect to international agreements and treaties that Egypt is party to; yet in a revolutionary context, the role of public opinion will be a significant factor that can affect the Egyptian foreign
  43 Haaretz Website ( Available at: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/netanyahu-warns-outcome-of-egypt-revolution-could-be-like-iran-s-1.340411, 31 January 2011)
  44 Mahmoud Muhareb, “Israel and the Egyptian Revolution”, Research Papers, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, May 2011
  22
  policy towards Israel in the years to come. In reality, Israel will come under renewed pressure to deal with both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank45.
  Other optimistic view points; though not that significant, were positive about the revolts in Egypt. Their argument was that a democratic Egypt could in the long run deliver to Israel something much better than Camp David’s cold peace46. Despite the different arguments, one may conclude that Israel will have a hard time in dealing with the upcoming regime in Egypt. It has always preferred despotism and corruption rather than a “political Islamism threat”.
  Iran
  With the wake of the Arab Spring, Iran believed that the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions reflected an Islamist popular rejection of tyranny and of subservience to the United States and Israel; and thus such revolutions could be understood as extensions of the Islamist Iranian Revolution47. The position of the Islamist Republic regarding the Egyptian revolution was very supportive. The Supreme Guide of the Islamist Revolution; Sayyid Ali al-Khamenei claimed that the “Egyptians revolted against Mubarak’s regime because he was an agent of Israel and subservient to America”48.
  Despite the explicit support of the Arab Spring and Iran’s ambitions to play a regional role within the region, there is a clear and historical rivalry between Iran and countries such as Egypt over the dominance and manipulation of the Middle East region. More importantly there were Egyptian fears from spreading the “Shiaa Principles” within the Egyptian Sunni context. Despite this fact, Egypt is still considered a crucial potential ally for Iran in becoming the regional superpower, especially after the decline of Egypt’s role in the region.
  In this context, there have been continuous Iranian attempts to improve relations with Egypt after these attempts failed under the leadership of Mubarak.
  After the 25th of January Revolution, Iran has been among the first countries praising the Egyptian uprising and expecting it to lead to an improved relation with Egypt.
  45 Kai Bird, “Why the Egypt Revolution Is Good for Israel”, Foreign policy , February,2011
  46 Ibid.
  47 Rachid Yalouh, “Iran and the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions”, Research Papers, ,Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, May ,2011
  48 Ibid.
  23
  Moreover, it has perceived the new system in Egypt after the revolution as an opportunity to be exploited, to open new markets for Iranian goods, and to face down the economic sanctions imposed on it49.
  As for the benefits on the Egyptian side, there is also a need for a new ally in the Middle East that can increase its power vis-Ã-vis others in the region. To this end, the visit of an Egyptian delegation of 45 public figures to Iran was welcomed by high officers in the Iranian government as a way to enhance relations between the two countries, on the political as well as economic fronts.
  More importantly, the visit of the newly appointed Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi to Iran on the occasion of handing over the presidency of the Non Alliance Movement Summit to the Iranian president was a precedent and was viewed by many analysts as a sign from Egypt to consider dialogue with Iran in the near future.
  With this optimistic future for the Irani relations with the Egyptian political system, Iran is still encountered by a very important challenge and a question that will eventually find an answer in the years to come: If Iran’s main instrument for achieving regional leadership has been its soft power among the region’s populations—rooted in a rejection of the U.S.–Israeli–Saudi status quo—will the regional shifts enable the Islamic Republic to exploit popular Arab victories to its own interests? Or will the emergence of a more empowered Arab street will undermine the foundation of Iran’s soft power, thereby allowing its rivals to exert greater influence? 50.
  Turkey
  The rise of Turkey as a regional power during the last decades had been notable and well recognized. Ankara has sought to become the preeminent arbiter in the Middle East region.
  Moreover, Turkey has presented an attractive model of a soft-power that has been appealing for many of the Arab states. It has employed trade, investment, and a consistent approach that emphasized diplomacy and international integration. Turkey’s significant political, economic, and
  49 Al Ahram Newspaper, 22 August 2012
  50 Ibrahim Kalin, ” Turkey and the Arab spring”, Project Syndicate, May 2011, (available at: http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/turkey-and-the-arab-spring)
  24
  cultural influence have steadily increased in the region. In the wake of the Arab Spring, Turkey was amongst the first countries that praised the Arab revolts.
  Not only that , but over the last decade, Turkey has developed different types of relationships with the countries of the Middle East, targeting improved relations with both governments and the public. Indeed, Turkey is probably the only country that has been able to promote relations at the two levels in the Arab world51.
  Arab intellectuals, activists, and youth leaders of different political inclinations have taken a keen interest in what some describe as the “Turkish model.” Turkey’s stable democracy, growing economy, and proactive foreign policy have generated growing appreciation of the country’s achievements, which has augmented its “soft power” in the region52.
  After the toppling down of the Mubarak ‘s regime, the Turkish prime minister; Recep Tayyip Erdoğan paid a visit to Egypt and he was extremely welcomed by many of the Egyptians. With the rise of fears from an extremist version of political Islam, Turkey took the initiative of promoting its own brand of Islamist democracy and called for adopting the ‘zero problems’ approach in its foreign policy.
  Despite this fact, Turkey is also open to accusations of hypocrisy. Although Turkey was one of the first countries to call for Mubarak’s resignation, yet it urged dialogue and restraint in dealing with Gadhafi in Libya; a stance that posed a question mark on its credibility and image. Turkey will eventually face an increasingly difficult challenge of balancing its interests with its values.
  Saudi Arabia
  Although Saudi Arabia did not praise the Egyptian revolution since its outbreak, and despite the fact the Saudi Arabia opened its territories to Ben Ali of Tunisia and offered support to Mubarak who refused it, yet it declared that it respected the choice of Egyptians in changing their system.
  The Saudi fears from the Arab revolts is derived from the fact of the threat of a Sunni monarchy on its border being overthrown, or even entering a power-sharing arrangement with the Shiite communities concentrated in Bahrain on the Eastern borders of its territories.
  51 Ibid.
  52 Ibid.
  25
  However, to prove its support and good will to the Egyptian revolution, the Saudi foreign minister Saud Al-Faisal announced that his country would provide Egypt with $3.75 billion to support its economy that was negatively affected after the revolution, and it already transferred $500 million by mid-May 2011 to the Central Bank of Egypt53.
  The positive side of the rise of political Islam in Egypt is that , Saudi Arabia can mobilize relations with the Islamist forces attaining power in Egypt to its interests; both the Brotherhood and the Salafists particularly due to the similarity of the Salafist ideology with the Wahabi ideology in Saudi Arabia .
  It is even clear by now that Saudi Arabia strongly understand that having a dominant role in the Middle East is conditioned by good relations with Egypt, especially after the 2011 revolution and thus further support and commitment from the Saudi government to the revolution and the current political forces in Egypt is a must in the near future.
  6. THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRAY WITHIN THE EMERGING POLITICAL SPECTRUM IN EGYPT
  In the aftermath of the revolution, there is no doubt that the Egyptian political scene became highly pluralistic . It is still uncertain that out of this disorderly pluralism a democratic regime can emerge in the short term.
  Four different players can determine the answer to this question; the rising political parties, the military, the former National Democratic Party (NDP), and the protest movements.
  With regards to the political parties in Egypt, one can say that these are still in the maturing process except for the (FJP) ( Muslim Brotherhood). To a great extent most of the rising parties have quite similar party platforms, essentially centrist ones. Most of which- including Islamist parties, describe themselves as civil parties. Despite the similarity in platforms, the division between Islamist and secular parties is quite obvious and sharp. To date a real attempt to form a democratic alliance of all – namely defined as – civil parties didn’t materialize and a strong political will and proper organization of all civil factions is a must in the near future.
  As for the Military, one can note that the military played the central role in the aftermath of the revolution and the stepping down of president Mubarak . Members of the Supreme Council for
  53 Ibid.
  26
  Armed Forces ( SCAF) had promised an interim period of holding power, promising elections and a return to civilian rule within a framework of 6 months. Despite this fact, the military rule lasted much longer till the presidential elections took place in June 2012 and resulting in the winning of the Muslim Brotherhood candidate Dr. Mohamed Moursi. The new president seemed reluctant in his first days in office to take any concrete decision. However in a surprising manner, a number of decisions were taken in parallel after almost 45 days held in office. The most controversial decision was calling Field Marshal Tantawi the head of the Supreme Council for Armed Forces ( SCAF) for retirement and undertaking concrete changes within the military. Moreover, the newly appointed president issued a decree to cancel the complementary constitutional declaration that gave evident powers to the military. Such decisions were perceived by many of the analysts and Egyptians as being a soft civilian coup by the president that would put an end to the role of military at least of the time being, while others perceive it as an agreed compromise to ensure a safe exit for the military and to avoid presenting the main figures within the military into political trials.
  As for the dissolved National Democratic Party (NDP), one may say that a number of its former senior members are still working behind the scenes to revive its role. The launch of new political parties by prominent figures of the old (NDP) makes it clear that the old guards are still fighting back54.
  With regards to the protest movements which were the driving reason for the revolution, these movements which then formed what was named as the ” Youth Revolutionary Council” is still a loose immature coalition. This is due to the fact that youth movements refuse strict hierarchical structure and well defined leadership roles55. Revolutionaries who had called Egyptians into the streets failed to make concrete moves towards forming political parties. When such revolutionaries had a political demand , they resorted to the public demonstrations and strikes and avoiding the long task of party building56.
  54 Marina Ottaway, ” The emerging political spectrum in Egypt” , Commentary, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October , 2011 (Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/10/emerging-political-spectrum-in-egypt/5u7l)
  55 Ibid
  56 Nathan J. Brown, ” The Muslim Brotherhood Democratic Dilemma”, National Interest, December , 2011
  27
  Due to the current political spectrum in Egypt, a number of possible challenges to democratic transformation lie ahead of the Islamist forces holding power in Egypt particularly the Brotherhood, these can be summarized as follows:
   The challenge of how to let democracy, as an organizing principle for the Egyptian polity, trickle down to other arenas in society. In other words, how to institutionalize democracy with its key procedures and values not only in formal politics but beyond57.
   The challenge before the Brotherhood to separate institutionally between the movement’s dawa (religious call) component and its political component. The Brotherhood has sustained itself since 1928 as both a social/religious movement and a political arm58.
   The secular-religious divide is the most fundamental fault line in the Egyptian politics, and it is one of the significant factors that threatens the transition from authoritarianism to pluralism.
   Although the Islamist forces and specifically the Brotherhood flag their continuous calls for a civilian state with an Islamist reference, yet in reality, they are unable and unwilling to free themselves from a heavy ideological inheritance59. In contrast to the Turkish and Tunisian Islamists, the Brothers in Egypt are allergic to the terms secular and secularism and view them as “anti-Islamist”. A paradigm shift in the Brotherhood mentalities is a pre-requisite for a healthy democratic transition.
  ***
  CONCLUSION
  The paper aimed at examining the role of the rising religious forces on the democratic transformation in Egypt and whether the political opening and attainment of power can affect the ideological and political stances of these forces or not.
  The paper concluded that despite the centrality of religion for both the Muslim Brotherhood represented by the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and the Salafists represented by Nour Party,
  57 Amr Hamzawy, ” From dictatorship to democracy”, Cairo Review of global affairs, (Available at http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/CairoReview/Pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=27)
  58 Ibid.
  59 Fawaz Gerges, Ibid.
  28
  yet, there had been differences between both religious forces. These differences were mainly issues of timing and tactics rather than of goals or principles.
  Assessing the rhetoric and the political discourse of both forces, the paper revealed that pluralism and political opening have clearly affected the ideological stances of the two religious forces. Furthermore, it stressed that dealing with the religious forces in Egypt collectively as a cumulative force representing political Islam is a kind of fallacy , as in some cases, these forces departed from each other and in other cases they coincided together . This was evident with regards to their perception of the nature of the state. So while the (FJP) called for a civil state with Islamic reference, the Nour party explicitly refused the term civil state and called for a state governed in the context of Islamic Shariaa (rule). On the other hand, both forces coincided on issues such as their stances from the role of women and the rights of Egyptian Copts.
  Findings have also shown similarity between the orientations of both parties with regards to the main aspects of foreign policy in the aftermath of the Egyptian revolution. Despite this fact, it was noted the (FJP) was more operational and detailed in reflecting its foreign policy orientations into its political platform and a in number of on-ground activities. On the other hand, the foreign policy orientations of the Nour party was a sort of general guidelines that lacked political experience and maturity.
  The paper argued that the role of the religious factor was clearly noticed on the discourse level for both the (FJP) and the Nour parties. However, when it comes to real stances and on-ground actions, pragmatism and strategic interests are the main drivers for both parties especially for the Muslim Brotherhood
  Against this background, the paper concludes that Islamists leaders who came into power have learned the art of compromise and pragmatism and thus one may say that ideology, in this sense, takes a back seat to the interests of the Islamist leaders particularly within the Muslim Brotherhood..
  In addition to the main research question, the paper has also tackled and pinpointed the inter-generational dimension that has been clearly evident in the case of the Brotherhood . It tried to examine its implications on the future of movement and the democratic transformation at large. The paper concluded that the power politics between the different generations and trends within the Brotherhood will most likely be challenged in the upcoming years especially that the
  29
  Brotherhood is now in power and thus conflict of interests and aspirations will probably alter the traditional balance of power within the movement, and bring other players at the forefront. Without a clear common enemy, the paper concluded that maintaining organizational cohesion will constitute a real challenge in front of the Brotherhood in the years to come.
  Finally , the paper examined the extent of possible compatibility between political Islam and democratic transformation in Egypt. It concluded that political Islam in Egypt can co-exist with democracy. Islamist parties will find themselves being pushed to adjust to the democratization process, though not necessarily in its Western format. The current religious forces will most likely embrace democratic and civilian traits in their actions due to the constraints and characteristic of the social, religious, political, and geostrategic aspects in which these forces must operate at.
  In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the Egyptian revolution, an open and participatory modality of governance will be the only chance for Islamist forces to survive and build their legitimate presence at the popular and societal level otherwise they will end up being sidelined.
  More than religion or ideology, it is geopolitics and hegemony that have come to the fore as the central factors shaping how governments are responding to unprecedented regional unrest.
  For now, the future implications the rise of religious forces in Egypt is still being examined. Only time will reveal whether the Arab Spring will be followed by a winter of renewed autocracy or if, instead, the seeds of democracy will bring the Arab Spring to full fruition.
  30
  REFERENCES
  Al Ahram Newspaper, 22 August 2012
  Alyoum 7 Newspaper, March 2, 2011 ( Available at: http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=361708&SecID=97&IssueID=106).
  Amr Hamzawy, ” From dictatorship to democracy”, Cairo Review of global affairs, (Available at http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/CairoReview/Pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=27).
  Barry Rubin, “Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists: Same Goals; Different Strategies”, The Global research in International Affairs (Gloria) Center, December, 2011 (Available at: http://www.gloria-center.org/2011/12/muslim-brotherhood-and-salafists-same-goals-different-strategies-2/)
  Dan Murphy, “Will Egypt’s government now strike a deal with the Muslim Brotherhood?,” Copt Science Monitor, February 6, 2011 ( Available at: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0206/Will-Egypts- government-now-strike-a-deal-with-the-Muslim-Brotherhood)
  Fawaz Gerges, ” The Irresistible Rise of the Muslim Brothers”, Comment and Opinion, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) Website, (Available at :http://www2.lse.ac.uk/newsandmedia/commentandopinion/2011/12/brotherhood.aspx)
  Haaretz Website ( Available at: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/netanyahu-warns-outcome-of-egypt-revolution-could-be-like-iran-s-1.340411, 31 January 2011)
  Hany Nasira, The Internal Crisis of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the James Town foundation, Volume 9, Issue 16 , April 22, 2011
  Ibrahim Kalin, ” Turkey and the Arab spring”, Project Syndicate, May 2011, (available at: http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/turkey-and-the-arab-spring)
  Kai Bird, “Why the Egypt Revolution Is Good for Israel”, Foreign policy , February,2011
  Khaled Hefni, ” Adopting a Civil State with an Islamist Reference” , El Masry El Youm Newspaper, December 3rd, 2011
  31
  Mahmoud Muhareb, “Israel and the Egyptian Revolution”, Research Papers, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, May 2011
  Marina Ottaway, ” The emerging political spectrum in Egypt” , Commentary, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October , 2011 (Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/10/emerging-political-spectrum-in-egypt/5u7l)
  Mohamed Bassiuni Abd El Halim, ” The Generational Gap: The Aspects of the Internal Crises between the Muslim Brotherhood and their Leaders after the Revolution” Al Syassa Al Dawlia, Issue no. 188, April 2012
  Nathan J. Brown, ” Egypt and Islamist Sharia: A Guide for the Perplexed”, Q&A, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May , 2012 (Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/05/15/egypt-and-islamic-sharia-guide-for-perplexed/argb)
  Nathan J. Brown, ” The Muslim Brotherhood Democratic Dilemma”, National Interest, December , 2011
  Olivier Roy, ” The Transformation of the Arab World”, Journal of Democracy, Volume 23,July 2012
  Osama Saleh, ” The Cautious Approach: Will the Rising Islamist Movements Restructure the Arab State”, Al Syassa Al Dawlia: Strategic Transformation Papers, issue no. 188, April 2012
  Rachid Yalouh, “Iran and the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions”, Research Papers, ,Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, May ,2011
  Rahil Yasin, “Are Islam And Democracy Compatible?”, Countercurrents, 21 March, 2009 (Available at http://www.countercurrents.org/yasin210309.htm)
  Shadi Hamid, ” Brother President: The Islamist Agenda for Governing Egypt”, Cairo Review of the Global affairs, June 2012
  32
  The Freedom and Justice Party platform 2011, (Available at http://www.hurryh.com/Party_Program.aspx)
  The official website of the Nour party; (Available at: http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_headers)
  Timothy Stanley, An Islamist state in Egypt can still mean democracy”, CNN Website, 27 June, 2012 (Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2012/06/27/opinion/stanley-morsi-islam/index.html)
• “Islamic Perspective on Democratisation between Theory and Practice: A Comparative Study of the Egyptian and the Tunisian Revolutions”
  Paper Presented to the
  First graduate conference:
  “Perspectives from Economics and Democratisation Studies”
  Collaborative project between the London School of Economics and the Faculty
  of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University
  “Egypt in the Arab Spring: Multidisciplinary Research Perspective”
  London School of Economics, London, 28 September 2012
  Presented by
  Yasmine Zein Al-Abedine
  Ph.D. Candidate, Political Science Department, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, and
  Assistant Lecturer
  Faculty of Economics and Political Science
  Future University in Egypt
  2012
  2
  Introduction
  Uprising of Islamic dimension is the most important trait of political life post the Arab revolutions especially in Egypt and Tunisia. A great debate among political intellectuals focuses on its reasons and its impact on the long term inside the Egyptian and the Tunisian societies; is it an imposed or a selected alternative of the secular regime?. Parliamentary elections in Egypt (The Freedom and Justice Party “Ḥizb Al-Ḥurriya wa Al-’Adala” and The Light Party “Ḥizb Al-Nūr”) and Tunisia (The Renaissance Movement Party “Hizb an-Nahḍah”), and presidential elections results in Egypt proved that is the people choice which arises the following research problem.
  Research Problem:
  What is the role of Islam in the democratisation process in theory and practice by applying on Egypt and Tunisia pre and post- revolutions?
  Methodology:
  This research paper will be handled by using the political discourse analysis of some Islamic literatures which treat Islamic perspective on democracy and human rights, and that by 2 tools; the context analysis and the comparative approach which will compare between the Egyptian and the Tunisian revolutions , and between theory and practice of the Islamic perspective on democratisation process.
  Research Plan:
  1- Theoretical Framework: Identity- Otherness- Revolution- Democracy.
  2- Religion and Democracy before Egyptian and Tunisian Revolutions.
  3- Islamic Perspective on Democratisation Post- Revolutions.
  a- Position of the Freedom and Justice Party.
  b- Position of the Light Party.
  c- Position of the Renaissance Movement Party.
  4- Challenges to construct an Islamic model and its Resistance Internally and Internationally.
  5- Conclusion.
  3
  1- Theoretical Framework: Identity- Otherness- Revolution- Democracy.
  This part treats the analysis of four main concepts which represent the study’s framework.
  a- Identity: The study adopts the meaning of identity, its characteristics and problematique presented by Prof. Saif Al-Din Abdul-Fattah (Professor of Political Science at Cairo University) in his paper “Education and Identity: Toward the Establishment of Civilisational Universities” because of two reasons; at first, he represents many trends for defining identity and clarifying its characteristics and problematique. Secondly, its theory on identity can be applied on different perspectives of identity; Islamic and Western. According to him, identity is a renewed flood which reflects a set of doctrines, principles, characteristics and symbols. It helps to make a specific nation feels its uniqueness and distinction from “the other” without omission or isolation which indicates the general frame of reference concerning forming, renewing and reproducing identity in order to achieve the most important end summarized in coexistence of civilisations through 5 main factors; 1- Self-Awareness, 2- Determining positioning between nations, 3- Goals Setting, 4- Formulating problems and 5- Facing Challenges.
  Identity has 6 main characteristics:
  - It can never be formed as a result of random interactions, achievements and attitudes.
  - Its elements are related to the nation past and present achievements.
  - Each identity includes criteria, values system, priorities, problems and challenges which can be faced.
  - Linguistic system is the mediator which reflects the meaning of identity and its elements.
  - Identity is always a project under construction. It is never completed and finished.
  - Identity is in need of continuous revival of quest and awareness.
  4
  Dr. Saif affirms that if a nation stops to renew its identity and reproduce it, it will face the decline of civilisation which transforms identity into useless transmitted burden to people1.
  b- The Other (Otherness): Thinking about alterity is important when analyzing and constructing identities. According to many political scientists, the question of alterity appeared with the nation- state, and any person, before being an “other”, he is a citizen in the national societies and in the public sphere, and he represents certain differences. Outside this group or this society, the other is a stranger. In spite of that, these scholars see that alterity is not a political invention, but it finds its space and the reason of its presence everywhere even in religion, history and philosophy. In this regard, Jean Leca raises the idea of Axiological Neutrality in science, and that when analyzing the difference between the other naturally and the other socially, while J.-M. Donégani and M. Sadoun present an analysis of liberalism in which they consider alterity as a separation between people, spaces, authorities and eras. On the other hand, the concept of “the Other” can be treated from national, legal or mass media perspectives, for example, some thinkers, like A. Chebel d’Appollonia deal with national identities through the other attitudes and morals, and by clarifying that pluralism is a result of the plurality of ethics, reference values, priorities, estimations and feelings. They argue that in order to reach the pacific coexistence with the other, there must be a “We” specific, distinguished and able to be affirm its differentiation and able to integrate the ethics of the other at the same time. In addition, the idea of national identity became one of the alterity criteria, from the national perspective, the other is not only different but he is also less merit and value which affects the international meanings spread in the 18th century and highlighted the cultural differences without mentioning the aspects of homogeneity2.
  1 Dr. Saif Al-Din Abdul-Fattah, “Education and Identity: Toward the Establishment of Civilisational Universities” (in) Dr. Saif Al-Din Abdul-Fattah (Introduction) and Osama Mogahed (Ed.): High Education in Egypt: Mapping Reality and Exploring the Future, Center for Political Research and Studies, Cairo University, 2006, p. 985 (in Arabic).
  2 Régine Azria, Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 108-8, Octobre- Décembre 1999, Bertrand Badie, Marc Sadoun (éds.), L’Autre. Études Réunies pour Alfred Grosser, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, 1996.
  5
  c- Revolution:
  The concept of revolution will be used, in this paper, according to what Lawrence Stone presented in his study “Theories of Revolution” which provides a summary view and a critical examination of the literature concerning the history of the concept. He argued that “revolution” becomes possible when a condition of multiple dysfunction meets an intransigent elite: just such a conjunction occurred in the decades immediately before the English, the French, and the Russian Revolutions. Revolution only becomes probable, however, if certain special factors intervene: the “precipitants” or “accelerators.” Of these, the three most common are the emergence of an inspired leader or prophet; the formation of a secret, military, revolutionary organisation; and the crushing defeat of the armed forces in foreign war. This last is of critical importance since it not only shatters the prestige of the ruling elite, but also undermines the morale and discipline of the soldiers and thus opens the way to the violent overthrow of the existing government3. Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky presented another study which analyzes the impact of the revolutions on international relations. According to him, there are four types of revolution; the first one is mass revolution which reflects fundamental changes in the structure of political authority and the social system. The second type is the revolutionary coup, it is fundamental changes in the structure of political authority and possibly some change in the social system. The third type is the reform coup which represents moderate changes in the structure of political authority. The last type is the palace revolution and it does not cause any change virtually4. The Egyptian and the Tunisian revolutions can be classified, according to these previous types, as reform coup which will be analyzed in this paper.
  d- Democracy:
  The use of the word “democracy” brings to mind a myriad of images. The roots of this system of government are in the city-states of ancient Greece. In contemporary usage it can refer to the unruly shouting matches of a
  3 Lawrence Stone, “Theories of Revolution”, World Politics, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1966, p. 166.
  4 Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, “A Theory of Revolution”, Conflict Resolution, Vol. XI, No. 3, 1967, p. 265.
  6
  town hall meeting or to the complex representational political structures of many Western states.
  By simple definition, democracy is a system of government by the people rather than a single individual or elite group. It can be defined as government by the populous; a form of government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised directly by them or by their freely elected agents. This investment of the supreme power in the people must have on it certain checks lest it simply degenerate into anarchy and a power struggle within the populous itself. In most modern states democracy is synonymous with a republican form of government wherein the people have the power to freely elect representatives to act in their best interest. They elect representatives to rule for them and in doing so give up a certain amount of the power vested in them. In a democracy this is done willingly, and thus central to democracy is the idea of free elections. However, this alone is not synonymous with a healthy democracy. “Free elections” do not necessarily equate a democracy. There are other more basic democratic principles. As Roger Trigg says “a democratic country is one in which government is answerable to the people, and can be dismissed by them in an election”. While the people have given up some rights, they still retain the ultimate power over elected officials. Thus Trigg concludes: “A pre-condition of exercising that democracy is an individual freedom according to which all citizens are free to form judgments about what is important, and to live life accordingly. A state in which citizens are told what to think, or conditioned through lack of information to accept certain things as true, is controlling its citizens rather than being controlled by them”.
  The preservation and exercise of individual freedom is necessary for the proper functioning of a democracy. This fundamental principle has far-reaching consequences in the shaping of a democracy. A democracy is a rule by the people collectively, but it must be free individuals that produce this collective body. The preservation of individual freedom leads to other necessary principles of democracy.
  The exercise of individual freedom in a society produces certain cultural dynamics that have become hallmarks of democratic societies. Bassam
  7
  Tibi repeatedly emphasizes two of these cultural dynamics that are present in a truly democratic society. He says “my assumptions herein are that pluralism and power-sharing are basic features of democracy. He added that it is his opinion that a process of democratisation that is restricted to the procedure of voting is not a real democratisation process. These two core elements of pluralism and power-sharing come up repeatedly throughout Tibi’s work. Pluralism is the logical result of the exercise of individual freedom. When people are allowed to think and act freely within a society the result is a plurality of ideas, thoughts, and voices within the public square. A democracy celebrates a diversity of ideas within a single body. Tibi’s second core value is power-sharing. In a vigorous democracy the ruling powers are not held within the grasp of a narrow segment of the population but are shared throughout the whole of the body. Thus the plurality of voices, the freedoms of the individual, are represented not just within the society but also within the exercise of the ruling powers. These values are central to true democracy. Thus in the investigation of the compatibility of Islam and democracy it must be considered if Islam is compatible with these core principles. It also should be discussed how these principles are put into practice within living democracies.
  Among the many values prized in democratic societies the most central are individual freedom, plurality, and power-sharing. When these values are put into practice they have the potential to produce a fair and just form of human government. Especially throughout the past three centuries, many of the happiest, most productive, and advanced societies have been those where these core values were prized and most consistently exercised. These values have been exercised most freely in those countries of the West, but have also been recognized and sought by the international community. As just one example of this the United Nations in 1948 put forward its “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”. In the exercise of democratic ideas this declaration called for its members to “implement human rights that gave priority to the protection of the individual over other national goals”. To implement a policy such as this is logical only in
  8
  a society where the power is with the individual rather than with the political leadership.
  A second aspect of the practice of democratic values is that when carried to an extreme these values create a logically unsustainable position. A primary example of this is seen in pluralism. The idea of a plurality of voices and ideas within the society is fundamental to a healthy democracy. Yet, the pursuit of pluralism cannot be the final goal of a democracy. When this becomes the final objective it creates a culture wherein it is impossible to hold any belief because it is incumbent on the individual to hold all beliefs. When tolerance becomes prized above all other values and any semblance of truth is removed from the public sphere the society begins to lose any authentic voices because all the voices speak the same ideas. No idea is allowed to be freely expressed because it may not represent every idea. In essence it becomes enforced liberalism. As Roger Trigg says “enforced liberalism will be as objectionable to some, as dogmatic intolerance is to liberals”. This debate over how far “plurality” should extend before it reaches “pluralism” is presently raging in Western Europe and the United States5.
  Michael Saward pointed out many indices of democratisation as follows:
  (A) Basic freedoms
  1. Each citizen has the right to freedom of speech and expression.
  2. Each citizen has the right to freedom of movement.
  3. Each citizen has the right to freedom of association.
  4. Each citizen has the right to equal treatment under the law.
  5. Each citizen has the right to freedom of worship.
  (B) Citizenship and participation
  6. The political community must have a common and standardized form of legal membership compatible with the basic freedoms.
  7. Citizens have an equal right to run for elective office.
  8. Citizens have the right to be equally eligible to serve, and, where appropriate, granted an equal probability of being selected for service, in non-elective representative and decisional bodies.
  5 J. Paul Barker, “Compatible? Incompatible? A Theoretical Analysis of Islam and Democracy”, e-ir.info, June 5, 2011, pp. 1- 2.
  9
  9. Citizens have the equal right to vote in all elections and referendums.
  10. Citizens’ votes must be decisive under all decision mechanisms.
  11. Mechanisms must be available for citizens to vote directly on substantive outcomes. If elected officials deem a decision inappropriate for direct decision, the burden of demonstrating the grounds of such inappropriateness lies with those officials.
  12. There must be a voting system (such as two-stage contests) which allows for the expression of a majority preference in multi-sided contests.
  13. Where votes for representatives are conducted, these votes must be renewed at regular and specified intervals.
  14. Regular opinion polls must be conducted by an appropriate agency on all issues of substantive importance, whether or not these issues are to be decided by representative decision. The burden of demonstrating the appropriateness of not following citizen preferences on a given issue lies with elected representatives.
  15. There must be a presumption that all issues will be decided by referendums, and clear guidelines as to when a referendum may be forgone.
  16. All issues not specifically prohibited from majority decision must be open to majority decision via one of the appropriate mechanisms.
  (C) Administrative codes
  17. There must be appropriate codes of procedure for employees in public bodies.
  18. There must be regularly produced evidence that public decisions are being put into effect.
  19. There must be appropriate time limits placed on the realisation of the substance of public decisions.
  20. There must be instituted adequate appeals and redress mechanisms with respect to public bodies and their functions.
  21. There must be freedom of information from all government bodies. The burden of proof of demonstrating the inappropriateness of full freedom of information in specific cases lies with the elected representatives.
  (D) Publicity
  11
  22. There must be a constant and formal process of public notification of decisions, options, arguments, issues and outcomes.
  (E) Social rights
  23. Every citizen has the right to adequate health care.
  24. Every citizen has the right to an adequate education6.
  2- Religion and Democracy before Egyptian and Tunisian Revolutions.
  Religious (Islamic) political parties in the most Arab countries, especially Egypt and Tunisia, did not have a chance to be presented officially, moreover Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists were excluded from both governments, withdrawn from Parliamentary elections which means that they were suffering lack of democracy under the pretext of terrorism and corruption (money laundering for example). In Egypt, police arrested several of the top leaders of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, especially before parliamentary elections which was explained as a cracking down by the governments on the Muslim Brotherhood in the months leading up to major national elections7. Since then, Egypt’s government jailed key Brotherhood members, crimped its financing and changed the constitution to clip religious parties’ wings. The Brotherhood made missteps, too, alienating many Egyptians with saber rattling and proposed restrictions on women and Christians. These setbacks have undermined the group’s ability to impose its Islamic agenda on this country of 81 million people, the Arab world’s largest8.
  They were also accused for deteriorating position of religious minorities. According to a report carried by an Italian news portal Coptic Christians, women and other minorities are paying the price of increasing Islamisation in Egyptian society, leading author and intellectual, Tarek Heggy, has told Adnkronos International (AKI). The fundamentalist opposition Muslim Brotherhood was one of the groups responsible and was indoctrinating young people through its welfare work, Heggy said “I believe the major problem for the Copts in Egypt is related to the overall cultural environment. The more radical society becomes, the worse the situation gets. This is also true for Bahaiis”, Heggy said, referring to a smaller religious minority in Egypt which now numbers only a few hundred people. Heggy was speaking in the southern Italian coastal town of Otranto where he was awarded the prestigious 2008
  6 Michael Saward, Democratic theory and indices of democratisation, in: David Beetham (ed.) Defining and Measuring Democracy, Sage, London, UK, 1994, pp. 12- 13.
  7 http://globalmbreport.org/?p=2142
  8 http://globalmbreport.org/?p=1466
  11
  Grinzane Terra D’Otranto prize for dialogue, tolerance, solidarity and integration. Copts -who form some 10 percent of Egypt’s population and the largest Christian community in the Middle East- have been the target of periodic attacks by Muslim hardliners in recent years. The Islamisation of education in recent decades is a major cause of an intolerant mindset that has developed in Egypt, which the Muslim Brotherhood has helped create under the guise of aid to local communities, Heggy argued “The Muslim Brotherhood is well regarded by the average Egyptian, who equates the government with autocracy, corruption and repression”, Heggy said “The group is seen as less corrupt and more supportive of people, and serving them in the real arena of need -health and education”. The Muslim Brotherhood gives extensive aid to local communities, including medical assistance and private lessons for school children for a symbolic fee -a major draw for poor Egyptians, many of whom view the group positively. A trip to a regular dentist costs 12 euros -half a teacher’s monthly wage- while there are 80 children in an average class in state schools, Heggy said “The Egyptian government is handling the Muslim Brotherhood as a security issue alone”, he said “But it is a cultural, social, political, educational, religious and economic problem”. The fundamentalist Wahabi influence has penetrated education in Egypt, where Arab literature, poetry and plays have been replaced with sacred Islamic texts in schools, Heggy said up until the 1960s, Egypt was a truly Mediterranean society, but this has been gradually replaced by an Arab/Bedouin culture. Besides schools, mosques and the country’s media -radio and TV- have also been Islamised, he said “The four entities that have most influence on people have also been influenced by anti-secular cultures”, Heggy stated Egypt’s 1971 Constitution defines Islam as the state religion and Islam as the main source of law. “The Coptic problem is that of pressure on a minority, intolerance towards others and a lack of acceptance of pluralism. “The more Egypt is influenced by the Wahabi interpretation of Islam, the worse it is for the Copts”, said Heggy9.
  In several incidents the Brotherhood has projected the image of a movement too certain of the appeal of its rhetoric, the popularity of its platform, strength of its organisation, and the size of its constituencies; it has acted as though it were virtually self-sufficient, needing no cooperation with weaker opposition actors. The Brotherhood has also had legitimate reason to mistrust the attitudes of other
  9 http://globalmbreport.org/?p=1179
  12
  opposition actors. Some legal parties, such as the leftist Unionist Party, al-Tajammu‘, continue to oppose Islamist participation in politics and thus allied themselves with the regime to limit the Brotherhood’s political space. Al-Tajammu‘ leaders even endorsed repressive government measures against the Brotherhood and justified them on the grounds that they were targeting an undemocratic organisation. Other parties that fear the Brotherhood’s popularity, such as the liberal Wafd, have done very little to protest the manipulation of 2005 parliamentary elections against the movement’s candidates or even their de-facto exclusion from local elections in 2008. Although protest movements such as the Egyptian Movement for Change (Kifaya) have in recent years demonstrated a clear commitment to defending the right of the Brotherhood to participate in politics, they have systematically distanced themselves from the group whenever the regime has pursued repression against its leadership.
  Even if such suspicions between the Brotherhood and other opposition actors could be overcome, there exists a deep structural difference: while most other opposition parties are focused primarily on politics, the Brotherhood leaders concern themselves with a broad and diverse social movement with many different wings and activities. This tends to make the Islamists cautious, anxious to avoid provoking official repression. When pressed on why they participate only half-heartedly (if at all) in opposition demonstrations, for instance, Brotherhood leaders retort that while Kifaya demonstrators get roughed up, their supporters are hauled in for indefinite periods. The outcome in recent years of these two political realities -the Brotherhood’s determination to participate without evoking the regime’s wrath, as well as the mutual mistrust between Islamist and non-Islamist Actors- has been the movement’s mixed experience of partial cooperation and continued tension in the opposition spectrum. Alliances have been formed on occasion -most notably the 1984 electoral alliance with the Wafd party- but they have generally dissolved after short periods or been limited to short-term tactical coordination.
  But even if alliance achievements have been limited, they have left real marks on the Brotherhood’s positions. Since 2002, the Brotherhood’s partial search for common ground with other opposition actors has resulted in the strengthening of its platform on social, economic, and political reform. In different official pronouncements and programmatic statements, for example the 2004 Reform Initiative and the 2005 electoral program, the Brotherhood’s platform has echoed that
  13
  of liberal and leftist parties calling for constitutional amendments, democratic reforms, government accountability, and freedom safeguards.
  The Brotherhood’s efforts at coordinating political activities, especially during election campaigns, have also been apparent. Prior to the 2005 parliamentary elections, the group joined the majority of legal opposition parties -including the traditional anti-Brotherhood al-Tajammu‘ and protest movements in forming the United National Front for Change. In spite of the coalition’s grand promises, it failed to coordinate opposition activities and harmonize positions toward a national platform for democratic reform. In fairness to the Brotherhood, the only meaningful coordination of action came from its side.
  The Brotherhood announced at that time that it would refrain from competing against other opposition candidates, revitalizing the slogan “participation without domination,” and it honored this commitment during the elections. In March 2007, the Brotherhood once again joined other opposition actors to form a coalition against the undemocratic constitutional amendments proposed and imposed by the NDP. The coalition threatened to boycott parliamentary debates on the amendments as well as the popular referendum that would endorse them. However, the coalition’s members did not see its threats as binding, and several parties such as the leftist al-Tajammu‘ and the liberal al-Wafd defected. Such cross-ideological fronts and coalitions among Egypt’s opposition actors have proved short-lived for several reasons. In most cases, they were not supported by strategic and tactical cooperation on the ground, but on informal agreements between Brotherhood leaders and other opposition actors with limited rapprochement at the grassroots and constituency levels. The Brotherhood’s credibility has been greatly undermined by its inability to harmonize political positions or pressure the regime for common reform policies.
  Ultimately, the experience of cross-ideological cooperation in recent years has confirmed the limiting impact that mutual mistrust and varying political objectives have on opposition actors10.
  Concerning the salafist movements, before the Egyptian revolution, they were enjoying their greatest support among the lower classes of northern Egyptian cities, but were present to some extent at all socio-economic levels. They confined their activities to preaching in mosques and on extremely popular Egyptian Salafi satellite
  10 Amr Hamzawy and Nathan J. Brown, The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Islamist Participation in a Closing Political Environment”, Carnegie Middle East Center, Number 19, March 2010, pp. 14- 15.
  14
  channels such as al-Naas and al-Rahma. Egyptian security forces appeared to be prohibiting them from further organisation so far. But Salafism was making inroads in existing Islamist groups as well. A younger generation in the Brotherhood, believing that participation in electoral politics is fruitless, was moving closer to Salafi ways of thinking. They were joined by at least ten thousand former members of radical jihadi groups who were let out of prison after al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, the largest and most violent radical group, published a series of ideological revisions. This group of individuals may or may not be Salafi in nature, but if the government continued to ban them from any participation in public life, they would tend to move in that same direction.
  With its singular focus on fixing the individual Muslim’s creed (‘aqida) as the path to Islamic revival, Salafism differs significantly from the Islamic centralism of Sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawi and the Brotherhood. While they do focus on nurturing the individual’s faith, they have never considered an individual to be outside the fold as long as he believes in the five essential pillars of Islam, however imperfect his commitment may be. Al-Qaradawi and the Brotherhood adopt a comprehensive approach to reform that includes the application of Islamic law (shari’a). For Salafists, however, no talk of shari’a is possible until the belief and behavior of Muslims meet what they consider to be proper Islamic standards.
  The implications of this doctrinal difference are significant, as the Salafi division of society into categories of belief and disbelief is implicitly reintroducing into Egyptian Islamist circles the idea of takfir that is, considering Muslims who do not meet their standards to be apostates and therefore fair game for violence. The most violent Egyptian groups of the 1980s and 1990s such as al-Jihad and al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, excommunicated Egypt’s ruler. Today’s Salafists “excommunicate not just the ruler but anyone who does not adhere to their definition of Islam”, according to Islamist intellectual Fahmy Howedi. He continues, “If Islam is the beard and the niqab (face veil), then whoever does not wear these is considered outside of the faith”.
  Secondly, Salafists, in comparison to most Islamists such as the Brotherhood and even al-Jihad, minimize the importance of fiqh, the use of contemporary logic to address issues that were not present at the time the Quran was revealed. Fundamentalists in the Western sense, Salafists believe that more literal readings of the Quran and of the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad (hadith) provide sufficient guidance for any contemporary situation. Followers focus on mimicking even the
  15
  most minute details of the Prophet’s lifestyle and that of his companions, which means a conspicuous emphasis on beards and face veils.
  While passive and apolitical now, Salafists may not always remain preoccupied with converting the individual. “As an Islamist reform movement, they can ban politics for a time, but not forever. Eventually, they will either allow politics or be reconciled to the conditions they are trying to change” and “in this case they would no longer be an Islamic reform movement”, explains Rafiq Habib, a noted expert on Islamist movements. Given the Salafists’ religious extremism, this potential for a more active role in society frightens many Egyptians. For example, in a September 2008 article in the independent newspaper al-Masri al-Youm, one writer warned that Salafists are only peaceful now while they gather strength, but that eventually they will produce terrorist cells of unprecedented fanaticism. Habib predicts that Egyptian Salafists will eventually split: one group will move towards the Islamic centralism of al-Qaradawi and the political activism of the Ikhwan, while a second will embrace Salafi jihad.
  Salafists are not opposed to all political participation in principle. In Yemen and Kuwait, where Salafi movements are strong in comparison to the state, they participate in electoral politics. Salafists in Alexandria and the now Salafi al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, for example, display the interest and capacity to participate in politics if permitted. But due to their reluctance to compromise on principle and the strength of the Egyptian state, no participation in electoral politics is likely any time soon.
  More worrying is the potential for a turn to violence. Many Egyptian intellectuals argue that as the root causes of violence have not been addressed, violence in Egypt has stopped but not ended. With twenty thousand former jihadists released from jail but prohibited from playing any role in politics, is Salafism the new reservoir for the radical movements of previous decades? As Howedi points out, the continued absence of political alternatives, the government’s incessant use of violence against its opponents, and deteriorating social and economic conditions are increasingly pushing Egyptians towards the rigid, uncompromising views of Salafism and making a return of violence more likely. The recent Israeli attack on Gaza is likely to add to the momentum. Ibrahim Eissa, editor of the independent al-Dostor, recently wrote that Islamic extremism is certain to increase because of the war and the perception that the Egyptian government’s position towards Hamas was a position
  16
  against Islam itself. Such a perception only reinforces the takfiri tendencies inside Salafism and the appeal of such thinking to other Islamists11.
  Concerning Tunisia, starting from 1995, its government was afraid from Islamists who threaten the national security. Islamic movements in Tunisia appeared as a reaction to the secularisation programs set by Bourqiba, and activated from foreign countries in ben Ali era; the first indicator was when Al-Nahda movement candidates won more than 50% of the vote in the general elections in 1989 which was hidden by the Tunisian government. In the next year, Islamists request for registering their party (Al-Nahda Movement) officially, was refused under the pretext that it is a religious organisation and not a political party. In 1992, they discovered that there are some elements, from Al-Nahda Movement, included in the armed forces which can lead to a coup d’État12. The domination of the security obsession and the persistence on the priority of terrorism elimination led to deteriorating the economic conditions and exercising pressure on people through exploiting their passivity and lack of interest in politics13. The predominance of tyranny pushed Bou Azizi to suicide on December 17, 2010 which sparked the Tunisian revolution and led to the escape of Ben Ali on January 14, 2011 to Saudi Arabia. These events were followed by the parliamentary elections in which Al-Nahda Movement party won with 89 seats from 217 in the National Constituent Assembly14, then the Congress for the Republic party headed by Al-Monsef Al-Marzouki who became the President starting from December 13, 2011.
  The Congress for the Republic party is based -according to his program- on the Islamic Arabic identity of the people, the human values, and the liberal thoughts15. This party was indignant on the political system in Ben Ali era and it presented a model of the republic system which is established on the principles of democracy and citizenship rights16.
  11 Nathan Field and Ahmed Hamem, “Salafism Making Inroads in Egypt”.

  http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2009/03/09/salafism-making-inroads-in-egypt/2fka

  12 Carlos Echeverría Jesús, “Radical Islam in the Maghreb”, Orbis, Spring 2004, pp. 9- 10.
  13 Abou Al-Abbas Abraham, “The Tunisian Revolution: Waiting for Lessons Completion”, Civilized Dialogue, No. 3250, 18/ 1/ 2011.

  http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=242295

  14 Hassan Badie, “Islamic Future for North Africa and sinking of Francisation”, Cooperation Journal, November 15, 2011.

  http://digital.ahram.org.eg/articles.aspx?Serial=704077&eid=2281

  15 http://mottamar.com/a-propos
  16http://www.cpr.tn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=101%3A-24-2001&catid=41%3Atextes-fondateurs&Itemid=70&lang=ar
  17
  3- Islamic Perspective on Democratisation Post- Revolutions.
  This part presents the Islamic perspective on democratisation through the three political parties and the difference between theory and practice or the difference between before and after coming to power and that as follows.
  a- Position of the Freedom and Justice Party.
  The third principle in chapter 1 of its program is the credence of Al-Shura (Democracy) especially in political life representing in choosing the political leader, People Assembly members and imposing checks and accountability17. According to its members, Al-Shura is the core of democracy which is the only way to the nation’s interest in order to avoid tyranny. In addition, the general reform is one of the Egyptian need and the Egyptian people have to take the initiative in achieving it for the sake of freedom, renaissance, justice, equity and democracy18. Concerning the State characteristics, they affirm that Egypt has to be based on the following:
  - Citizenship.
  - Constitution.
  - Al-Shura (Democracy) which is considered as an essential principle of the State and it is not only a political principle ruling the different political relations. It means, also, the devolution of power, and the right of the Egyptian people in self-determination. Freedom and Justice party does not mention a specific form of Shura which forces them to apply the best one.
  - Civil State: They insist on the idea that an Islamic country is a civil one, so, it is not a military state which was established on a coup d’État and governed by a dictatorship19. They did not mention the difference between the Islamic state and the religious one, but they focused on the difference between any Western democratic country and the Islamic democratic one; the last country has an Islamic background based on the dogma or the doctrine of the majority, it organizes; on one hand,
  17 The Freedom and Justice Party Program, p. 4.
  18 Ibid., p. 6.
  19 Ibid., p. 11.
  18
  cults and values, and on the other hand the different Muslim life sides and his relationship with non-Muslims20.
  - The Brotherhood has been for several years in an alliance with the April 6 Youth Movement, a left-oriented secular movement that used social media as an organizing tool. The Movement was close to the opposition forces led by Muhammad El Baradei who, despite being promoted by the Obama Administration, was also allied to the Brotherhood. When the Movement decided to begin demonstrations in January 2011, the Brotherhood was well-informed of these plans but decided not to participate directly. It had three good reasons for following this policy, so that the protests were not discredited internationally as Islamist-directed; to limit the inevitable government crackdown on the Brotherhood; and to see if the anti-Mubarak campaign did take off. While the regime quickly rounded up the “usual suspects” among Brotherhood leaders, the demonstrations not only gained momentum in Egypt- or, more accurately, in Cairo- but also won a huge amount of media sympathy and international support. Literally within hours of the onset of the movement, the Obama government in the United States was calling for the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak, an ally since he had taken power thirty years earlier. Within days of the start of protests, the Brotherhood sent its youth cadre into Tahrir Square with orders to keep quiet their affiliation and ideology. It played an important role in furnishing tough young men who could stand up to the Mubarak regime’s police and covert attacks. Credulous Western journalists helped them keep their cover. The revolution was branded as moderate and democratic. Yet it succeeded so quickly and easily in large part because the Egyptian military was also fed up with the Mubarak family and open to a regime change.
  Once the revolution had succeeded -with power in the hands of senior officers who were in no way hostile to the Brotherhood- the group’s situation was quite good. Its supporters were among those chosen by the
  20 Prof. Mostafa Elwi Lectures, Course of International Relations Theory, PhD Program, Spring 2012 (Not Published).
  19
  generals to make limited constitutional amendments in order to prepare for elections. Later, it won the referendum to accept those amendments and early elections, despite the opposition of the relatively moderate reformers and El Baradei himself. Having broken with its former allies among the relatively liberal, the Brotherhood upgraded its publicly expressed ambitions. Having said it would only contest thirty percent of the parliamentary seats, it raised that quota to fifty percent. It formed its own political party. Though it insisted on not planning to run a presidential candidate, a top Brotherhood leader did declare his candidacy. While nominally expelled by the Brotherhood, there are reasons to believe he remained their stealth candidate. According to Barry Rubin, in understanding the Brotherhood’s post-revolutionary power, it is important to note that its primacy is based not only on its own organisation but the lack of organisation of all other political forces and also the unwillingness of these alternative groups to oppose the Brotherhood21. Rubin’s the Muslim Brotherhood lack of political experience and methodology which appeared when they won the majority of the People Assembly seats and when Mohamed Morsi arrived to power, perhaps they are not corrupt as the previous regime, but there is a contradictory position between their program, and their political discourse on one hand, and their political practice especially in respecting law and establishing national security which appeared when Morsi decided to bring back the People Assembly22, and what was happening in Sinai23, and at the American Embassy24.
  Upon assuming office, Morsi’s power and authority was limited by two primary sources. First, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) prevented Morsi from serving as commander-in-chief and maintained legislative, military, and budgetary control of Egypt. Second, the power of the president was further limited by perceptions that Morsi was little more
  21 Barry Rubin, “The Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Revolution”, e-ir.info, July 16, 2011, pp. 1- 2.
  22 Ahmed Aboul Enein, “Morsy brings back People’s Assembly”, Daily News Egypt, July 8, 2012.

  http://thedailynewsegypt.com/2012/07/08/morsy-brings-back-peoples-assembly/

  23 Harriet Sherwood, “Egypt-Israel border attack leaves over a dozen dead”, The Guardian, Monday 6 August 2012.

  http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/05/attack-across-egypt-israel-border

  24 http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/13/us-protests-idUSBRE88C0J320120913
  21
  than a puppet of the Brotherhood and selected as their candidate based on his demonstrated willingness to follow instructions from key party leaders (including al-Shater). While it appeared that the SCAF would significantly limit Morsi’s power and authority as president, his actions in recent weeks indicate a focused attempt to centralize control and authority in Egypt. On August 12, the president issued a constitutional declaration to transfer legislative authority from the SCAF to the president, forced the resignation (retirement) of the two most senior members of the SCAF among others, and appointed a new vice-president. While weakened, the SCAF maintains control of the military and Morsi and the Brotherhood have said they will continue to accept the authority of the SCAF on matters of foreign policy and domestic security. The economic implications of this are significant given that Egypt is the recipient of $1.3 billion a year from the United States in military aid and additionally owns as much as one-third of the nation’s economy through a vast network of government-owned service and manufacturing companies. It is important to recognize that, while weakened, the military continues to hold a great deal of power. Morsi’s actions, however, bring in to question both the degree of power the military has over the president and the degree to which the SCAF can -or would- challenge his authority to block the assumption of additional powers.
  The relationship between Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood also creates uncertainty about Morsi’s real power. Although the president officially resigned from the Muslim Brotherhood when he took office, Morsi is widely seen as little more than a figurehead president who continues to closely consult Brotherhood leaders and follow their policies, aims and objectives. One recent indicator of their continued closeness was seen when Morsi announced the retirement of the generals. The Muslim Brotherhood financed the transportation of thousands of Muslim Brotherhood supporters to Tahrir Square from various governorates to publically celebrate his announcement. This level of support indicates the Brotherhood’s ongoing support for Morsi and their continued alignment.
  Although the SCAF’s influence and grip on power has apparently lessened in recent weeks, the personal motives and ambitions of the president
  21
  remain unclear. Close links with the Muslim Brotherhood are both predictable and evident, but the degree to which Morsi will continue to operate “under orders” from the Brotherhood is not yet certain. It is important to remember that while the Muslim Brotherhood may have been successful in the early stages, their ability to maintain their current grip on power will depend upon their ability to prove themselves to voters and make significant strides that reflect not only the aims of the party, but also the demands of the revolution and the will of the people. For many in Egypt, until these things occur, regardless of who is in power, the revolution will continue25.
  b- Position of the Light Party.
  The economic program of the Salafist party consists of many points; the second one which is the necessary economic policies includes fighting political tyranny through applying Al-Shura and democracy based on Islamic sharia for all citizens. This condition is very important in the path to economic integration, exploit economic resources efficiently, eliminate poverty, and realizing prosperity for all citizens. According to salafists, economic liberty cannot be achieved within a political tyranny and the human experience proved that the economic growth becomes sustainable in the democratic societies because they are characterized by the self-reform and different opportunities which minimizes ethnic, geographic and religious troubles inside the same society which avoid all forms of internal conflicts26.
  This was the only locus of democracy or Al-Shura in the Light party program without mentioning the difference between the civil state and the religious one, or even underlying their view to the Egyptian country if the come to power as the Freedom and Justice party did. If the problem of the brotherhood was the lack of political experience or practice, this problem was worst in the salafist case which appeared clearly after winning the second rank of seats numbers in the People Assembly and after the
  25 Ami J. Abou-bakr, ” Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Why the Revolution Continues”, e-ir.info, August 23, 2012, pp. 2- 3.
  26 The Light Party Program, p. 12.
  22
  dominance of the Muslim Brotherhood on the executive power which will be detailed as follows.
  Since Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak was pushed aside on February 11, 2011, many U.S. academics and policy makers have issued warnings, reassurances and speculations on the question of how relations with Egypt will be affected by the rise of its largest opposition movement, the Muslim Brotherhood. True to expectations, the Brotherhood did well in the first post-Mubarak parliamentary elections, with its Freedom and Justice Party collecting almost half of the seats in the new People’s Assembly. The biggest election surprise, however, was that its greatest rival was not one of Egypt’s many secular parties, all of which did poorly, but rather another set of Islamists -the Salafi Islamist bloc won almost a quarter of the seats.
  This surprising Salafi showing stirred many Egyptian liberals and international human-rights activists to warn that the Salafis, if given any power, would curtail the rights of women and non-Muslim minorities, particularly Egypt’s large Coptic Christian population. For the United States, the potential consequences of the Salafi rise are also profound. In some circles, the label “Salafi” is understood to mean one particular stream of Salafism championed by Ayman al-Zawahiri (an Egyptian), Osama bin Laden’s successor as head of Al Qaeda. And indeed, some of the Salafis in politics once were jihadis. Even if the Salafis are not all closet jihadis, they are feared because of their unrelenting hostility toward Israel, harsh stance on women’s and minority rights, rejection of democratic principles and general anti-Americanism. The Brotherhood presents itself as a group of pragmatic, kinder and gentler Islamists. The Salafis do not27.
  The mission of the salafists is harder than the Muslim Brotherhood because of the bad impression internally and internationally which can hinder transition of democracy. According to many politicians, political analysts and intellectuals, they are related to jihadi movements all over the world as in Gaza28.
  27 Daniel Byman, Zack Gold, “The Salafi Awakening”, The National Interest, June 28, 2012.

  http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-salafi-awakening-7068

  28 David Maggs, ” The Growth of Salafi-Jihadism in Gaza and Consequences for the Peace Process”, e-ir.info, July 1, 2011, p. 1.
  23
  Salafi involvement in Egypt’s political process and public life since the January revolution brought increased centralisation and discipline and forced the movement to focus on public opinion and messaging. Salafi scholars, many now turned politicians, have begun treading the same pragmatic path as the Muslim Brotherhood. They have learned to either compromise on the call for Sharia rule, or to express their religious commitments in non-threatening ways. In the wake of the revolution, leading Salafi personalities such as Abd Al-Minam Shahhat were among the first public figures to declare their intention to form political parties, justifying this sudden departure from Salafi quietism by invoking the Sharia principle of “public interest”. Their argument was that an Islamic state is the ideal, but in its absence it is imperative to participate in a secular system in order to prevent the return of an oppressive and corrupt government. Salafi political activities gathered steam in late spring, coalescing around the the Light party and the smaller Fadila and Asala parties. There was also support for the Bana’wa Tanmiya party launched by Gamaa Islamiyya, which is not strictly speaking a Salafi party, but is generally seen as part of the same constellation of more radical Islamist organisations. Over the course of the summer, the Salafi parties squabbled with each other, with some joining forces but then separating again. Despite these disputes, however, Salafi parties eventually joined the broad Democratic Alliance along with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Wafd, al-Wasat party, and several liberal and left of center parties. These groups hoped that sharing parliamentary lists and coordinating candidates would ensure a parliamentary majority for parties that oppose the previous ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). But the Democratic Alliance soon unraveled as most liberal parties left the Alliance during the summer, followed in October by all Islamist parties other than the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party. On October 23, 2011, the Light, Asala, and the Gamaa Islamiyya announced the formation of an official Salafi alliance (called the Islamist Alliance) and agreed to share parliamentary lists. Salafi parties began stressing the practical nature of politics, stating that now is not the time for ideology.
  24
  They also recognized the importance of overtly respecting election laws by promising not to use religious symbols or places of worship in their election campaigns, in keeping with the ban imposed by the High Judicial Election Commission (whether or not they actually did so is currently being debated). The Light party’s website is a model of pragmatism. It is -noticeably and indeed bizarrely- free of Islamist language and effectively accepts the existing structure of the Egyptian state and law. It highlights how social justice and political transparency are essential for preventing a return of the systematic corruption of the Mubarak era. The party calls for a civil state where all Egyptians live together without discrimination, “far from a theocracy that claims the government rules by God’s will”. It calls for the separation of legislative, judicial, and executive powers, with the justice system protected from political interference. The party seeks to guarantee a long list of freedoms and rights, including freedom of expression, the right to choose a leader and hold him accountable, and free health care and education. The party does insist in a somewhat vague way, however, that these rights exist within a basic Sharia framework. The Light party presents a brief foreign policy doctrine, noting suggestively that Egypt allowed “unfriendly countries” to take advantage of the country in the past, and let even small states impinge upon its interests (almost certainly a reference to Israel). The Light’s foreign policy priorities focus on increased attention to Africa and the Nile basin as well as the greater Arab and Islamic world. The site calls for respecting existing treaties and prioritizes protecting the Egyptian people’s true interests. The platform is undoubtedly still very Islamic, but it expresses Sharia concerns indirectly. For example, it does not stress adherence to Islam in cultural matters, but states that Egypt’s institutions must help reinforce the nation’s Arab identity and its “majority religion”. The role of Sharia in the state is mentioned only in reference to Egypt’s existing constitution, which states in Article 2 that Sharia is the main source of law. Again making no distinction to Egypt’s current legal system, the Light remarks that Sharia law must protect the personal religious rights of Copts, whose personal status and family law are handled by their own religious systems. For all other matters, Egypt’s national law governs all people. Salafi parties have
  25
  also acknowledged the essential role of women in electoral politics. Egyptian laws governing party formation require a party to nominate at least one woman for parliament, and initially parties like the Light part stated that they would nominate female candidates as long as they were sufficiently religious. The new Salafi alliance’s rhetoric quickly became even more female friendly, embracing the presence of female candidates generally. On December 12, 2011, The Light Party announced that it would allow female candidates to put their picture on campaign posters, replacing the symbol of a rose, which was used in the first round of elections. On its website, the Light party emphasizes that women play an essential economic role in Egypt. The party also recalls the great women who surrounded the Prophet Muhammad and participated in early Islamic politics. The party’s social program includes a call to end violence against women and reduce instances in which women are the sole breadwinners in a family. In early October 2011, the Light held a Salafi women’s conference in Alexandria. However, the Salafi vision of proper female involvement in political life is still fraught and a leading concern for Egyptians outside the Islamist bloc. Having a stake in political life has brought unprecedented discipline to the Salafi movement in Egypt. Immediately after the March 30, 2011 attack on Sufi shrines by Salafi vigilantes, for example, Alexandrian Salafi leader Abd Al-Minam Shahhat told newspapers that such criminal acts were completely impermissible for Salafis, who oppose the veneration of graves but do not advocate their destruction. This statement proliferated on Salafi websites, and attacks on Sufi shrines ceased. In May 2011, several leading Salafi preachers, including Muhammad Hassan and Muhammad Husayn Yaqub, formed the Consultative Council of Scholars (Majlis Shura Al-Ulama). Along with another Alexandrian Salafi scholar, Yasir Burhami, these figures have been highly influential in Salafi political activities, although they themselves are not candidates or officials in any party. This centralisation has led to increased control over messaging and public comments by Salafi scholars. They have been forced to take more responsibility for how their opinions are perceived by the general public and liberal opponents. This trend has continued since the first round of parliamentary elections. Salafis
  26
  had previously shown united support for the presidential candidacy of Hazim Salah Abu Ismail, a former Salafi Muslim Brother who since left the Brotherhood. Recent media appearances by Abu Ismail, during which he made controversial statements about women’s rights and Pharaonic artwork, however, led the Light party to officially state that he has no link to the party. Similarly, public statements made by Shahhat during his run-off campaign led the Light leadership to ban him and any non-official spokesperson from talking to the media29.
  c- Position of the Renaissance Movement Party.
  The position of any political party toward democratisation depends on its position toward “the other” who is different in opinion, culture and identity. But, at first, each country has to affirm its national identity which was done by Renaissance Movement in Tunisia. It underlined, in its program, through the main goals of the Tunisian revolution, the importance of establishing a democratic parliamentary independent political system which guarantees free press, the devolution and the balance of power30.
  Within days of Ben Ali’s flight into Saudi Arabian exile on January 14, an interim government filled with his appointees decreed a new organisation to craft procedures for a rapid presidential election, presumably aimed at allowing Ben Ali’s longtime premier, Mohamed Ghannouchi, to become the new chief executive. Soon, however, a strong, nonviolent civil society protest outside the prime minister’s office, as well as demands for full participation in decision making by newly emergent and solidly united groups within political society, secured a change of course. There would be a fresh entity comprising not Ben Ali holdovers but representatives from all parties as well as civil society. Generally known as the Ben Achour Commission after its chairman, attorney Yadh Ben Achour, this turned out to be one of the most effective consensus-building bodies in the history of “crafted” democratic transitions. It stands in particularly stark contrast with the situation in neighboring Egypt, where dictator Hosni
  29 Jonathan Brown, “Salafis and Sufis in Egypt”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 2011, pp. 8- 11.
  30 Renaissance Movement Program: For Tunisia Freedom- Justice and Development, December 2011, p. 6.
  27
  Mubarak fell shortly after Ben Ali but was replaced not by an open civilian body, but rather by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), with its penchant for attempting to manage fundamental political change by means of unilateral communiqués. In November 2011, the Commission had voted. Here are the main points they discussed at length and the decisions they made:
  1. The Commission members recognized that many changes were important for improving Tunisia and consolidating democracy. Yet they wisely took a “process-first” view and agreed to concentrate as a body only on decisions that were indispensable to the creation of a democratic government capable of carrying out reforms legitimately and with public consent. Key decisions thus concerned matters such as voting rules and guarantees of electoral freedom and fairness.
  2. The Commission decided that the first popular vote to be held would be to choose the members of a constituent assembly. As the name implies, this body’s central task would be to draft for voters’ approval a new constitution that would set up a presidential, a semi presidential, or a parliamentary system. This “decision to defer the decision” was important because an alternative course, such as early direct election of a president, would have lowered incentives for party-building as prominent national figures lined up to run as nonparty candidates for president (as happened in Egypt), and would have given whomever was the directly elected president great capacity to shape the still not fully formed constitution.
  3. The Commission agreed that the Constituent Assembly, as a legitimately elected body, should possess powers like those of a parliament in that it would select a government that would be responsible to the Assembly and be subject (as in the Indian and Spanish transitions) to its vote of no confidence.
  4. The Commission agreed that the electoral system would be one of pure proportional representation (PR). This decision was correctly understood to have crucial anti-majoritarian, democracy-facilitating, and coalition-encouraging implications. Had a Westminster-style “first-past-the-post” system of plurality elections in single-member
  28
  districts been chosen, Ennadha (Renaissance) would have swept almost nine of every ten seats, instead of the slightly more than four in ten it was able to win under PR.
  5. To help ensure strong participation of women in the constitution drafting process, it was agreed to aim for male-female parity in candidates by having every other name on the candidate lists be a woman’s. By all accounts, the first party to accept this gender-parity provision was the Islam-inspired Ennadha (Renaissance).
  6. To ensure that all the contesting parties would have confidence in the fairness of the electoral results, it was decided to create Tunisia’s first independent electoral commission, and to invite many international electoral observers and give them extensive monitoring prerogatives.
  In Egypt, by contrast, the SCAF initially barred international observers with the claim that they would be violating Egypt’s sovereignty. Eventually, the SCAF allowed entry to “election followers” (authorities insisted that they not be called observers) in smaller numbers and with weaker prerogatives than observers in Tunisia had enjoyed.
  7. On the issue of what to do with Ben Ali’s official party, the Commission decided to ban the party and some of its most important leaders from being candidates for the first election. However, in order not to exclude a large group of citizens from participating in the first free elections, the Assembly declared that former Ben Ali party members or supporters were free to form new parties. On 11 April 2011, approximately 155 members of the Ben Achour Commission voted on this package of measures to create a democratic transition. Two members walked out and two more abstained, but all the others voted for the package. The formal basis of a successful transition to democracy had been laid, providing a foundation for the October 2011 election31.
  In post- Ben Ali Tunisia no violence has occurred. Indeed, the country’s secular parties and Islamists have a chance to add to the
  31 Alfred Stepan, “Tunisia’s Transition: and the Twins Tolerations”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 23, No. 2, April 2012, pp. 92- 94.
  29
  world’s repertoire of ways in which religion, society, and the state can relate to one another under democratic conditions. Analysts often downplay the importance of Tunisia, overshadowed as it is by its much larger and strategically weightier neighbor, Egypt. But since Tunisia is so far the only Arab country to have met the four requirements of a democratic transition, analysts and activists alike should pay it more attention, especially for its example of how secular and religious actors can negotiate new rules and form coalitions32.
  At the end of this part, and according to many authors, it is important to underline that revolutions inspire change, or rather change can inspires revolutions. The United States and the European Union have seen that the Arab people were strong enough to fight against their oppressive regimes and that they are not going to be as receptive, as say Mubarak, to outside aid and influence. The approaches that the United States and the European Union have taken in the region have been different; however, they are linked in some ways. It is true that when the U.S. went into Iraq, it most likely did not expect to stay in there as long as it did. Establishing a new government after its people have been living under a violent dictatorship is difficult -both time and financially consuming. With the occurrence of the Arab Spring, the United States will have to rethink their approach to promoting democracy and what would be the best way to do it. The European Union can see this as an opportunity to establish new, stronger economic relationships to benefit both sides. For now, time will play an active role in determining what will happen next in the Middle East and North Africa. The European Union and the United States have many things to consider in terms of foreign policy in the region and the views presented here are related to a liberal viewpoint as well as highlight important concepts such as terrorism, international organisations and democracy33.
  4- Challenges to construct an Islamic model and its Resistance Internally and Internationally.
  The three political parties respect the balance of power; they are not ready for doing anything against their interest in power which is contradictory with their program and discourse in several occasions as mentioned above which means that
  32 Ibid., p. 101.
  33 Emina Ademovic, “The Arab Spring and a Liberal Analysis of US and EU Foreign Policies”, e-ir.info, June 13, 2012, p. 5.
  31
  they are able to change their discourse according to their positions by finding political and religious interpretations. This change means that their claim to Islam and democratisation does not exceed the general principles or the political discourse to the dialogue, the respect of other’s difference in culture and identity, and the submission of integration and coexistence model between all cultures which deserve more their intellectual effort and interest. So, the first challenge is an intellectual, religious and ideological challenge and it can be added to another challenges as; the ability of each political party to surpass its internal and external crises, its ability to surpass the expected clash with the secular wave, its ability to create a balance between their aspirations, their duties and the international balance of power. The fifth challenge is the challenge of incompatibility management real or expected, civilisational or strategic between the Islamic State project and many other countries and powers. The last challenge concerns the internal divisions and cleavages which can be faced by the political party34. All the previous facts do not prevent to affirm that the three political parties succeeded partially35, and could represent a good example if avoiding some weak points which means that they are able to either set democratisation, social justice or to establish deterioration and disturbance and that will be normal after forming any new system or after any political revolution.
  5- Conclusion.
  The aim of the study is to search about the role of Islam in the democratisation process and the difference between the discourse of the Islamic political parties and their practice of power. In this regard, this part consists of 2 main points; observations and recommendations:
  a- Observations:
  - When watching the policies of the Islamic political parties in Egypt and Tunisia after one year and 9 months, we can observe that the lack of democracy, equity and social justice are the reasons of these two revolutions and we can observe too that the Islamic political parties are slow in setting democracy, and they repeat their previous mistakes on the side of the political discourse and the international policy which
  34 Dr. Walaa Al-Beheiry and Aboul-Fadl Al-Esnawy, “Embarrassing Geography: How could Islamic Waves think in Regional Framework Dilemma”, Al-Syassa Al-Dawleyya Periodical Supplement, No. 188, April 2012, p. 34.
  35 Saiid Okasha, “Era of Doubt: Dilemma of Establishing an Islamic Model after the Arab Revolutions”, Al-Syassa Al-Dawleyya Periodical Supplement, No. 188, April 2012, p. 40.
  31
  means that Muslim brotherhood and Salafists are not able to make this transition yet and find a new Egyptian and Tunisian perspective on democratisation, or it is related to the local governments which are temporary and do not obtain all legitimacy yet which means that its policy is still in the making process.
  - It is important to put into consideration that the political will and the internal situation represent the first indicator when framing the stages to democracy.
  - Handling the problematique of democratisation depends on the respect and recognition of each other identity and cultural difference. Each one has to affirm his identity instead of marginalizing it by surpassing the clash memory and the culture of conflict to the establishment of construction culture through integration and interdependence which requires a new Islamic jurisprudence able to create a general frame of dialogue and coexistence.
  - The challenges faced by the new State, either in Egypt or Tunisia are not due to counterrevolution only, but due to lack of political experience and lack of methodology in applying Islam in political life.
  - The problem of the Islamic perspective is represented in applying the methodology (A thought crisis), while the problem of the Western perspective is represented in finding the methodology and a long-term theoretical framework (a methodology crisis) which allow it to assimilate and integrate the continuous development of interactions with the other. Differences in Islam allow people to understand themselves, others and their role in life, it is an integrated interactive difference which form the cosmic unity.
  b- Recommendation:
  - Activating the Islamic perspective on democratisation by setting a new jurisprudence and exerting a continual scientific effort at linking between theory and practice.
  List of References.
  1- Documents.
  - The Freedom and Justice Party Program.
  32
  - The Light Party Program.
  - Renaissance Movement Program: For Tunisia Freedom- Justice and Development, December 2011.
  2- Books.
  - Abdul- Fattah, Saif Al-Din (Introduction) and Osama Mogahed (Ed.): High Education in Egypt: Mapping Reality and Exploring the Future, Center for Political Research and Studies, Cairo University, 2006. (in Arabic).
  - Badie, Bertrand and Sadoun, Marc (éds.), L’Autre. Études Réunies pour Alfred Grosser, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, 1996.
  - Beetham, David (ed.) Defining and Measuring Democracy, Sage, London, UK, 1994.
  3- Articles.
  - Abou-bakr, Ami J., ” Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Why the Revolution Continues”, e-ir.info, August 23, 2012.
  - Aboul Enein, Ahmed , “Morsy brings back People’s Assembly”, Daily News Egypt, July 8, 2012.
  - Abraham, Abou Al-Abbas, “The Tunisian Revolution: Waiting for Lessons Completion”, Civilized Dialogue, No. 3250.
  - Ademovic, Emina, “The Arab Spring and a Liberal Analysis of US and EU Foreign Policies”, e-ir.info, June 13, 2012.
  - Al-Beheiry, Walaa and Al-Esnawy, Aboul-Fadl, “Embarrassing Geography: How could Islamic Waves think in Regional Framework Dilemma”, Al-Syassa Al-Dawleyya Periodical Supplement, No. 188, April 2012.
  - Badie, Hassan, “Islamic Future for North Africa and sinking of Francisation”, Cooperation Journal, November 15, 2011.
  - Barker, J. Paul, “Compatible? Incompatible? A Theoretical Analysis of Islam and Democracy”, e-ir.info, June 5, 2011.
  - Brown, Jonathan, “Salafis and Sufis in Egypt”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 2011.
  33
  - Byman, Daniel and Gold, Zack , “The Salafi Awakening”, The National Interest, June 28, 2012.
  - Hamzawy, Amr and Brown, Nathan J., The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Islamist Participation in a Closing Political Environment”, Carnegie Middle East Center, Number 19, March 2010.
  - Jesús, Carlos Echeverría, “Radical Islam in the Maghreb”, Orbis, Spring 2004.
  - Maggs, David, ” The Growth of Salafi-Jihadism in Gaza and Consequences for the Peace Process”, e-ir.info, July 1, 2011.
  - Okasha, Saiid, “Era of Doubt: Dilemma of Establishing an Islamic Model after the Arab Revolutions”, Al-Syassa Al-Dawleyya Periodical Supplement, No. 188, April 2012.
  - Rubin, Barry, “The Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Revolution”, e-ir.info, July 16, 2011.
  - Sherwood, Harriet , “Egypt-Israel border attack leaves over a dozen dead”, The Guardian, Monday 6 August 2012.
  - Stepan, Alfred, “Tunisia’s Transition: and the Twins Tolerations”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 23, No. 2, April 2012.
  - Stone, Lawrence, “Theories of Revolution”, World Politics, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1966.
  - Tanter, Raymond and Midlarsky, Manus, “A Theory of Revolution”, Conflict Resolution, Vol. XI, No. 3, 1967.
  4- Websites.
  - http://globalmbreport.org
  - http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2009/03/09/salafism-making-inroads-in-egypt/2fka
  - http://mottamar.com
  - http://www.cpr.tn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=101%3A-24-2001&catid=41%3Atextes-fondateurs&Itemid=70&lang=ar
  - http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/13/us-protests-idUSBRE88C0J320120913
  34
  5- Other Sources.
  - Prof. Mostafa Elwi Lectures, Course of International Relations Theory, PhD Program, Spring 2012 (Not Published).

• Local Governance and Democratization:
  The Roadmap for a Responsive
  Accountable Egypt
  Salwa Tobbala
  Faculty of Economics and Political Science – FEPS
  Cairo University
  Ph. D. Student (ABD)
  2010-Present
  Presented at:
  The London School of Economics and Political Science – LSE
  September 2012
  Salwa Tobbala/ Sep-2012 P a g e | 2
  Abstract
  As Egyptians took to the streets January 2011, they were expressing deep
  frustrations with a closed and centralized political system that was unwilling to
  open a space for meaningful public dialogue to meet the social and economic
  challenges facing Egypt. This paper aims to study democratization in transitional
  democracies in Eastern European countries, focusing on Poland, as they
  restructured their political and state systems as a reaction to the political and
  economic failure of the authoritarian centralized systems during the Soviet Union
  era. Moreover, this paper is an attempt to study the decentralization process in
  both Poland and Egypt as decentralization and devolution of power from central
  to local authorities is one of the priorities to make the state more democratic and
  efficient in delivering public services and promoting economic and social
  development. Finally, the researcher intends to draw on lessons learned from the
  Polish local administration reform through political, social and economic case to
  present a roadmap for the Egyptian initiative to implement decentralization and
  provide practical solutions for political, administrative and fiscal reforms.
  Salwa Tobbala/Sep-2012 P a g e | 3
  Table of Contents
  Introduction:
  ……………………………………………………………………………………….
  4
  “Bread,
  Freedom,
  and
  Social
  Equality
  “
  ………………………………………………………………………………..
  4
  What
  is
  today’s
  Democratic
  Governance?
  ………………………………………………..
  5
  Is
  Egypt
  Ready
  for
  Democracy?
  ……………………………………………………………….
  6
  Democratization
  through
  Decentralization:
  ………………………………………………
  7
  Poland’s
  Decentralization
  Case:
  The
  “Know-­‐How”
  ……………………………………..
  9
  Why
  to
  Decentralize?
  ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
  9
  Local
  and
  Central
  Institutional
  Arrangement
  …………………………………………………………………..
  10
  Local
  Government
  Revenues
  &
  Expenditures:
  …………………………………………………………………
  12
  Capacity
  Building:
  …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
  13
  Lessons
  Learned
  from
  the
  Polish
  Experience:
  …………………………………………………………………
  14
  Egypt’s
  Decentralization:
  Roadmap
  for
  a
  Responsive
  and
  Accountable
  Egypt
  .
  16
  Egypt
  Local
  Government
  Structure:
  …………………………………………………………………………………..
  16
  Egypt’s
  Shaking
  Transition
  2011-­‐2012:
  ……………………………………………………………………………
  17
  Opportunities
  for
  Decentralization
  in
  Egypt’s
  Democratic
  Transition:
  ……………………..
  19
  Donors’
  Role
  in
  Egypt’s
  Transition:
  ……………………………………………………………………………………
  21
  Conclusion:
  ……………………………………………………………………………………….
  22
  References:
  ……………………………………………………………………………………….
  26
  Salwa Tobbala/ Sep-2012 P a g e | 4
  Introduction:
  “Bread, Freedom, and Social Equality “
  At Tahrir Square during January 2011, the calls and slogans were
  concentrated on “Bread, Freedom, and Social Equality”. Egyptians summarized
  their frustration of the centralized, corrupt and failing government, which is
  unable to deliver services to its citizens. Egyptians united their call for a
  responsive accountable government capable of meeting the social and economic
  challenges of today’s world. Since 1952’s revolution and the military control over
  power, successive Egyptian governments have worked on depriving average
  Egyptian citizens from referencing their poverty to being deprived of their
  political rights. Moreover, The elite was dominating the wealth of the state
  through a corrupt system lacking an enabling environment for using youth talents,
  ambition, energy and denying their rights to an effective education system.
  Mohamed El Baradie, former director of the International Atomic Energy
  Agency, and considered by many Egyptian youth as the God-father for Egypt’s
  revolution, wrote on Twitter on January 13, 2011: “Tunisia: repression + absence
  of social justice + denial of channels for peaceful change = a ticking bomb.”
  Moreover, Egyptians and Tunisians both realized that their society’s economic
  problems are mainly caused by lack of political rights.1 The people reflected the
  above-mentioned issues in the uprisings of 2011. For the first time many of the
  poor Egyptians realized the casual link between democracy and poverty.
  Moreover, Egyptian youth identified the root cause of all their problems through
  lacking their political rights through today’s democratic governance systems
  1 Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2012). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power,
  Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Publishing Group. Print. pp. 2-3.
  Salwa Tobbala/Sep-2012 P a g e | 5
  prevailing in democratic countries. The corrupt institutions and the elite
  dominating political life with no hope of alternation of power caused Egypt’s
  economic problems. They also realized that the corrupt government is incapable
  of delivering public services to its people and is a root cause for the lack of equal
  opportunity.
  What is today’s Democratic Governance?
  Today’s democratic governance is known as a combination of both the
  values of democracy through a process of governance that involves interaction
  among actors representing the State, civil society and the private sector. The
  process of governance is therefore based on universally accepted principles
  ensuring the balance of power, checks and balances. The principles mainly
  include: participation, accountability, and transparency, rule of law, separation of
  powers, access to justice, subsidiarity, equality and freedom of the press.
  Moreover, democratic governance cannot work without these principles, since
  deficiency in power and freedoms will be a direct result if any of the above
  mentioned is missing. In addition, there will be loss of balance between the three
  powers: executive, legislative, and judiciary, which will consequently affect the
  checks and balances, and freedoms negatively.
  In addition to the balance of power, checks and balances, each society
  functions with a set of economic and political rules created and enforced by the
  state and citizens collectively. Political Institutions in a nation determines the
  ability of citizens to control politicians and influence how they behave and hence
  control the use of power entrusted in them. Institutions within a nation are the
  Salwa Tobbala/ Sep-2012 P a g e | 6
  cause of success or failure of the state.2 Moreover, states that apply democratic
  governance, its main citizens’ aim is for having a responsive, transparent and
  accountable government. In most developing countries poor people are lacking
  prompt, efficient public service including education and healthcare. An effective
  government should enable the state to deliver services more effectively to all its
  citizens, specially the poor.
  Is Egypt Ready for Democracy?
  A question that has been ongoing recently since the re-election of
  Mubarak in 2005 and even today after 2011’s revolution. For nearly 7,000 years,
  Egypt has operated as a unitary state with one of the longest histories of a
  centralized, top-down, decision-making process and traditions in the world. After
  1952 revolution, Nasser tended to increase centralization through the prevailing
  socialism spirit generated by the Soviet Union. Moreover, Egyptians have been
  deprived of their rights to participate in Egypt’s political life leading many
  Egyptians to lose self-confidence and accumulate ignorance of the meaning of a
  democratic state. This typical authoritarian type of centralized planning system
  and tightening of the military control over the state’s institutions and systems
  continued to persist up through Mubarak’s outset in 2011.
  Nevertheless, the early days of Tahrir Square proved that Egyptians are
  ready for democracy and youth led the calling for nothing but their participation
  in the decision making through a democratic governance system based on
  representative democracy. Egyptians risked their lives to outset one of the
  mightiest dictators in the Arab World in 18 days of peaceful protest. The people
  2Acemoglu and Robinson. pp. 42-43
  Salwa Tobbala/Sep-2012 P a g e | 7
  showed their call for a governance system that is delivering to its people. The call
  was for the Egyptians’ right for a democratic civilian state ensuring protection of
  civil rights, social justice, independent judiciary system, and retribution for the
  thousands of lost martyrs and freeing civilians from military prisons.
  In a nutshell, decentralization is one the reforms states need to adopt to
  recover from oppressive authoritarian regimes and move to a democratic
  governance regime. The road is not easy and the milestones need to be met. East
  and Central European countries passed through the same road of transition during
  the early 1990s during their transition from being socialist oppressed systems to
  today’s democratic governance systems as part of the European Union
  community.
  Democratization through Decentralization:
  Decentralization is a major reform to the state’s institutions promoting and
  implementing self-governance to develop the state’s institutions and enable
  citizens to exercise their civil rights. It is a fundamental reform during transitions
  aiming to expand and develop local self-government institutions.
  Increasing overall quality and effectiveness of the state’s governance
  system can be achieved with a consequent increase in the authority and capacities
  of subnational government levels. In addition, decentralization, when
  appropriately structured, provides an arrangement through which critical issues
  such as national unity and indivisibility are countered; ensures local development
  and equity in the distribution of resources, and hence local autonomy can be
  realized.
  Salwa Tobbala/ Sep-2012 P a g e | 8
  Contrary to authoritarian systems, in a decentralized system, the function
  of the state differs from controlling to setting macro development goals and
  monitoring performance of subnational governments to implement development
  strategies with a local perspective.
  Therefore, decentralization is not an objective in itself but a process to
  transfer functions, responsibilities and resources from the central authority to
  local governments. Decentralization’s aim is based on the subsidiarity principle
  bringing decisions closer to the beneficiaries at the most effective level of local
  government and therefore increasing effectiveness, transparency and curbing
  corruption.
  During transition to democracy from an authoritarian regime, the state
  should undergo major public administration reforms. Considering the shift of the
  relation between the state and its citizen from control to responsiveness, therefore
  the state’s administrative apparatus must undergo major shifts.
  In authoritarian governments as the communist states in Eastern and
  Central Europe, and similarly Egypt post Nasser’s era since 1952, the states
  control citizens and force them into directed behaviors by the political authorities
  and its security forces.
  In a democratic nation, the state is not superior to its citizen, but
  governments’ main objective is to serve its people and create an environment for
  development of its citizens. Therefore institutional reforms are a pre-condition for
  building democracy during transitional phases to allow for the inclusion of the
  citizens in the decision-making process.
  Salwa Tobbala/Sep-2012 P a g e | 9
  Many countries have made efforts to decentralize their political, fiscal and
  administrative systems. These efforts were met with varying degrees of success
  because each country responds in its own way to unprecedented changes and
  challenges in its administrative and political performance.3 Poland is considered
  one of the successful examples for decentralization with its 20 years efforts on the
  road to decentralization and democratic governance considering its growing
  economy and its developing democratic governance system among its peers from
  Central and East European countries.
  Poland’s Decentralization Case: The “Know-How”
  Why to Decentralize?
  By the end of 1989, and the fall of the former Soviet Union, as most of the
  Central and East European countries, Poland chose to decentralize decisionmaking
  aiming to achieve economic development and provide more effective
  service delivery at the local level. Consequently, decentralization and the
  3 United Nations Economic and Social Council (2006). Definition of basic concepts and
  terminologies in governance and public administration. New York.
  Salwa Tobbala/ Sep-2012 P a g e | 10
  devolution of power from the central to the local municipalities became among
  the priorities in changing the state to be a more democratic and responsive state to
  its citizens’ needs.
  Poland in 1990, created a legal environment to give Polish local
  governments the authority they needed to be able to meet their responsibilities as
  delegated by the central government and as required by their local communities.
  The main aim of Poland’s shift towards decentralization was to relieve the central
  government of their local responsibilities that they used to handle under the old
  communist system and to delegate the power of meeting local community needs
  to the democratically elected local councils.
  Local and Central Institutional Arrangement
  It was necessary for Poland to go through the different stages to achieve
  decentralization by implementing fiscal decentralization, devolution of
  responsibilities, better and effective management and more opening to public
  participation in the decision-making process. It is worth noting that the success of
  many Polish municipalities depended on their ability to respond quickly to the
  rapidly changing internal and external conditions.
  In 1989, the first change has occurred in relation to the major political
  change. The transition from centrally planned economy to market economy and
  non-democratic policy making to democratic decision making that required many
  decentralization reforms and introduction of a more decentralized and democratic
  local governments. This initial step also required administrative change and the
  establishing of about 2500 gminas (municipalities or commune) with the
  Salwa Tobbala/Sep-2012 P a g e | 11
  responsibility of delivery of basic communal services totally on their own,
  including the development of communal infrastructure.4
  The legislation changes of 1990 were of revolutionary nature while the
  later changes seemed to be gradual improvements within the general framework
  of an already created system. An enormous change has occurred inside the local
  governments with the newly elected officials since they were no longer having
  burden of the old centralized system and were looking for new and more effective
  ways to manage local services and develop local infrastructure.
  To illustrate, at the beginning of decentralization reform, Poland only had
  one tier of local government, the gmina, i.e. the basic municipal level of
  government. The municipal authorities obtained a substantial autonomy over
  resources and decision making with a much stronger political position in relation
  to what was experienced before 1990. Later in 1998, Poland witnessed a later
  stage of local government reform, and two other levels of local government were
  formed. Since then, the local governments have been operating on 3 tiers
  including 2413 municipalities (gmina), which are the basic local government unit,
  379 counties (powiat) and 16 regions (voivodship).5
  Yet, the constitution of 1997 was the main pillar to preserve the decision
  to shift towards a decentralized system. In Article 15, it stated that the territorial
  system of the Republic of Poland shall ensure the decentralization of public
  power. Moreover, it mentioned that the basic territorial division of the State shall
  be determined by statute, allowing for the social, economic and cultural ties which
  4 Kowalczyk Andrzej, Local Government in Poland, In Decentralization: Experiments And
  Reforms, Horváth, Tamás M (ed), Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2000
  5 Kowalczyk Andrzej, Local Government in Poland, In Decentralization: Experiments And
  Reforms, Horváth, Tamás M (ed), Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2000
  Salwa Tobbala/ Sep-2012 P a g e | 12
  ensure to the territorial units the capacity to perform their public duties. The
  constitution also designated chapter 7 to Local Government, and their autonomy.
  Therefore, the constitution safeguarded the autonomy of the local governments
  through their financial resources and capability to raise it.
  Local Government Revenues & Expenditures:
  The new divisions of functions and responsibilities included a new layout
  for collecting revenues and spending of expenditure.
  Own source revenues –
  Local Government has limited power of taxation. For most of local taxes,
  property tax and tax on agriculture are the most significant, Local Governments
  have limited discretion to decide over tax rates. Normally, there is a maximum
  ceiling rate and local council may decide for the local rate up to this ceiling. In
  2009 local governments own source revenue reached 48.6% of their budget,
  according to IMF and EU sub-national governments report.
  General purpose grant –
  is decided by the formula. The largest part is called “education subvention” and is
  no lower than 12.8% of central budget revenues. There is also an equalization
  element – received by local governments with own revenues below 85% of
  national average.
  Specific grants –
  there are either specific grants for current operation decided by separate legal
  regulations or specific grants for capital spending, which are distributed by the
  regional governor.
  Salwa Tobbala/Sep-2012 P a g e | 13
  As for the Polish local governments’ expenditures, according to the IMF
  and EU Sub-National basic facts, Poland local expenditures moved from 19 % of
  National Budget expenditures in 1998, to 20% in 1998 and finally reached about
  30% in 2006. This shows the development in the shares of local governments
  from the central budget and therefore an indicator of the economic improvement
  of service delivery at the local level.
  Capacity Building:
  The normal argument against implementing a decentralized local
  administration system is always focused on the risks faced through the low
  capacity at the local level. Therefore, while setting the decentralization strategies,
  capacity building is a cross cutting reform challenge to the three pillars of
  decentralization: administrative, political and fiscal. Poland’s National School of
  Public administration was a parallel reform to local governments capacity and
  image within a decentralized system.
  · Poland’s National School of Public Administration – KSAP
  A National School of Public Administration KSAP was established in
  1999 and was officially operating in 1991 known today as KSAP, the first
  institution in the post-Communist countries to be responsible for building the
  capacity of local governments. The first democratically elected government in
  Poland took the decision to establish this institution to prepare the capacities
  needed for local governments to implement local governance reforms through
  decentralization.
  Salwa Tobbala/ Sep-2012 P a g e | 14
  KSAP students are selected through a transparent and competitive
  recruitment procedure including criteria of an upper age limit of 32 and
  possessing a Master’s degree. Students are trained for 18 months and are
  obligated for employment in the central administration for a minimum of 5 years.
  The Prime Minister makes available posts to be selected by the students6.
  Establishing of KSAP was critical to implementing decentralization.
  KSAP was capable in changing the capacity of local governments and hence the
  success of local administration reform in Poland. Moreover KSAP’s success in
  meeting its objective to build the capacity of subnational governments countered
  the argument about low capacity of local governments and their inability to
  implement under a decentralized local administration system.
  Lessons Learned from the Polish Experience:
  Based on the Polish experience in implementing decentralization, the most
  common opponents to decentralization and institutional reforms were7:
  1. Central Administration:
  A natural opponent to decentralization since it limits the central administration’s
  right, power and authority. The shift of relation between the central and local
  level requires greater effort to control the local level through different legal and
  economic tools, in contradiction to normal hierarchy through a centralized system.
  6 KSAP official website http://www.ksap.gov.pl/ksap/
  7 A practical Guide to Building Local government, The Polish Experience, Jerzy Regulski, Local
  Government and Public Service Reform Institute, Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2010
  Salwa Tobbala/Sep-2012 P a g e | 15
  2. Fiscal Administration:
  Fiscal decentralization means autonomy of local resources and therefore loosing
  control by central governments over major portion of public finances. Ministry of
  Finance is therefore a major obstacle to fiscal decentralization.
  3. Politicians at the Central Level:
  Administrative decentralization limits the central authority over the subnational
  levels by cutting the hierarchy relations. Politicians’ power is limited in respect to
  affecting local administrative decisions.
  4. Leadership of Public Institutions and Enterprises
  Being part of the local subnational government, they are held accountable to local
  governments with closer supervision through the local communities, hence
  loosing their influence, independence and prestige. Reporting to the local level
  Mayor and not the central level Minister diminishes their self-esteem and status.
  5. Trade Unions:
  Acting as the negotiators with the central government by representing large
  number of workers, is a status that they lose under a decentralized system where
  the local authorities step in and political power is lost with central governments.
  Opponents to decentralization change based on the vested interest within
  each state. Losing power will remain the major criteria to opponents for
  decentralization and therefore it is very important to take opponents into
  consideration while designing the reforms looking for compromises to eliminate
  opponents through legislative or political routes.
  Salwa Tobbala/ Sep-2012 P a g e | 16
  Egypt’s Decentralization: Roadmap for a Responsive
  and Accountable Egypt
  Egypt’s Democratic Transition phase is very critical in designing its
  future. There are essential factors that should be assisted to ensure the success of
  the transition. These factors are mainly summarized in the existence of: political
  will, expert knowledge, social support for the reform, and adequate human
  resources capable of realizing the change.
  There is no one model for reform or implementation of decentralization,
  but deep analysis and thorough design of the reform accompanied by close
  monitoring and adjustment is the road for a successful implementation.
  Nevertheless, the three pillars of decentralization should be equally valued and
  footed during the decentralization strategy’s design phase to include: political,
  administrative and fiscal decentralization.
  Egypt Local Government Structure:
  Egypt’s local government system is largely a centralized hierarchy system
  with some deconcentrated features. The local administration system in Egypt is
  more of a local administration and not local governance structure. Although
  elected local popular councils are present at the different local levels, the
  hierarchy system within the elected and appointed local councils in addition to the
  non-defined roles and responsibilities represent the root cause of its
  ineffectiveness.
  Law 43 of 1979 is the law that governs local administration in Egypt. The
  following modifications increased localities to five levels by adding the hai and
  markaz (Kism), in addition to the governorate, city and village. Additionally, a
  Salwa Tobbala/Sep-2012 P a g e | 17
  council of governors has been created, headed by the Prime Minister and
  including all governors as well as the Minister responsible for local
  administration. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the system applied in
  Egypt is mainly administrative and executive, and has no political functions. 8.
  Egypt’s Shaking Transition 2011-2012:
  Post Mubarak’s outset on February 11, 2011, the Supreme Council for
  Armed Forces (SCAF) took over power until a new president was elected. SCAF
  was entrusted to run the transitional period with a non-bias towards all Egyptian
  movements, political parties and minorities through justice for all.
  Egyptians entrusted SCAF blindly to lead the road of democratic transition,
  which was routed with unclear goals and distorted political tracks. The transition
  period was characterized by lack of transparent transitional plans with no clear
  milestones. The route started with Constitution referendum in March 2011,
  Constitutional Declaration by SCAF, People Assembly’s elections (Lower House)
  November through December 2011, Shoura Council’s elections (Upper House)
  January-February 2012, Presidential Elections May 2012.
  In spite the fact that the Parliament was seated in January 2012, SCAF
  dissolved the Parliament in June 2012 based on the constitutional court decision
  of the unconstitutionality of the election of 1/3 of the members.
  From 2011 through 2012 Egypt’s path was distorted and unstable due to the
  lack of transparency and openness of the transitional phase. No clear milestones
  8 ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, Public Administration Country Profile, Division for Public
  Administration and Development Management (DPADM), Department of Economic and Social
  Affairs (DESA) United Nations, February 2004
  Salwa Tobbala/ Sep-2012 P a g e | 18
  was agreed upon or shared with Egyptians, political parties or youth movements.
  This situation resulted in continuous chaos, and deterioration in economic and
  social status.
  On the other hand, the transition resulted in a continuous deteriorating social
  cohesion, due to the rising power of the Islamists groups and their domination
  over the political seen with a majority in the Parliament around 70% to both
  Freedom and Justice Party (Moslem Brotherhood) 46.3 % and Al Nour Party
  (Salafists) 24.4%9.
  Finally Dr. Mohamed Morsi, FJP President, was elected as Egypt’s President
  on June 30th, 2012. This Islamists domination resulted in an escalated fear of
  Egyptians’ liberals, being Muslims or Copts towards Egypt’s identity as a civil
  state.
  9 European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity http://www.europeanforum.net/country/egypt
  Salwa Tobbala/Sep-2012 P a g e | 19
  Results of People Assembly’s 2011 Elections:10
  Party Percentage Seats in PA
  Democratic Alliance
  (incl. Freedom and Justice Party)
  46,3% 235
  (213)
  Islamist Alliance
  (incl. Al-Nour Party)
  24,4% 124
  (107)
  Al-Wafd 7,5% 38
  Egyptian Bloc
  (incl. ESDP*)
  6,7% 34
  (16)
  Independents 5,1% 26
  Felool parties 3,1% 16
  Al-Wasat 2% 10
  Reform and Development Bloc 1,6% 8
  The Revolution Continues
  (incl. SPAP and ESP*)
  1,4% 7
  Total of elections 98% 498
  Appointed by SCAF 2% 10
  Total in Peoples Assembly 100% 508
  Opportunities for Decentralization in Egypt’s Democratic
  Transition:
  A major factor of success to the decentralization process is the “Political
  Will” towards establishing a local democratic governance system, backed by
  social support for reforms through a transparent participatory National Strategy.
  10 European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity http://www.europeanforum.net/country/egypt
  Salwa Tobbala/ Sep-2012 P a g e | 20
  Reform opponents will always argue that society is not ready for
  democracy and not capable of practicing reforms. Low capacity at the local level
  will always be the excuse to stop reform. Accepting this argument will stop
  reform forever. This is in practice is unrealistic, as people learn by being
  authorized responsibilities and allowed for trainings to meet their new roles.
  People must understand the arguments for reform and the objective of their new
  responsibilities through a participatory decision that is inclusive for ideas.
  Learning democracy by doing is the best option for democratic
  governance reform during a transition. When changes are introduced properly
  and the reasoning behind the changes is understood, society can adjust and learn
  from the new opportunities very quickly
• …and I am Sid Harth@mysistermarilynmonroe.org